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LFP/vsl
July 21, 1975

No. 74-204, Weinberger v. Eldridge.

The purpose of this brief memo, dictated during the
summer, is to aid my memory as to the issues presented, and to
record my quite tentative reaction after a preliminary reading
of the opinions and briefs.

*· *****
This case (up from CA4), together with Weinberger v.
Williams, No. 74-205 (up from CAS), present an important question for the administration of the Social Security Disability
Insurance program.

In a brief summary, the question is:

Whether disability benefits under this program may be terminated without a prior adversary hearing, but purs~ant to regulations
which require written notice, opportunity
for reconsideration, and eventually an
evidentiary hearing?
We granted cert in this case (No. 74-204), and I believe
we are holding No. 74-205.

The two cases are substantially

identical, except the constitutional issue is more

sha~ply

presented here (No. 74-204), since it is conceded that HEW complied with the applicable regulations.
District courts in both Virginia and Georgia found

No. 74-204

2.

Goldberg controlling, and invalidated the regulations.

CA4

and CAS affirmed without opinions.
The question presented was before the Court in Wright
v. Richardson, 405

u.s.

208 (1972), but was not decided.

As

HEW changed its regulations, the Court vacated and remanded that
case to be reconsidered under the new procedures.

Procedure Under New Regulations
The SG's prolix and rambling brief (presumably written
by bureaucracy lawyers in HEW) purports to summarize the procedure (p. 27 et seq.), and also incorporates-- as Appendix A
a more detailed description of the procedure, copies of the
regulations, and certain statistical data.
As I unde rs tand it (subject to verification by one of
my clerks), the procedure which may result in termination of
disability benefits involves the following steps:
I.

Initial Determination.

The State welfare agency,

pursuant to the statute, has the initial responsibility.

It makes

a "continuing disability investigation," requiring periodic
reports, medical examinations, etc.

If there is reason to believe

disability has terminated, the available evidence is reviewed by
a "team" including a physician and trained disability examiner.

3.
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If they believe the worker is no longer disabled, he is notified,
given a summary of the evidence, and ten days in which to respond.
At this stage, the worker may be assisted by counsel or friends
who (according to the SG's brief p. 28) may "examine all the
evidence in the worker's file,

including medical reports." At

this stage, the worker may submit further evidence in writing.
The state agency forwards its determination to the Social Security
Agency's (SSA's) Bureau of Disability Insurance, which reviews it
for conformity with uniform national standards.
disagrees with the state agency at this point.

SSA rarely
If, as it usually

does, it accepts the Agency's determination, SSA notifies the
worker in writing, states the basis of the determination, and
advises the worker of his right to seek further review.
II.

Agency Reconsideration.

If the worker requests

"reconsideration," as he has the right to do, a different team
at the state agency

reviews the record de novo, considering

any additional evidence submitted by the worker.
III.

Evidentiary Hearing.

If the administrative

decision upon reconsideration remains adverse, the worker may
obtain an evidentiary hearing before an SSA administrative law
judge.

It is conceded (see pp. 3, 4 of _AFL/CIO!s brief) that

this hearing meets the minimum procedural due process standards

4.
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Goldberg.

Weighing the Competing Interests
Our cases establish that determination of "what
process is due" requires a weighing or balancing of the interests
involved, those of the individual and those of society as represented by the government.

See Cafeteria Workers; Goss v. Lopez;

Morrissey; Arnett; Wolff.
In brief summary, the worker is interested in not
having his benefits cut off unfairly.

Under the regulations, he

receives benefits for two months following the initial determination of non-entitlement.

The SG states that it now takes between

10 and 11 months for the full administrative procedure to run its
course, to and including the evidentiary hearing and the handing
down of a decision.

If the decision is reversed, benefits are

paid retroactively.
From the government's viewpoint, the principal interest
is the substantial additional administrative burden -- a further
enlargement in the . . . . bureaucracy administering welfare laws
with consequent expense.

Perhaps more important, is the interest

of society generally in having Social Security -- in all of its
vast ramifications

administered fairly, expeditiously, and

No. 74-204
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without undue ' increase in costs and bureaucracy.

In this

connection, federal funds necessarily are limited (eventually,
at least), and these funds should be preserved for the benefit
of those who need them most.

Goldbe~

This case is admittedly close to Goldberg.

The SG

emphasizes that disability benefits are not paid on the basis
of need, and that the need is not necessarily "brutal need" as
in Goldberg.

Respondent contests this.

·~

I am interested primarily in comparing the nature and
dependabi~ity

of the procedure for termination of disability

benefits with that which was held to be inadequate as to welfare
benefits in Goldberg.

I would like for one of my clerks to make

this comparison.
My tenhative view, at least, is that the procedures for
terminating disability benefits provide reasonable due process.
our society simply cannot afford to resolve every difference by
litigation.

BOBTAIL BENCH MEMO
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Gregory K. Palm
No. 74-204
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DATE:

September 15, 1975

v. Eldridge

This case, together with Weinberger v. Williams [No. 74205], presents the important question whether disability
benefits under the Social Security Insurance Program can be
terminated without a prior oral adversary hearing, but pursuant
to administrative procedures which include written notice,
opportunity for response and submission of additional evidence
prior to termination of benefits, and an opportunity for
reconsideration and finally an evidentiary hearing subsequent
to termination.

The courts below, relying almost exclusively

on Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), concluded that the
administrative procedures were inadequate and that due process
requires the opportunity to have an evidentiary hearing prior
to termination.

Although were it not for Goldberg I would

find it difficult to conclude that the administrative procedures
provided here are constitutionally inadequate, this case is
close enough to Goldberg to make a different result hard to
justify.

Since you are familiar with the interest balancing

analysis that is commonly applied to determine "what process
is due" in particular circumstances,as requested in your July
21, 1975

memorandum this memorandum primarily will concentrate

on a comparison of the nature and reliability of the termination

2.
procedures involved here with those found in Goldberg.

It

will also consi'der in abbreviated fashion what I perceive to
be the most important similaritie s and differences between
the competing interests involved in these cases.
The challenged procedures for welfare terminations in
1

Goldberg are subject to compact summarization.

Pursuant to

§ 353.26(b) of the New York Department of Social Services

Regulations, the New York City Department of Social Services
2

promulgated Procedure No. 68-18.

In accordance with that

procedure a caseworker who concluded that a recipient was no
longer eligible for assistance met with the recipient and
discuss ed the reasons for the proposed termination.

The

caseworker then prepared a notice of intention to terminate
assistance, and forwarded that form, along with the case record
to the unit supervisor.

The unit supervisor then reviewed the

case record and the termination form.

Apparently there was no

required consultation between the caseworker and the
supervisor.

Their only official contact with regard to this

matter was the transmittal of the case record and termination
proposal.

If the unit supervisor concurred in the caseworker's

recommendation, he then sent a written notice to the recipient
stating the reasons for the proposed termination and informing
him that within seven days he might request that a higher
official within the Social Services Department review the record,
and that he might support that request with a written statement
prepared personally or with the aid of an attorney or other

3.
person.

If the reviewing official affirmed the determination
'

of ineligibility, aid was terminated immediately and the
recipient was informed by letter of the reasons for the action.
There was thus no provision for a personal appearance by the
recipient before the reviewing official, for oral presentation
of evidence, or for confrontation and cross-examination of
adverse witnesses.

There was, however, provision for a post-

termination hearing before an independent state hearing officer
at which the recipient might appear personally, offer oral
testimony, and confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
him.

A record was made of this hearing.

If the recipient

prevailed, he received all funds erroneously withheld.

Judicial

review was also possible if the hearing resulted in an affirmance
of the termination of aid.
The administrative procedures applicable in the case
of Social Security Disability Benefit terminations are more
complex.

In order to establish initial and continued entitle-

ment to Social Security disability benefits the worker must
demonstrate that he is unable
to engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medical!~ determinable physical
or mental impairment whicli can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months • . . .
42 U.S.C.

§

423(d)(l)(A).

In satisfying this test the worker

must demonstrate, by means of "medically acceptable clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques", id.

§

423(d)(3), that

he has a physical or mental impairment, as defined in the Act,

4.
id. § 423(d)(3), that is of such severity that
he is not ' only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy,
regardless of whether such work exists in the
immediate area in which he lives, or whether a
specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether
he would be hired if he applied for work.
id. § 423(d)(2)(A).

The disability insurance program is

administered through an unusual combination of state and federal
agencies performing interrelated functions.

The Act provides

that the determination whether a person is under a di s ability,
when it began, and when it ceased shall be made by the state
agency administering the plan, 41 Stat. 735, as amended, 29
U.S.C. Supp. IIIM701 et

~.,

or by another appropriate agency,

pursuant to an agreement entered with the Secretary.

The Act

authorizes the Secretary to make the determination concerning
disability if the state declines to enter into such an agreement, but apparently all states have done so.
Petitioner 20 n. 18.

Brief for

The Act permits the Secretary to review

on his own motion and to reverse a state agency's determination
find
that a person is not disabled, or/that the disability began
later or ceased sooner than determined by the state agency.
42 U.S.C. 42l(c).

He may not, however, review a determination

that a person is not disabled.

The Secretary has delegated

his responsibilities under the Act to the Social Security
Administration.
5828.

See 40 Fed. Reg. 4473, amending 33 Fed. Reg.

5.
As in the case of welfare, eligibility is dependent
'

on the continu'e d existence of facts which satisfy the statutory
criteria.

By far the principal reasons for the termination

of benefits are that the worker is no longer disabled or has
returned to work.

Brief for Petitioner, App. A, 2a n. 3.

For auxillary beneficiaries, charges in relationships,
dependency status or age and completion of schooling are also
causes of termination.

The procedures followed in these latter

cases are significantly different from those involved here.
But those procedures are not of direct interest since this
case concerns solely a challenge to the administrative
procedures involved in the termination of benefits because
of medical recovery. Also not involved here directly are the
procedures for termination in "return-to-work" cases.

Those

cases do not necessarily or usually entail state agency
involvement mandated by the Act.

But since that type of

termination is one of the two most common under the Act and
since the return-to-work procedures are in many respects
similar to those provided in the case medical recovery-i.e. ,
neither provides for a pre-termination evidentiary hearing--

1~

' whatever is held with respect to the latter procedures will
3
also like affect the validity of the former.
According to

I

petitioner, the principal reasons for making such investigations
in particular cases are that a medical investigation had
been previously scheduled (as here), an employer has reported
earnings by the worker, or the worker has notified the Social

)

6.

Security Administration that his condition has improved or
he has returned to work.

'

See id. 2a-3a.

If there is reason
1
to believe there has been medical recovery a team consisting

----

-

of a PEYsician and a non-medical person trained in disability
"

.

evaluation reviews the available evidence.
municates with the disabled

wor~er,

The agency com-

typically by mail--in

which case he is sent an explanatory letter and a detailed
questionnaire to be completed and returned within 10 days,
Appendix to Petition 72a-75a [Form SSA-454a], or by telephone
and asks him to furnish information concerning:

his present

condition, his belief as to whether he is able to return to
work, any current medical restrictions, the sources of treatment
for his disability, the nature and extent of his employment
during the past year, and any vocational services he is
receiving.

SSA Claims Manual § 6705.1 ("CM"); Disability
4
Insurance State Manual § 353.3 ("DISM").
The worker is also

invited to submit any addi tional information that he considers
to be relevant to his continued entitlement to Social Security
benefits.

The notification letter, see Appendix to Petition

68a, also invites the recipient to direct any questions o: which
he might have regarding the questionnaire to the local SS
5
Office.
Unless there is a clear-cut evidence of medical recovery

6

the state agency will atiiempt to obtain information from
medical sources regarding the recipient's current condition.
DISM § 353.2(B).

For example, the investigatory team may have

7.
an independent consulting physician perform an ~xamination

~

of the benefictary, if there is a conflict between information
presented by the beneficiary or his physician and that obtained
from other sources.

DISM § 353.4.

Upon completion of this

investigation the state agency arrives at a tentative conclusion
regarding whether and when the beneficiary's disability has
ceased.

Id. §§ 353.2E, 353.5.

Whenever the agency's

assess- ~

ment of the severity of the beneficiary's impairment conflicts
with the beneficiary's own assessment, before the agency's
tentative determination becomes final the beneficiary is
(1) informed of the proposed adverse action-- ordinarily in
writing; (2) given a summary of the evidence upon which it is
7
based, followed by an opportunity for the worker or his
representative to review all the evidence in the worker's
8
case file, including medical reports, and to respond in writing
within at least 10 working days; (3) given additional time-to 30 days--if needed to obtain and submit supplemental
9
evidence in support of his claim. Id. § 353.6
Taking into account any response by the worker the state
10
agency then makes its determination.
If the determination
remains adverse to the beneficiary it must be supported by
specific findings and conclusions.

20 C.F.R. § 404.905(d).

The state agency then forwards its determination to Social
Security Administration (SSA) headquarters for review by a
disability examiner in the Bureau of Disability Insurance for
conformity with national standards.

42 U.S.C. § 42l(c); CM

~

8.
§§

6 701 (b), (c); Disability Insura"Q.ce Letter No,- II-46,
'

Brief of Petitioner 60a-6la.

If -as it usually does- the

SSA accepts the agency determination, it notifies the

-

-

--

beneficiary in writing, informing him of the reasons for its
l )

decision, as well as his right to seek reconsideration.
20 C.F.R. § 404.907.

to.

Because of the two-month grace period

during which benefits are ordinarily provided even after the
date the worker has ceased to be disabled, the immediate effect

)

of this determination upon the recipient varys according to
the relationship between the disability date and the date of
the SSA determination of cessation of disability.
J

By regulation the Secretary has provided that beneficiaries
may request reconsideration of the initial determination, even
if no new evidence is to be submitted.
generally id. §§ 404.909-.16.

Id. § 404.909.

See

A request for reconsideration

must be submitted within six months of the initial determination.

This period may be extended by the SSA for good cause,

or other reasons.

Id. § 404.911; see id. §§ 404.612; 404.953.

Reconsideration is initially conducted by the state agency,
but usually not by the same persons that handled the case
11
originally.
The beneficiary may submit new evidence.
Similarly the state may update its file by seeking addi tional
pertinent evidence such as current physical condition or
vocational position.

Again, the state submits its determination

to the SSA where it is reviewed in the same manner as the
original determination.

I

9.

SSA then notifies the beneficiary in writing of the
basis for its determination, which if adverse to the beneficiary,
is treated as a "determination" for the purpose of the statutory
right to a post-termination evidentiary hearing.
~nsideration

Id.

404.917(a).

§

must thus be sought before there can be 'an

evidentiary hearing.

This notification also informs the

~

beneficiary of his reasons for the termination, the right to
request a hearing, id.

§

404.915, such request to be filed

within six months unless the period is extended.

Id.

404.918.

§

At the hearing the beneficiary may submit additional or new
I

evidence of disability and the administrative law judge
'---

considers the record de novo even if no new evidence is submitted.

Id. 404.927.

The hearing is non-adversary and the

SSA is not represented by counsel or other staff.

As at all

other prior and subsequent stages of the administrative process,
however, the beneficiary may be represented by counsel or
other representative.

Id.

§

404.934.

The beneficiary is

'---

--

accorded an array of procedural rights at this hearing.
Brief for Petitioners, App. A, 12a.

See

It is generally conceded

that this hearing meets the minimum requirements of procedural
due process.

If the post-termination evidentiary hearing

results in an adverse decision, the worker still has the
right to request discretionary review by the SSA Appeal Council,
which may review the record de novo and may receive additional
evidence.

After an adverse decision or denial of review by

the Appeals Council, the worker may then obtain judicial review.

-

)
7

---

10.
Unlike all other prior levels of

r~view

the district court

is required to treat findings as conclusive if they are
supported by substantial evidence.

42

u.s.c.

§ 405(g).

If, at any point after payment of benefits has been
terminated, it is determined that the worker's disability
continued beyond the date of cessation established in the
initial determination, then the worker is entitled to retroactive payment of benefits in accordance with the subsequent
Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 423(b).

determination.

On the other hand,

if a beneficiary receives any benefits to which he is later
determined not to ber entitled, the Secretary may reduce any
other payments to which the beneficiary is entitled, or require
the payment of a refund, id. § 404(a)(l), unless the beneficiary
is "without fault" and such adjustment or recovery would defeat
the purposes of the Act or "would be against equity and good
conscience."

Id. § 404(b).

See generally 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.501-515.
Although one can pinpoint certain differences between
the nature of the procedure for termination of disability
benefits and the procedure for the termination of welfare
benefits held inadequate in Goldberg, there are also
important similarities between the two administrative systems.
Under the welfare termination procedure the caseworker first
met the aid recipient and, if he concluded termination of
benefits was appropriate, he then transmitted the case record
and a termination proposal on Form M-3c, see Goldberg

11.
Jurisdictional Statement, App. D.,, A48 (copy attached) to hi s
unit supervisor.

The supervisor then reviewed this information

and, if he concurred with the recommendation of the caseworker,
mailed the Form M-3c to the recipient.

Form M-3c would contain

a statement of the reasons for the termination of aid and
instructed the recipient that if he felt aid should be continued, he should check the box requesting review and return
the form to the Welfare Department.

He was also informed of

his right . to submit additional written evidence through an
attorney or other representative.

If the reviewing official

affirmed the determination of ineligibility, aid was terminated
immediately, and the recipient was notifed of the reasons for
the action and his right to an evidentiary hearing.
The disability benefit termination procedures differ from
the Goldberg welfare termination procedures in several respects.
When the state agency questions the continued eligibility of
a recipient it sendshim a detailed questionnaire, Form
(copy attached), which arguably enables him

SSA-4 54~

effectively ..._

communicate the types of information upon which the disability
benefit termination decision is to be based.

The questionnaire

format would seem to enhance the ability of the aid recipient
to present his "case" in written form.

The initial questionnaire

also informs the recipient that if he has any questions
regarding the questionnaire he can obtain aid at the local
SSA office.

Unless the worker's information, as well as the

i n formation provided by his physician or other sources which he

12.
lists provides clear-cut evidence of medical recovery the
DISM provides that the investigatory team must engage in
further investigation and develop current medical evidence.
See DISM

§

353.4.

For example, consultative medical examina-

tions may be required. Id.

§

353.4(A)(2).

If after engaging

in this investigation, the team concludes that the recipient
is no longer eligible he is notified of that fact, ordinarily
in writing, given the reasons for the disposition, and
informed that he has the right to submit additional information
through a representative and to seek review.

j he

Most importantly

is also given a qualified right to examine all of the

} m~ials in'his case file.

The only limitation is that, in

accordance with accepted medical practice for the protection
of the doctor-patient relationship, the worker is not permitted
to examine the medical evidence. But his representative is
lla
permitted to do so.
The ability to review the entire case
file should make the submission of additional written information a significantly more effective means of presenting his
case since the worker will have a much clearer idea of the
types and sources of information upon which the preliminary •
decision is based.

.vtl'f

Under this system it is possible to care-

fully e~·ne and question both the conclusions of the
investigatory team and the underlying data upon which those
conclusions were based.
Still, it is certainly not clear that these perceived
differences in the nature of the administrative processes are

/A/-~

13. )

enough to justify a different result here than in Goldberg.
I

The Goldberg majority's principal objections to the welfare
termination procedures would also seem to be in part applicable
to the disability termination procedures.

The central deficiency

of the welfare procedures was viewed as the failure to allow
the recipient to appear personally before the decision maker.
397 U.S. at 268.

It was felt that the only means by which

the welfare recipient might communicate his case to the
decision maker -written submissions, cr oral communications funnelled through the caseworker- were insufficient.

There was

no . opportunity to confront or cross-examine adverse witnesses.
Written submissions were viewed as deficient because they do
not provide the "flexibility of oral presentations" and do not
"permit the recipient to mold his argument to the issues the
decision maker appears to regard as important." Id. at 269.
Moreover, the second hand presentation to the decision maker
through the caseworker was regarded as deficient because the
caseworker -who usually gathers the information to support
the ineligibility charge -could not be relied on to adequately
present the recipient's side of the case.

These objections

also pertain here for the worker is never given the opportunity
to present orally. his case to the decision maker or to confront
~

------..../"'-

and cross-examine adverse witnesses.
distinctions are possible.

On the other hand several

First, the written submissions

here are arguably a much more effective means of communicating
the recipient's case than in Goldberg.

Both the detailed

14.
nature of the original questionnaire, and more importantly,
the right of the recipient to examine the evidence within
his file will enable him more readily to ascertain "the issues
the decision maker appears to regard as important."

Second,

unlike in Goldberg none of the information provided by the
recipient is being funneled to the decision maker through a
third party whose position and responsibilities in the
administration of the aid program made his adequacy as an
unbiased conduit suspect.

There is no information in the

Goldberg opinion as to whether the welfare recipient was able
to examine his case file.
opportunity.

Quite likely he was denied this

Thus although the process in Goldberg, unlike

the process here, did provide for oral communication between
the caseworker and the recipient, the benefit of this communication was sharply eroded by (1) the caseworker's role in the
termination process, and (2) the fact that the decision maker
was given the material in the case file even though the aid
recipient did not have knowledge of its precise content so
that he was unable directly to challenge the validity of
12
any information contained there.
By contrast such an
opportunity is provided him in the context of the termination
of disability benefits.

Since he is permitted access to the

full case file he is also able to specifically question the
validity of all information provided to the decision maker,
including the reports and conclusions of any physicians who
may have been consulted concerning his current condition.

15.
Of course, since his challenge is still limited to written
'

responses - there is thus no opportunity for cross-examination the adequacy of these procedures under Goldberg is uncertain.
It would also seem useful to consider whether there exist

) any

fun~ental

differences in the nature of the relevant

1 inquiry--i.e., types and sources of pertinent information-so as to make it reasonable to conclude that the Social Security
disability benefit termination cases are relatively more suitable than the welfare cases for resolution entirely by an
administrative process which depends solely on written communication.

The government argues that in contrast to the welfare

area "the specter of questionable credibility and veracity is
not present," even though there may be "professional disagreement with the medical conclusions.
402 U.S. 389, 407 (1971).

II

Richardson v. Perales,

Medical recovery terminations, like

the initial determinations of disability, rely heavily upon
"routine, standard and unbiased medical reports by physician
specialists concerning a subject whom they" have examined,
id. at 404, the general reliability and probative value of
which have been "uniformly recognized."

Id. at 405.

Moreover,

the government contends that the determination whether the
disability has terminated is made by a team of dispassionate
professionals in contrast to the welfare caseworkers who may
have had adverse personal confrontations with the caseworker.
Finally, unlike welfare recipients, disability recipients
generally have substantial recent employment experience.

16.

They also generally have more education.
missions are

t~us

The written sub-

'

not an unrealistic alternative.

These contentions are not without substance.

It does

seem that the importance of confrontation and cross-examination
may be less significant in this context than in Goldberg since
questions of credibility and veracity are substantially less
important.

The decision maker does in large measure base his

determination upon undisputed facts and there is arguably less
need for an adversary proceeding in which the conclusions of
the experts are attacked.

This is particularly so given the

access which the terminated recipient has to his case file.
Presumably the types of information that he will need to combat
the medical diagnosis and other information contained there
will have to be compiled by his own expert and will be equally
susceptible to written as oral communi cation.

Moreover, the

disabled worker would in general appear better able to
effectively communicate his case on paper than the average
welfare recipient.

This written communication ability is

complemented by the detailed nature of the questionnaire form
sent to the aid recipient.

His focus is directed toward types

of information that are most pertinent to his continued right
13
to disability benefits.
But there are powerful arguments which tend to diminish
the importance of these distinctions.

Many of them are

contained in Justice Brennan's dissent in Richardson v. Wright,
405 U.S. 208, 212 (1972), although his argument there is

17.
directed more broadly toward all

c~tegories

benefit termination procedures.

The Amici Brief makes the

of disability

important point that the disability termination assessment
turns on several factors, with contested factual matters sometimes being central to their resolution.

Id. at 10-13.

The

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit aptly summarized the
factors upon which a decision whether disability has ceased
may turn:
[T]here are four elements of proof to be
considered in making a finding of Claimant's
ability or inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity. There are: (1)
the objective medical facts, which are the
clinical findings of treating or examining
physicians divorced from their expert judgments
or opinion as to the significance of these
clinical findings, (2) the diagnoses, and
expert medical opinions of the treating and
examining physicians on subsidiary questions
of fact, (3) the subjective evidence of pain
and disability testified to by Claimant, and
corroborated by his wife and his neighbors,
(4) Claimant's educational background, work
history, and present age.
Underwood v. Ribicoff, 298 F.2d 850, 851- 852 (4th Cir. 1962).
See also Bi ttel v. Richardson, 441 F.2d 1193, 1195 (3rd Cir.
1971); Ber v. Celebrezze, 332 F.2d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 1964).
The Amici Brief cites additional sources which generally
support the proposition that the "substantive determination
of disability calls for an individual application of a set
of necessarily complex medical and vocational facts to the
definition of disability which is in the Social Security Act

''

Administration of Social Security Disability Insurance

Program, Prelim. Rep. Subcomm. on the Administration of the

18.
Social Security Laws, House Comm. on Ways & Means.
'

It would not seem possible to say with certainty that
the administrative process here is more or less dependable

I

than that in Goldberg.

My own conclusion is that the disability

14

benefits termination procedures are more "dependable."

This

-

is primarily because the system does appear to provide the aid
recipient with a more effective means of communicating his
"case" to the final decision maker.

The written questionnaires

facilitate the transmission of pertinent data.

The recipient

is somewhat more suited to communicating in written form than
the typical welfare recipient.

More importantly, much of the

information that needs to be transmitted will come from expert
sources other than the recipient.

These experts presumably

are capable of effectively communicating through written
documents.

Although, as the Underwood Court pointed out,

questions of fact and subjective testimony concerning areas other
than medical opinion are relevant to the question of medical
recovery, I think that since questions of veracity and
credibility play a significantly less important role, the need
for a hearing at which there is confrontation and crossexamination is less important.

Given the recipient's access

to his file, either he or his representative can prepare their
own submissions challenging any observations and conclusions
in the file with which they disagree.

This file access permits

the recipient to ascertain and focus upon the issues the
decision maker regards as important.

Finally, the entire

19.
disability benefits termination process appears to be substantially more thorough and systematic than that in Goldberg
where the single caseworker played such a critical role and
appear~to

have had more discretion with regard to the nature

and extent of the eligibility investigation.
Unfortunately, any conclusions that I might have regarding
the relative dependability of these administrative review
processes are not supported by any hard data.

In Goldberg

there was no discussion of the precise accuracy of the pretermination evaluation process.

The Court merely concluded

that the stakes were too high for the welfare recipient and
the possibility of error too great to allow termination of
aid without affording the aid recipient the opportunity to
have an evidentiary hearing.

397 U.S. at 266.

By contrast,

here the parties have provided statistical information con~

cerning the accuracy of the administrative procedures.

The

government cites primarily data derived from initial disability
cases which it contends are reasonably representative of the
pattern in termination cases.

Brief for Petitioners 31 n. 36.

For example, in fiscal 1973, there were 575,3000 initial
determinations adverse to worker's initial disability claims,
but claims were allowed as to only 61,900 on reconsideration,
only 24,100 after evidentiary hearings, only 1,918 after
review by the Appeals Counsel (318 after remand from the
courts), and only 172 by the courts.
43 at n. 47.

Brief for Petitioners

From these statistics the government thus

15
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emphasizes that a total of 88,090 claims were allowed after
post-termination review, which constituted only 15% of the
claims initially denied that year.

The government also argues

that even this theoretical reversal rate is deceptively high
since the program is operated on an open-file basis and a
particular termination may be entirely justified, but later
be reversed because of the introduction of new evidence.
Respondents contend that since the Court is being asked to
decide only whether those disabled workers who request an
evidentiary hearing are to be granted that hearing at the
pre-termination stage the only pertinent statistics are the
reversal rate of appealed denials of benefits after an evidentiary
~earing.

As the amici curiae

note in their brief, in

1973 58.6% of all appealed decisions terminating disability
benefits were reversed following evidentiary hearings while
in 1972 the reveral rate was 54.7%.
7-8.

Brief for Amici Curiae

Certainly these reversal rates are not insignificant.

Cf. Fusari v. Steinberg, 43 U.S.L.W. 4121, 4122 (January 14,
1975) (reversal rate of appealed denials of unemployment
benefits of between 19.4% and 26.1% are "significant").

Of

course, neither the appealed reversal rate nor the overall
reversal rate statistics alone provide a meaningful basis
for assessment of the administrative process.

The latter

statistic fails to take into account the many aid recipients
who although erroneously denied benefits for some reason fail
to contest that decision.

Similarly the former statistics

t(
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are no doubt unduely weighted by the fact that a disproportionate

. . LL
number of recipients with strong cases appeal, while those who -r"'
J/Yv-have correctly been denied benefits fail to do so.

Viewed in

combination, however, it is difficult not to conclude that there
is a significant chance of error in the initial determination.
Another very relevant statistic is the percent of adverse
initial terminations which result in reversal after reconsideration.

This statistic is particularly important since the

reconsideration decision is made much sooner after the initial
determination than the evidentiary hearing.

Presumably then,

if the bulk of the reversals occur at this stage of the
administrative process, then the real harm to the wrongfully
terminated recipients is substantially less.

The government

claims that it has no precise data concerning disability
terminations, but cites data concerning adverse initial determinations in disability cases which show that the bulk of the
reversals occurs at the reconsideration stage.

In 1973, for

example, of about 35,000 adverse initial determinations, in
only about 9,000 (25%) was reconsideration sought; in about
39.5% of reconsiderations in initial disability cases the
decision is favorable to the worker.

Of the 5,600 adverse

decisions after reconsideration in disability cessation cases,
in only about 1,900 (34%) was a hearing requested; after a
hearing in the initial disability cases in about 40-50% the
decision is favorable to the worker.
16
App. A lOa-lla nn. 21, 24.

Brief for Petitioners 31;

22.
These numbers are meaningless, however, unless one also
considers the rapidity of the administrative review provided.
The Amici Curiae contend that disabled workers who dispute
their claims must wait approximately 12-15 months for an
evidentiary hearing and that no benefits are paid during this
period despite the fact that approximately 55% of those who
appeal are so disabled that they are unable "to engage in any
substantial gainful activity."

Brief for Amici Curiae 8.

In Fusari where there existed a 126-day delay between the
initial decision and administrative review the administrative
appeal system was noted as "torpid".

43 U.S.L.W. at 4123.

The delay figures cited by Amici, which were derived from a
March 7, 1975, letter from the Secretary pertain to all types
of Title II disability cases, including initial and cessation
decisions.

App. A, 4a.

According to his letter individuals

now requesting o. hearing may anticipate a waiting time of
between 10 and 11 months.

Since the evidentiary hearing may

only be requested after reconsideration, it is thus quite likely
that 12-15 months will elapse between the initial decision to
terminat 'j~Jhe hearing.

But this situation is ameliorated

somewhat by the fact that the mean length of time between the
filing of a reconsideration request and a decision is only
86 days

•

wh~le

the

is only 68 days.

~iaV\
Me8ft leng~n

of

•

t~me

for such an interval

In his letter the Secretary contends that

even these numbers somewhat overstate the length of the delay
in cases such as this--where the original denial is affirmed

77
I
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and notice thus originates directly from the state agency,
'

instead of being prepared by the SSA. In those cases he
time
estimates the mean and median/periods are 50 and 46 days.

It

is not clear, however, that these statistics are that illuminating
since they are based on all Title II programs and all types of
reasons for termination of benefites, including reasons such
as attainment of age 18, marriage, or cessation of full time
school employment.

It would appear reasonable to conclude

that assessment of any of these

~ter

factors may be substantially

less complicated than the inquiry necessary to ascertain
whether medical improvement has made a particular aid recipient
ineligible under the dis ability benefits program.

This theory

is borne out somewhat by the statistics cited by the government to the effect that in April, 1974 the median processing
time for all disability cases (including initial applications
and terminations) were 74 days for reconsiderations resulting
in affirmances and 105 days for reconsiderations resulting in
reversals.

Brief for Petitioners, App. A lla n. 22.

Based

on these statistics I think a reasonable estimate of the
current time required to process a reconsideration request
would be 2.5 to 3.5 months.

Ten to eleven months additional

time would then be require before an evidentiary hearing
would be provided.
Whether these delays are regarded as too lengthy in the
context of the rather small percentage of cases overall which
are reversed and the rather large percentage of appealed cases

24.
which are reversed either after reconsideration (39.5%) or
later after an evidentiary hearing (55.0%) is dependent in
part upon one's perception of the i mportance of the recipient's
interest in uninterrupted benefits and the coststhat would
be imposed upon government (society) should an evidentiary
hearing be required prior to termination of any benefits.
Even though the figures cited by the government concerning
the administrative costs that would be involved were it required
to provide a pre-termination evidentiary hearing upon request
to terminated disability recipients are inflated, see Brief
for Amici Curiae 20-23 (failure to account for possible
elimination of the post-termination hearing or decrease in the
current 10-11 month waiting time prior to hearing; possibility
of recoupment of overpayments . . . . ) a reasonable conclusion
is that some not insignificant addi tional costs will likely
be incurred by the government.

Still, the respondents and

amici emphasize the important point that the government's
sole interest here is increased administrative cost.

The

government interest is thus analogous to that in Goldberg
and distinguishable from that in cases such as Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (adverse effects of prolonged
retention of a disruptive employee) (Powell, J., concurring).
But while the only interest directly implicated here is
increased administrative costs it should be recognized that
other important interests potentially are affected.
Procedural requirements

ent~l

1 the expenditure of limited

25.
resources.

At some point the benefit to individuals from an
'

additional safeguard is substantially outweighed by the cost
of providing such protection.

Most importantly, the cost of

protecting those likely to be found undeserving will probably
come out of the pockets of the deserving, since society is
unlikely to be willing to allocate more than a fixed amount
of its limited resources to a particular welfare program.
Thus in determining what process is due one should not
depreciate the importance of increased administrative costs
for any increase in these costs eventually will affect the
level of substantive benefits provided.

While lower

administrative costs cannot justify an arbitrary decision
making system, since both society and _eligible _recipients have
a valid interest in en suring that qualified recipients are
not erroneously terminated, due process should be flexible
enough to permit something less than a full evidentiary
hearing whenever the government denied the individual some
benefit.
The remaining question is the relative importance of the
benefit provided to the recipient and the potential effect of
an erroneous denial on his well being.

The government contends

that an evidentiary pre-termination hearing was required in
Goldberg because of the "brutal need" of welfare recipients
for uninterrupted benefits.

By definition a welfare recipient

is destitute, without assets or funds.

The government argues

that this rationale is not transferable to the disability

26.
benefit context since these benefitp are not

pr~vided

on the

basis of any demonstrated need and, in fact, a recipient may
have substantial independent resources.

Alternatively, he may

be eligible for other forms of social welfare assistance during
the period in which his disability benefits are erroneously
terminated.

To be sure disabled workers as a class are not

as bad off as welfare recipients.

Still, the respondents and

amici persuasively argue that most disabled workers are almost
wholly dependent upon their disability benefits.

Amici cite

the fact that in 1965 the mean income of the family unit of a
disabled worker was $3,803.00 while in that year the official
government poverty line was $3,223.00.

Moreover, they cite

studies which show that 90% of the severely disabled workers
have no earnings whatsoever.

Brief for Amici Curiae 14-15.

Still, the same 1965 statistics also show that the mean
financial assets of disabled workers' family units was
$4,862.00-~ile the median for a similar group was only $940.00.

the existence of this asset reserve makes the disabled signficantly
more able than a welfare recipient to withstand a two-four
month waiting period for the reconsideration decision, or
possibly even the much longer period before obtaining an
evidentiary hearing.

On the other hand, a recipient who is

wrongly terminated is, by definition, unable to engage in
any substantial gainful activity.

The effect of delay on such

a person and his family may well be serious.

Moreover, as the

amici note, there is certainly no assurance that a terminated
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disability recipient will automatically qualify for some
alternative wel:fare program.

Id. 17.

'

Again, his situation

is likely better than the average welfare recipient and the
administration procedures here prior to the evidentiary hearing
are arguably better than those present in Goldberg.

But given

the significant rates of reversal, the proBable importance of
the benefits to the welfare recipients, and the great emphasis
in Goldberg on the need for and value of an oral evidentiary
hearing with the right to call and cross-examine witnesses it
is difficult to conclude that consistent with Goldberg, the
administrative review system here satisfied due process.

On

the other hand, there are enough distinguishing features so
that an opinion could be written which, without explicitly
overruling Goldberg,

would sustain the disability

termination procedures based on the many distinctions developed
above.
Should the Court hold that some form of pre-termination
hearing is required here I think it most important that it
consider carefully precisely what type of hearing is demanded
in this context.

The answer, of course, is dependent upon

whether any other prior and subsequent administrative review
processes are provided and their content.

The chief difficulty

which I have with the Goldberg decision is not its requirement
that some type of pre-termination hearing be provided but its
insistance that the form of the hearing so closely duplicate
a criminal or civil trial.

Due process would seem more

28.
flexible than this.

See generally Joint Anti-Fascist Committee
'

v. McGrath, 34t U.S. 123, 171-72 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 Penn. L. Rev.
1267, 1277-1305.

Although it certainly may be infeasible for

the Court to lay out precisely what due process will demand
at a minimum in this context, I think that the point should be
made that the state is not locked into the trial-type format
mandated in Goldberg.

Greg
ss
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FOOTNOTES
1.

Justice Brennan's opinion for the majority contains

an accurate summary of the termination procedures.

A more

detailed description may be found in the district court opinion
and the Jurisdictional Statement.

See Goldberg Jurisdictional

Statement 4-5; A8-Al2; A-39-40.
2.

Attached is a copy of that Procedure, as well as the

written notification forms sent to welfare recipients.
3.

For a summary of the procedures involved in return-to-

work terminations see Brief for Petitioners, App. A, 14a-15a.
4.

If no response is received, an appropriate follow

up is made (by mail or telephone) within two weeks of the
initial notification.
5.

DISM § 353.33B(l)(a).

Attached is a copy of Form SSA-454a, as well as a

copy of a model notification letter.
6.

Clea~ -cut

evidence of medical recovery is deemed to

exist when a beneficiary who was scheduled for a medical
reexamination returns to full-time work without any significant
medical restrictions.
7.

DISM § 353.2B.

Such summaries of the evidence are "tailored to

individual case situations and . . . prepared in such a
manner as to enable beneficiaries to understand better the
reasons for cessation."
8.

DISM § 353.7A

The state agency is obliged to insure that medical

source evidence used to establish the absence of continuing
disability is in writing, with the source properly identified.
DISM § 354.4C.

b.

9.

The worker is currently not permitted to examine

medical evidence, although his representative is permitted to
do so.

CM § 7314.

~Q .

DISM § 353

See also 20 C.F.R. § 401.3(a)(2).
specifies the format and content of the

notification letter.

The state is given the option of developing

its own letter in accordance with the guidelines, or adopting
the "model letter" which is contained in subsection B.

No

information has been presented as to whether the states have
generally opted for one alternative in preference to the other.
10.

The government concedes that state agencies generally

do not interview the worker.

Brief for Petitioner, App. A,

7a n. 15.
11.

Neither the CFR, the CM, or the DSM anywhere

specifies that the reconsideration determination must be
performed by persons other than those who evaluated the case
in the first instance.

Petitioner cites an observation by

Robert Dixon in Social Security Disability and Mass Justice:
A Problem in Welfare Administration 32 (1973) to the effect

that different persons usually perform the rehearing function.

Mr. Dixon made an extensive study, commencing in 1970, of the
social security disability aid program as a consultant to
the Committee on Grants and Benefits of the Administrative
Conference of the United States.
lla.

The importance of this limitation is uncertain.
~without extert assistance1
On the one hand,tthe worker. likely wou d be unable to evaluate
effectively or to refute significant portions of the medical

c.

information within his case file.

But, assuming that many

workers will be unable to afford counsel or consultative medical
experts, they will be denied the opportunity to

chal ~ enge

certain forms of quasi-medical evidence- i.e., probable extent
of pain and suffering, or probable limitations on worker's
ability to engage in certain types of physican activity,
resulting from a particular medical disability.
12.

Although the parties do not focus upon this issue,

a subsidiary question is whether the investigation team can
provide the worker with a "fair hearing" since it necessarily
performs a dual investigatory/adjudicatory role within the
administrative system.

I think that it can perform such a

dual role consistently with the dictates of due process.
But this conclusion is not unassailable since one can draw
an analogy to the caseworker in Goldberg and argue that there
is a significant danger that these teams will come to view
their role more as an investigatory adversary than a neutral
fact-finding body.
13.

A related point is the fact that unless the worker

is represented by counsel the value of cross-examination and
oral confrontation in these circumstances is substantially
less than in the Goldberg context.

As Judge Friendly has noted:

One wonders how Pedro Pe ~ales in his claim for
Social Security disability benefits could have
effectively subjected specialists in neurosurgery,
neurology, psychiatry, orthopedics, and physical
medicine to the "ordeal of cross examination"
vaunted in Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent - a task
shunned by most lawyers without special experience
and often regarded as unproductive even by them.

d.
Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1285
(1975) (citations omitted).

Of course, this same logic can be

used in support of the proposition that free counsel should
be provided in these circumstances to workers who cannot afford
retained counsel.

Counsel may be thought particularly important

since the worker is not afforded access to the medical reports
in his file.
14.

Alternatively I would contend that if a pre-termination

evidentiary hearing were added to the administrative process
here, the marginal improvement in the accuracy of the eligibility
determinations would be less than that achieved by the hearing
requirement in the Goldberg context, and the incremental cost
arguably more.
15.

It is difficult to determine whether this

comparability assertion is valid.

Examination of the Congres-

sional Report from which these figures were derived reveals
that of the 575,300 cases initially denied, only 362,000 were
denied for failure to meet the disability test.

Staff Rep. on

the Disability Insurance Program, Connn. on Ways and Means, 93
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)

Arguably a substantial majority of

the other denials were based on the recipient's inability
to satisfy certain more objective cirteria, and therefore
the "reversal rate" in those cases might be significantly
lower than the combined average which is cited by the government.

As a consequence the reversal rate in the relevant

category of cases- those involving medical recovery- might
be significantly higher than 15%.

e.

16.

Again, these statistics are based on all disability
'

cases, not just the limited subject in which we are directly
interested.

See note 15 supra.
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For lJUrpo ses of this vrocedurc, this
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Appendix JJ . - Nrhibit 1 to C01um. Goldberg's Affidavit
2. In situations, of11er than those listed below, noti.
ficn.tion n111st be sent to t1Je di cnt of the intent to suspend
or c1isconi inue nssistmwe seven (7) cnlcncbr days p1ior 1o
the plmmecl effective elate of such nciion.
a.

death of unattacheu person

b.

admitted to institution (mental, penal, correctional,
etc.)

e.

client's request for discontinuance of assistance

d.

client's whereabouts unkno\vn and there is no for.
warding address

e.

client has left the State vcrmanently

f.

reclassification a.s to category

\

'.

.\

3. Upon reecipt of info-rmation that the client requests
an administrative review, the case shall be forwarded to
the Review OHiccr along ·with all written material submitted by the client.
4. The Review Officer shall promptly review the ca.<:e
reeord, the recommendations of the Cn se Unit and the
written material, if any, submitted by the client ·with his
request for a rev1ew.
5. Immediately after such rev1ew, the R.eview Officer
shall make an appropriate written determination as to
whether or not assistance shall be discontinued, detailing
the relevant facts and including all evidence submitted at
the time of the review, ns ,,·ell as any reference to· applicable proYisions of the Social Services Law, Rules of tht'
State Board of Social Welfare and Regulations of the
State Department of Social Services, and approved local
policy.
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II.
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Publi\· Assistance

Case Unit
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Discontinue Public Assistance
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H• •c· ords, in detail, discussion ·with the client and
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Ap

Caseworker

HeYi

3. Forw<nd -. ca.se record ancl all copies of Fonn M-3ct
together wi1l1 a return envelope identified with cnscload
number, to Unit Supervisor.

mate

Unit Supervisor

duel

4. Reviews case record and Form M-3c. If in agreement, signs case record entry and Form ]\[-3c. Arranges
for immeLlinte mailillg of two eopies to the client and
retains one copy in case rec.ord. Controls Forms ~I-3c
and date of their return on separate Form vV-708, headed
"Proposed Suspension or Disconiilluance of Assistance~'.

Soci

7.

llll'lll

Lleie

\\'el

Soci

polic
n..

I in n
\\'a n

Unit Supervisor

the
the

5. Heview!' Form \Y-708 daily. If client fails to
respond to Form ~[-3c, within the seven days provided or
indicates agre ement to have bJ.s case closed, instructs
Caseworker to prepare the necessary forms for closing
action in accordance with currc:nt procedure, using Form
M-3h.

Unit Supervisor

i

6. If the client requests a rev1e1v, makes appropriate
entry on Form \V -708; immediately forwards the case
record with any written doc.uments, releYant to the proposed action, submitted by the client, to the Review
Officer.

Nate: '1 he Case Unit is responsible for all service to

for
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the client pending the review and receipt of the determination from the ReYiew Officer either to close the ease
or continue assistance.
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Appendix D--E:rltiuit 1 to Cunzm. Goldberg's Affiduvif.
ReYiew Officer
7. Immediately reviews the case record and written
material, if any, submit ted by the client, and prepares a
memorandum, ::;etting forth the relevant facts and his
<.letcrmination to continue or discontinue as::;istancc, inclnclillg <my reference to <"])plicable provisions of the
Social Senice::; Law, Rules of the State Board of Social
Welfare and Regulations of the State Department of
Social Sen·ices (sec App endix), and approved local
policy.
a. If thC' determination is that assistance shall be continued, vrq1a.res the memorandmn, in triplicate. Forwards ori g i11al copy of memorandum with ca se reeord to
the appropriate Case Unit; forward s duplicate copy of
the menwr:lJJ dmn to Center Director; retains third copy
for own file.
b. If the determination is that assistance shall be discontinued or suspended, prepares mcmorandmn, in quintuplicate. H.Ptains one copy for own file; forwards original copy of memoran(lnm with c·ase record to the appropriate Cn ::;e Unit; for\\'arcls three copies to the Director's
office where one copy shall be retained in file, and two
copies forwrnded to the Fair Hearings Section, Ccntrnl
Office, one for the Commissioner's file and one for the
State A1·ea Office.
)

Unit Supervisor

•

l

.I

8. On receipt of llctcnnination of the Review Officer,
makes appropriate entry on Form \V-708. Forwards
case record nud all material to the Caseworker for
appropriate action and controls to insure prompt action.

...

-.· '
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Caseworker.
9. Takes appropriate action to conii11ue or discontinue
assistance; preptncs appropriate letter to client \\ith a
copy to his attorney or representative, if any, and one
copy to be retained in ease record; makes case cnt n
detailing action takes; prepares required forms to carry
out appropriate action in accordance with cmrent procedure.
LEGAL BASIS FOR, CLOSING CASE
State Department Regulation 351.26 requires that aft er
the review, the reviewing officer's decision shall include reference to applicable provisions of lmY, rules of the Sbir
Board of Socia.} \Velfare, regulations of the State Department of SociR.l Services nnd approved local policy.
The Social Services Law, Board of Hule:::; and Department regulations giYe tbe Commissioner authority upon
completion of an inYc:::;tiga.tion to suspei1d, increase,
decrease or revoke a grant in cases where such action is
based on the clement of Deed, as follows:

SOCIAL SEHVICES LAW
Section 134-" Snell person shall be visited.
., in order
that assistance or care may be t,ri.ven only in such amount
and as long as is necessary.. .. " (All catt·gories)

I
.I

I
I

j

I

Section 214 ( OAA)-" ... the amount and mmmer of
giving assist.anee may be changed or the assistance ma:·
be withdrawn if such officinl finds that the recipient 's- circumstances have changed sufficiently to warrant such artion. It shall be within the power of the social sen-ice~
offic.ial at any time to cnncel and re\·oke assi.s1 Ftncc for
cause, as he may deem proper, . . . "

A45
I

I

, l/'l'' 11 di.r

·or di l' <'oJtlin .,,
cli('ll \ 11 itlt ..
any, and !l! ,<
es ea~e t•nt 1)
)l111s to

c:t l'1)

nrcn1 Jl l"llt'' .!

ASE
·cs thnt aft.-:
1ll inc1nt1 l' rl r.
; of 1lll' ~t.il
Statc> D,•patl ·
10Jicy.
:md l)1·par\
1ihoriiy npo1 :
nd, ilH'Il' :l '• t,
mel! :tl'l ion I·

n

.I

!--'.~ l1il;it 1 to Cum111. Go!dbert!'s Aj}idavit

,.
·'<..;li(:2) (.\13) - -'' 'l'lw :tlllOtmt nncl nature of the
,.; , ., tllll - ·
' ' _. .. t:tllt't' :tnd ihl' JJJ< lllll l'l' of pro,·idiltg it shall be deter;•·. ). I ]J\' j]J(' ~o<'inl f..(•)'\ 'i C'CS omciHl with due· n·garcl to the
tH t iP''
·
.
.
.
•
il ion~ e:-:i shng m rnch u1 sc nnd m :t(·.c·orcbnce w1ih
l
•
)11
11
..... ]-JiioJJ S of the Dq)m·tmcmi."
1lII' It,.., 11 •
~ ..·tioll :103, subdivi:"iou (2) (AD) - "'l'h0 :1HJOunt and
• , lll'l' of tlte aiel [tJHl 1hr manner of providing it shall be
11
,\ ; krlllill('l1 h~- ih e socird s<~ JTiccs officials with due r egard
111 tin• t•ontlitions existi11g in the case in nccorclm1ce ·w ith
tlw pn1\· i ~ ions of this title, or other proYi ~ ions of t1Jis
, ) :iJ11••r, ihe rules of th e bo~ncl and th e regulations of the
1
f\ •J>:1 rt tnent. ''
1

:~

.,·tinn :l:JO, sulx1iYi sion 2 U1DC) - "allowan ces (a) shall
~~~ >! ],,. gT;micd for a p0riocl of longer ihan that pre scribed
1! 1 t lw rt1lcs of 1l1e lJoarcl ~md regulation s of the Depart11;, 11 t, :-: ulljL~ct to renewal from time to time.
(l1) ~Lly be imren se d, decren sed or l~eYoked at any
I i lilt'."
~~·~·tioJJ

'tl 0 I t 1I' I
., 1
sueh :tlllll lltt!
gorics)

llli\llll\'1' ,1(
sisi.anct· II J:I~
~cipit·Jlt •,.. t'it·
·ant suelt llt' ·
lcial scn·it't'!
ssisbJH'l' f .. r·

::1.

i3G5a (1\f:\ )-''The nmount, nnture nnd manner of
p1 m·iding medwaJ a ssist an ce for ne e d~- persons sha 11 be
.t~ · t•·nllinc·tl by 1l1e social se lTice s officials . . . . in accord.llll. <' with the lol'nl mcc1ic:nl plan, the proYision of the title
(I1), i he rules of the board and r eg ulations of the Depart-

I

IIH'IIL ' '

BO.:\.RD RULE
~:!.1 (a) (1) - " Pnblie assistance and care shall be granted
'lltly so long, and in such form am1 mnount, a.s is necessiIH!t-<1 by 1he needs of the recipient in the light of his
'" ~ onrees."
(All categories)

STA'l'E DJ!JP .AR'l'.JIE?\'1' HEGULA'l'IONS
::.·,1.~2(c) -"\Yhen an agency Yerifies ineligibility or a

•lJ:tllge in degree of ne ed, actiou shall be taJ{en immediately

.......--..---"'. . ... -.r
.

t

..

.;
I'
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'

l'lu:-:ing

to reduc e, in(·n ·u~;c , or <1i s<.:oJ l1inue ilw grant for ille next
payment period po ssible under existing payment.' procedure." (All e:1tcgorics)
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For tho se clo sings where there io illcligibility for reasonil
other t}Jan need, in addition to the foregoing, the follow ing referen ecs to Jaw, rule or regulation nw.y be included:

,)5

!
t

Closing Codes

•
~

l

40-47

t

t
t

t
!
t•
~

f

Soc:ial Services Law 349
Board Rule 80.1
State> Department Hegulatiom, 369.2, 369.3
'' Polic·ies Go,'e ming ihe Admini ..;t ration of Public Assisl:"mce ", Section 32
I

'

.:-·I

48 and 49

Sorial Services Law 131 (4)
State Department Regulat ions 351.3 and 369.2 (7)

50

Social Services Law 131 ( 4)
State Department Regulations 251.3 and :168.2

53

Social Services Law 321, 360
State Department Regulation 352.8
"Policies Go,·erning the Administration of Public As-

..·i I

'
'
·iti
'I

sistance", Chapter VI

ADC and T-ADC

t
£
j

J

l{

t
'*l

l

"

~

f
I

--

t
~~

~

I

'• I

~

t'

I

. ....

I

I

.)9

(
~

.....
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(lo:-;ing Codes
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I

I

So<.-"'l Services 1,"w 1:l4a
SLII'' D<'vartnw11t R.egnh1-

iion ;~51.7
Stn1e Dopar1.uwnt Regula-

::\.\

rcl-

lion 351.2
"Policies Govenling the AdHlinistruJion of Public Assistrmce' ', Section 165

lllS

)\\'-

ed:

Soeiul

57
t.

\

\\

58

\
59

1'-ADC

\

Services

Law

"' '
'

131

(5b), 350b
State Dcpar1ment RegulatioDS :~51.3, 369.2(7)
State Department Regula-

.,

tion 351.1
Soeia1 Services }_;aW 352
State Department R.egulation 369.1 (b)
Contact }.;egal Division
·where there is a contulUi1lg
neecl, there is uo legal l)nsis
for dosiug a case for misnse
of funds. State Department
Regulation 352.5 (n) (1)
provides for c1np1ication of a
grant in whole or pa.r t when
the origina1 check or proceeds were allegedly lost,
• stolen, or lliveri.ecl to othe-r
purposes, when the health
and sufety of the recipient
would be threatened · by a
failure to replace. Consideration should be given to
restriction of a grant, or
transfer to some other form
of a.ssistancc or care .

. .......

.

.:..

....

j
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Appendix; D -- l~'.r l1ibit 1 to Comm. (Joldbag's Affidavit

l

(Elll bl<'m)

(LC'1 1crhcad of)
THE

Crn.-

OF NBw YoRK

i

DEPA R.T:\!1~:\''l' OF SOCIAL SERVICES
NoTICE OF Il\TE:!\T 'l'o

SusPE:::\D OR

Drsco:!\TINUE

(.

Pn.!LIC AssrSTAXCE

Case Number

~

'.

This is to advise yon that this Depa,rtment intends to
0 Suspe11d 0 Di!:>continne your pnblic assistance grant
, for the followi11g rea sons:

If you feel thnt your public assistance grant should not be
suspended or discontinued, you may request a revie·w of
your record by a Re,·ie"· Officer on or before
You may also submit rmy ,Jatcment or docmnent which
may establish your neecl for pnl1lic assi stnnce. Yon han~
the right to submit this written material through an attorney or any representa1 i\·c of your choo sing.
If you wish a review, please mark an X in Box No. 1,
below. If you clo not wish a review, please rnark an X i11
Box No. 2, below. If you fail to reply, we will assume
that you agree with the action the Department proposes
to take.

Box

~ o.

1: 0 I request a Review

t

Box 1\o. 2: 0 I do not request a Review

r-

'
..

'

··r ..

.....

J"'

~

~;.

.

..

•# ..-....-~.

.

.

~ . . . • • ~~~ -

!
t
\
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p]L'a~c

r\
'E

·r

ends to
~ grant

I

l

f

f

It
l not be
i'iew of
: which
u have
'----' an at-

No.1,
11 X iu
s.ssumc
·oposes

rdnrn a copy of il 1is lei tor in the enclosed selfenYclO]Je <llld k<><'p the o1her eopy of ihis letter
for your records.
:~t1drcssed

If, nficr this reYiew, you are still di ssa tisfied with tho
decision given you, yon may request a Fair Hearing,
in writing or orally, by communicating wit.h the State
DL'partment of Soeial Services at 270 Broadway, New
York, N. Y. 10007, 'relcphone Number 488-6550.
lliere follows n Spanish Tran slation of the same ]

( J~mblc'm)
(LC'tterheacl of)

r\

Trm CITY oF NEW YORK
DEPAR'l'~lENT

l

\

Olr SOCIAL SERVICES

NoTICE oF DECISION, AFTER REv1p;w,

To

CoNTIKt.:E PuBLIC A ssiSTANCE

After careful coll sideration of all the factors ;.ml docunwnt.s you prc'sented, \\·e are in agreement that you are
slill eli gible to receive public assistance.
Plea se inform your Caseworker of any change in your
c·ireumstances that affects your need for assistance.
[Here follows a Spanish 'l'rrmsl<ltion of the same ]

"

..
T,
·-·

•.

"' ·~

.... .

...

...

;:;#

,..-;

J... ~ • .,.

!

. '

l

"

-·

). I

\

I

\
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\
(Lettcr1Jca.cl of)

Tm~
:;o·nc£ oF

CtTY oF NEW YoRK

]lr<eiSIO~, AJo'l'ER R•vmw, ·ro ]lmco''"~oE
Pun1Jrc

AssJSTANCE

Case Nu;ubcr
.I fl <'1' ca refnl conoidera\ ion by a RevieW Officer of all the
f ,·1<>''' ,n>tl clocu>nents you presented, it )Jas been clceidcd
10hal e ff<'e.\iv<> iunocdi a\ ely yon arc not eligible to receive
. ----- - - - - - for the followi11g reasons:

Yon"'")' wish to review the plllllphlet which was given to

~ "" at \1o• \ime of your

up)llication. It e,plaillS the pro·
v\ , \nns)nulcr w·hich this type of public assistance is granted
"' "\ yo o ,. r· \ gh Is with respect to review of this decision.
If yon arc clioeatislied with tllis decision you maY request
n Fn \ r \1 c arir>g, in writing or orally, by commm>icating
"\I h tlw S\ a\ c Department of Social Sen·iccs, 270 Broad·
"oy, ;\ ew York, N. Y. 10007, 'relephone 01 umber 488-6550.

~1

A.ssistar~cc
~lcdicaid

\'on will soon rccei ve iof orma ti on con ce ruing your eli<ri·
I' iIi I Y f u,. 'on\ iu u ed assist nn ce under the edical
I'' rn m ns Jn·ovided by the New York State

"~

\•rogram.

I\\,.,-,; follows a Sya1rish Translation of the smne]

..

•~

.• .. ,,I

Appc11dix !J - R.rhilJit 1 to Counn. Goldberg's Affidavit
( JGm blvm)

I

(Letterhc·ad of)

:

THE CnY OF NEw YoRK
DEPART~II~Xrr

(

OF SOCIAL SERVICES

\

NoTICE OF DrscoxnxuAXCE oF PunLrc AssiSTANCE
(Prepare in Duplic.ate)

..

Our investigation shows Umt effective immediately you
are not eligible to recei-.;-e - - - - - - - - - - - - - for the following reasons:

r

I
t

(
f

i
You may wish to review i he pamllhlet which ·was given to
you at the time of your applic:1tion. It explains the provisions under IYhich this t)·pe of public assisinllce is gr<mtetl
and your rights wiih respect to review of this decision.
If yon arc dissatisfied with this decision you may ·request
a Fair Hearing, in writing or orally, by communicating
with the State Department of Social Seniccs, 270 Broadway, New York, X. Y. 10007, 'l'clephone Number 4-SS-G::i:iO.
You will soon rcceiYe information concerning your eligibility for continued assistance under the :Meclieal Assis1am<·
Program as proYiclecl by t.he New York State Mcdicajd
Program.

"
·'

[Here follows a Spanish Translation of the same]

. I

, I

•

I

I•

i
'

~ 4-

-'--

..__ .. ,

;

:
'
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~

.
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Form S:'A-·15 -1 (u) (Socia l Securi ty Di,:tl>ilil)' Dcneficiory R<·J><> rl ) (Sec ~ 6705. 1)

Refer to
Socinl f.:ecuri ty I:umber

Dat e

~'hen

your dlsability p:!:r.::oe!"lts be.;"n , you .,.:ere notifi~d by the Social
Security Ad::'lini stri!t jon t~at your cond.i tion ::-.i£}:t L-:.;.rove ar.d your
claim \.:as scheCuled for a !'utur'! revie'..'. The ~ocial Security
AC:D.inistra~ion has rec',.J.ested us to dev"'lO'C c\!!'re:;t evi!e:-.ce as to
wheth-2r yoW" c ur.t!i tio:~ still p ·events y ')U~ :'ro:r. ·,•orki!lg .

To help us d(·terr.:ine .... :-.e~~ . er you are still e;,t~tlec! to di::;ability
b enefits, ,FlcE:se ar:s•.,·er the qu~st:!.ons on tr.e next t':'.ree ;at:es , sigu
your na:r:e at the 'cott:::., ani :-etU!'n ~~e ~ 0 :"::1 ·.:"it~:n t-:1 r:.c:n u.:;ing t h~
encl osed envel o;:e \o:hic:;. .req_uires no restage .

If at any tirr.c ::.o:-di cal e·lid·~ncl! sho·.,s :.h&t your C"::l!'l-!i tion r..e.s L.... prove d
so r..uch tl:at you fl.te r.o lont;er di:;nbled , you o:il l still receive bene:!'its
f or ll 3~r..'=>nth ;..eriod c~ aC..ju:;t::-.-ent. This ~er!.od ir..cluC.es t::.'! :r.onth in
.,:hich your cond.!tio!1 :.::-.;r':'lve s 2.:1d 2 adG.:tio:Jal tr.onths. Eenefits •,.:ill
t he n be stopped.

·f

If you ha·te questions c; need help in fill!.::; o'J.t the' :;,·J~stio:-_'1aire ,
please telerhone or vis!.t any s:~cial security office. You can find the
address in t.ne telep;-..:::;:~ di:rec:ory -.:..'iC..er "Social Security A:.tiinistration, ,,
or asl-. ut y-:,ur local ;~n·t office. If j'OU visit the sccie..l security office:
pl ease bring this lett~r ···. 'lt.n yvu .
Sincerely yours ,

1
l
j
I
l

...._
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SOCIAL

IECIJ~ITY

DII>BILITY BENEFICIARY llU'OKT

-------------------

I vnJettlancllhot 1hi1 repof! will be vlf'J to verily ·""Y c:onltn\liM ('li r,p bdi ty lo l..c:,cfd.i and •h o,.ld il be cl~r
lemined 1hol I om no lonr.~er enti!led, b!"nelits wdl ~ ter M•Ilt

-

INSTRlJCTIOIIS FOR COIAPLUING TilE rO RM
Answ~r ~a ch que\ lion as fully as

If any

pouible.

qve~lion doe\ not apply Ia you, writo "none" in

th• spec• pro ... ided.

If you nee-d more sp'l C: C to answer u question, uu r&,e ~ck of this form oro separate sheet of popor. If you uu
o sepa rate sheet of ~per, please be sure to put yovr so cia l security claim nvm~er on it.

- ----·---·---------------------Answrr oil ports of the fol!owi ng quutions:
1.

If No, upf.aia below.

No

(b) }-{u your doctN cold you rhat you arc able

0He
0 He:

; t,)

t':l ret~;trl

to wock?

uid Yes

If the anS.,.CC is }"CI, wht.>n? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

uid ~o

Q

(ti~• t d~td

lfe did not uy

(c) 1-hs he placed ::Hl)' signi!ic.A r'lt rnrrictions o ."': t~e kir.d of work you may do oc bow ::ca~y r.ours a
you mJ.y we:\:?

'lt;r
, sio:;!t
t~.~

0Yu

e..y

HYc:s, uphin below

Describe below in yoliC o"·n ..,. o:d" rour prcse:-;t condido:'l~ be sure to list • ·hu you bc:lievc- rou :are
unable to do in terms of lifting, bending, pus:O,ing, etc., that iruccfctC'S with )' OW" "o: l.:.iog av-in.

f ..._;:::-~v·i
·; '!

0

QY"

Soci•l
ycur

·.:. .. !.·~c;

(a) Do you feel youc m~dic~l cor.lition h;as i-. rr:~•ed so dut you uc able to rcl\lrn to w::~cl.:?

b~:~e~!.ts

:-..,~::1

in

:ts wi:!.l
----~1.:-e

•
-. !'ind the

33A

___.,_... - f' ........

" •-'t

.

.

..

.

~~- -.~c. ..-:""·--~·~·-·--~~-~·-· ·---~ ~- --·---~-~~~~~--~---..,..-~.
't. :/..
-~~~~.. ·--.-

~-~.~- -:~·;J::
.,

1~ • -

'.

..

·

~· ~-----------------------------------------~,~.~-~
••~.•~o~N~<~•~u•~•~•~•--~----

(c)NAMt Ofl'

P7<~ ;";;;~·:-;:;-;..
--,-,-,-,-0-.-,-,,.-,<--·----------------------t:.,-,,-.::,:,-c_.:-:.,:-,:-:.~.,-.~T~
<D:--------

.

~~u~~.;------------------------------------------~.~.,~.:-:.~~o,~<:C•--u~"-:,~,~.--------

3.

lh.vc you 'Wvrkcrl in the pa~c 12 mon1hs?

0

0

No

Yes If ''Yr..r," be sru~ to corntJf~tr. all of th~ follou.ing item$.

ft:i·... ,;-;:-,-.;;;;.·,;;-;,~~-,;;;;:;;;:; o• '""'"''"

jrrr;;;,c:
0 Yes

1'0V J

rn.~

(>)"'"" o•

•O•• oo;.~-- ----------

"OII:Kt.,C:I

0

No 1/ " lo;o.' ' up! a in bclow~J~by and give date you st opped wod. inc.

·'

''

~:

~ -------------------------------------------------

~----------------------~~--------------------------------

'·
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.

----... ... .. .. .. ..... -"".

----~-- - -~
----------

.....

-

.,

L "]No

[ J Y•• If
1-ttr:ic~r1y r• ~u6.1I ! Oiion

(b) ·-No~• ond-oJJreu o f

off,ce O"d t"OVI'IJOior,

·----------------- -------------

"-"'

-----------------------------------f':n!er

here or,y gddllional inforrn?ri~., t ha t yow believ• ; , ;,.,porion! a nd well css•ll il'l ri-•
1
Uf )'::IU '"fJ ... ore

tev iew of your continuing en! itl e """" ' to soc ia l u curi ty d•sobility benef1ts

J,pa ct, uu 11 :Jefuuat ~ thrtf o f P"P''· Also,
ah owt

)OUr Cllfftflf

if yo 11

uist,

)OM ,G)'

tttriiC'b a11y u•!r"'t:t tf.sr

co,ditir·,r,)

1-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

1-------- - - - - - - - - - - - -

•.,... ,u '''·

c. I

6.

Do you outhorire any phy JO iciol'l, hospital, oge.,cy, or other Or~oni:.otion IO d i s close ~0 t l.. e s~.::.cl Se :~.ority
Adm inistrcl ion or IO the S1 o~ o o;ency thor moy rev i e"" your enr.de~ent for conttr'lui"' g d, s: b:l,ry be•ef111,
ony med ical rec o rds or other informorion obovt your disability?

ov ..

CNo

I certify that tho above s tolements ore tru e, correct, ond COI'"" ;ll ete to the but of m'7· J.:,.,Qwle~;e. I lt 'l.o .... t..c t
onyene ... ho froud ule"'tly conceols or foils to report o dis~uol i fyir.g e v ~ nt or who mo(~s o f=lu 11.1' e- e., t :.r
reprue nlotion o f a mol~rio-1 foc t for Ule in det•rminin; a riv h t to payment vnc~, the So.:•cl Su:wr 't A:· :o .. !d
be svbjtct too (ine or imprisonment or bo th .

·

I

~· vou• •••<" vou u•u'CcY wo<Tt OT

o"t

If tho oddrua sh own on poge one of this for:-n is incorrect or incomplete pl eou • ., !er

1•""'' '""""
yo.Jr ,;:·u~_":' edd·es 1

below
NUI.IBtR AHO ITI'IET, AI"AAT ... f.HT .' 10,, I",Q, I:IJ', 0" RU ,.. AL. ,..O Y TE
CITY

STAT(

35A

~~ - . ·-:-.:.::; ~=-:--:--~....___.~----. . -~.·-;---··-r"f-~··---·----~~---x~.-:·~

~

--

- - - - -- - . . , _ , . . _ _ _ _ _ . o r - . . . . . - . . .

-.~·r-rr-··---::.~..--

·--·--·
67·19.

___,......--·~·

......... ~-

Form SSA--1S·t (Ticpor! of C:onlinuin;; Oi•nllilily Tn!eni•·"')

I

l

j
I. MEDICAL CAR( AHO

lR[ATME t~T

Ha r tlu tlo;..,.,,. l>con ••o..,;.,.cf,
lnvuti~otlon!

Qvts

hoe~toJ,

o• J..ot.pihliud tinco tJ..o lo•l Gpll'l;cotool\ 01 loti ,,.,,;,..,tnt tlitobilhy

O~o~o (1/'')' u," ro,..pl~lt '~'aut

uc-..J
O.t. Tt

~

Wi"lf:H

CL.AIIoiAiotf SCC!ol

)d.,,tifyoll
10vrcot that ho.,.
otodo•••·

~·-----------·------------+--------

ominocltho
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September 24, 1975

No. 74-204

Mathews v. Eldridge

My Tentative Thinking
I have reviewed the briefs (although not as thoroughly
as I hoped to) and Greg Palm's excellent memorandum of
September 15.

The case is close, and I will await the oral

argument and the Conference discussion before making a decision.
The "gut" issue is whether this case may be distinguished
from Goldberg.

Absent that decision, I would have no doubt

as to the constitutional adequacy of the elaborate administrative
procedure provided to determine whether social security
disability benefits should be terminated because of an end
of the claimant's disability.
I start with the statute which requires, for continued
entitlement to the benefits, that the worker must demonstrate
he is unable:
"To engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical
or mental impairment . . . . "
The central distinction between this case and Goldberg
could well turn on the fundamental difference in the
of the relevant inquiry.

aA..

As Greg's memo notes, the

natu ry~

ole ..,.~.-.t..IH..~ ~
decision ~

often will turn upon "questionable credibility and veracity"
of witnesses with respect to facts comprehensible to laymen.
In this case, the issue will usually

-k,~~
~tt!!'Jil ttl'en

written medical reports of physicians.

the unbiased

~

..
2.
Other differences that, in light of the difference in
the nature of the inquiry, include:
(1)

The relevant information is elicited by a written

questionnaire • wh+eh
out.

~ claimant

may seek assistance in

filling ~
~

He may obtain this from the welfare authorities with or

without counsel, as he pleases.
(2)

Much of the information called for by the questionnaire

will come from medical sources rather than the recipient or
lay persons.

Such sources (doctors) can communicate more

effectively through written documents than welfare recipients
who were before the Court in Goldberg.
(3)

The claimant of continued disability benefits has

full access to his files.

Either he or his representative

can prepare his claim and questionnaire after having reviewed
the agency file.

He will thus have an opportunity to "confront"-

at least to challenge - adverse information in the file.
(4)

-

no

The initial "decision-maker" is relatively independent.

The first step is taken by a team composed of a physician and
an employee of the state agency.

But their tentative con-

elusion is reviewed by a third party in the state agency•

~J'Uk'~

1\.

(Presumab1y a sort of review officer), ~ has the questionnaire

and such addi tional information as the claimant may wish to

71.c...

pres ent . ~~i,e h

c..,., •... ••• 1--r

tA• { • .

comes to the review officer directly from the

"

claimant, rather than through the initial investigating team.
(5)
f or

The entire process, consisting of multiple opportunities

the claimant to obtain administrative relief )is significantly

.
3.
more tailored to safeguard the rights of the claimant than the
procedure in Goldberg.

(See Greg's memo pp. 6-10).

Perhaps the s t rongest argument made by respondent is that
the post-termination de novo hearing before an administrative
judge involves substantial delay - up to 12 to 15 months
according to amicus curiae.*
Respondent also emphasizes that of the cases ultimately
heard by an administrative law judge, a reversal rate is high.
But this figure must be considered in light of the total number
of cases processed and disposed of by the administrative
procedure without ever reaching the full adversary hearing
stage.
The following language in Goldberg is relevant:
"Partticularly where credibility and veracity
are at issue, as they must be in may termination
proceedings, written submissions are a wholly
unsatisfactory basis for decision. The secondhand
presentation to the decisionmaker by the caseworker
has its own deficiencies; since the caseworker
usually gathers the facts upon which the charge of
ineligibility rests, the presentation of the
recipient's side of the controversy cannot safely
be left to him. Therefore a recipient must be
allowed to state his position orally. Informal
procedures will suffice; in this context due
process does not require a particular order of
proof or mode of offering evidence."
L.F.P., Jr.
ss
*In Fusar~ we commented on a delay of 126 days as being "torpid".
But· ~n Fusari, the administrative safeguards afforded the
claimant were elementary and not comparable to those presently
involved.
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October 15, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re:

No. 74-204 - Matthews v. Eldridge

During the conference discussion of this case last
Friday, I made the observation when it carne my turn that
although on balance I disagreed with the views .that had
b e en expressed by Potter and Byron as to the effect of
Sa lfi on the jurisdiction here, I thought them quite
r e asonable. At that time I was under the impression
that there were two possible approaches to the case~ but
upon reviewing what we have here of the record, I now
think there are three possible approaches, and that while
either of two ar~ consis~with Salfl, the third is not.
These three positions may summarized as follows:
(1) Because of the nature of the constitutional
claim based on Goldberq v • . Kelley, that claim may be
brought in the District Court · immediately upon the cutoff
of benefits, without making any effort even to present
that claim to the Secretary, despite§ 405(h)~
~{-

(2) Because of the nature of the constitutional
claim based on Goldberg v. Kelly, it may be separated
~~~;~;~ from the claim on the merits for restoration of disability
~~~~~ j~ benefits, ~ once the procedural claim has been presented
~~ to the Secretary and rejected, an act1on may be brought in
~~~he District Court even though a final decision on benefits
~
- ias not been rendered;
'A·~~~~~

9J-~~I/V~ o/-~ ~.
~t-t-~~· ~~v~
~~~~~ · ~

~~~~)~~1-D~
~~~~~7~~7
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(3) Because of the language of§ 40S(g) referring
to final decisions of the Secretary, no action may be
brought in the District Court under§ 405(g), even on the
procedural constitutional claim, until the Secretary has
finally resolved the claimant's continued entitlement to
benefits.
Although my misunderstanding may have arisen from
lack of sufficient attentiveness to the Conference discussion,
I don't think those who were in favor of upholding
jurisdiction here, particularly Potter and Byron,
differentiated between (1) and (2). In my opinion (2)
would be uite a reasonable accommodation between o urconstruction of the applicable jurisdictional statutes in
Sa fi and the necess1ty that a constitutiOnal clain\ based
on Goldberg v. Ke ly be presente
o JU 1cia determination
early in the dispute, bUt Tl} would be a complete repudiation
not only of Salfi but of the language that Congress used in
conferring jurisdiction on the district courts.

I

Under Salfi, there cannot be any doubt, I think,
that respondent's claim here was one 0n any claim arising
under [Title II of the Social Security Act} as that term
is used in 42 u.s.c. § 40S(h) and was construed in Salfi
at pages 4-5 and 8-9 of the slip opinion. At page 9, we
said:
11

11

It would of course be fruitless to contend
that appellees• claim is one which does not
arise under the Constitution, since their
constitutional arguments are critical to their
complaint. But it is just as fruitless to
argue that this action does not also arise
under the Social Security Act. For not only
11

-

3 -

is it Social Security benefits which
appellees seek to recover, but it is
the Social Security Act which provides
both the standing and the substantive
basis for the presentation of their
constitutional contentions."
In his pleadings, Eldridge alleged that he had been
receiving disability benefits pursuant to the Act, but
that they had been stopped (appendix, pp. 1-2). He then
prayed that the Secretary be commanded "to immediately
transmit unto your undersigned plaintiff, his wife and
infant children the disability benefits checks for the
month of August, 1972 and all subsequent months thereafter
until such time as your undersigned plaintiff is afforded
a hearing under the alleged change of condition claim by the
Department • • • • "
(appendix, page 3).
Surely if Salfi's claim was one arising under the
Act, so also is Eldri~e's.
1s means
a
e only
basis for jurisdiction in federal court is section 405(g)
of Title 42, and that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is unavailable.
The former section, of course, permits judicial review
"after any final decisionbf the Secretary", and Salfi was
at pains to point out that constitutional claims could be
considered on such review.
I

It could be argued that because of some of the language
in section 405(g) judicial review of any sort is available
only after a final determination by the Secretary on
termination of disability payments. This would, of course,
wholly frustrate maintenance of respondent's Goldberg v.
Kelly claim, since that claim is one seeking restoration of
benefits before any such determination. We read§ 405(g)
in a commonsense manner in Salfi, in order to avoid

- 4 requiring someone to go all the way up the administrative
ladder to the Secretary when the government had not
indicated such review was required by departmental
regulations. Here I think we could equally well construe
the lan uage of§ 405(g), part~cular y ~n l~ght of its
distinction between f~ndings" and "decisions" in its
text, to mean that a constitutional claim such as
respondent asserts here mus
e presente to the Secretary
or his delegate, but that ~t may be separated from t e
claim on the merits in order to enable respondent to
obtain judicial review of that aspect of the claim without
waiting for a final determination of the entire proceeding.
This would avoid any implication that Congress intended to
preclude any practical opportunity of asserting a Goldberg
v. Kelly type claim, and would still be faithful to the
explicit language of 405(h).
If (2) above is adopted as the proper meaning of
the statute, Eldridge is still allowed to make his
procedural claim at a time when he may still benefit from
it but must have alerted the Secretary or his delegate
of the claim and given them some opportunity to respond
to it. In addition, under§ 405(g) he must bring his
action in the District Cour~ithin sixty days after the
Secretary has turned down his claim for a pre-termination
heari~~·
It seems to me that this reading would serve to
effec~hat I take to be one of the principal values of
the third sentence of§ 405(h), safeguarding the Social
Security Trust Fund against unanticipated liabilities which
the Secretary has had no chance to deal with administratively.
If interpretation (1) is accepted by the Conference, it
will open the door to potential massive claims against the
fund. Eldridge can simply go into the District Court,
allege that his payments have been cut off, and assert
that he represents a class consisting of all others similarly
situated. Under (1) this class is potentially almost limitless, and while a judgment in their favor might not produce
a bonanza for the individual claimants, it surely would be
one for their lawyers. Under (2), however, the limitations
on actions found in§ 405(g) would significantly circumscribe
any potential class of beneficiaries. Eldridge could only
bring his action on behalf of those persons who had not
only asserted the Goldberg claim to the Secretary, but had

l
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asserted it within sixty days of the filing of Eldridge's
complaint in the District Court.
The third position, which would perhaps be slightly
more faithful to the language of 405(g), would for practical
purposes prevent the assertion of a Goldberg v. Kelly type
/ of claim in Social Security litigation. I do not think the
language should be read this way if such a reading can be
avoided. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 u.s. 361 (1974)~
Thus my tentative conclusion is that if Potter and Byron
were opting for a position along the lines of (2) above,
I could certainly agree because of the constitutional
implications, although I think it might entail some bending
of the statutory language. If they were opting for position
(1) above, I would regard it as a total repudiation of
Salfi without any very good reason for it, and could not
agree.
Sincerely,

. ~·

l3rC'nnan , J.
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MEMORANDUM
'

DATE:

TO:

Mr. Gre3 Palm

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

December 11, 1975

No. 74-204 Eldridge v. Mathews
I hsve spent most of the afternoon reviewing, hurriedly,
your first draft of 12/8/75.

I rush to dictate this memorandum

this afternoon so that you will have some guidance - even though
far less than I would normally give you - as to what I think
needs to be done as promptly as you can get at it.
First, my general reactions:
impressed by the draft.
of a good opinion:

I am quite favorably

It reflects the essential ingredients

a thorough grasp of the facts and the

relevant authorities, sound analysis (subject to a reservation
mentioned below as to the jurisdictional issue), and a wellwritten and documented draft.
There is, however, a major reservation.

As you would

be the first to acknowledge, the opinion in its present
form is unacceptably long.

I estimate that as now drafted,

including the notes, the printed opinion would be about
pages.

t~

•

Apart from the Rail Act case (written last term by

Justice Brennan), I can recall no opinion for the Court in
recent years that attains such vast proportions.

MY Rodriguez

opinion, as I recall, 40-odd pages, and this produced a
certain amount of criticism.

2.
I must, therefore, reQuest,you to

major revisions

unde~take

with the view to reducing the text by at least as much as one
third.

I know from personal experience that this is an

unwelcome task, but it is one that judges and lawyers frequently
confront.
Now for a few generalizations that may possibly be helpful
to you in this process.
1.

Part I (statement of the case and facts)

This may be condensed somewhat, although basically I see
little "fat" here.
2.

Part II (jurisdiction)

I have sent a copy of this part to Justice Rehnquist
for his comments.

We can await word from him before attempting

any revisions.
3.

Part III (the merits)

This is the heart of the opinion, and must be divided as you have indicated - into several subparts.

I will identify

these, with the pages indicated (perhaps roughly).
III-A. (pp. 22-28).

This summarizes the governing

principles and is excellent.

Perhaps you can achieve

some condensation, although the real opportunity is not
here.
III-B.
procedure.

(pp. 28-36).

This describes the administrative

It is far more detailed than necessary.

think you can cut it in half.

I

3.
III-C.

(pp. 36-54)

is required here.

A great deal of condensation

You really address two principal

topics, as follows:
pp. 39-43:
deprivation"

The discussion of the "level of

can be summarized.

pp. 43-54:

The reliability of the pre-termination

administrative procedures, while important, also can
be substantially condensed.
III-D.

(pp. 54-60)

The discussion of the interest

of government and the public, primarily in terms of the
administrative burden, can perhaps be reduced by as mucp
as two thirds.

We certainly don't want to "labor" this

governmental interest.
4.

Part IV (Conclusion) (pp. 60-62)

Excellent.

****
I have not had an opportunity this afternoon to read the
footnotes.

It is evident, however, that these also much be

reduced if we are to come up with an opinion of reasonable
length.

Please use your best judgment as to where the "cutting"

should take place.
Title 42 U.S.C.

I do observe very lengthy excerpts from

We simply have to omit or substantially reduce

things like this.

****

4.

It is well to remember that a Court opinion, as distinguishec
from a lawyer's brief, need not make every point, meet every
argument in detail, or advance in detail every reason that
supports the Court's decision.

One advantage we enjoy is that

we can be far more "conclusory" than a lawyer's brief.

I know

it will be painful to eliminate some of your excellent discussion:
but this must be done.
I feel satisfied, despite all that I've said above, that
you have the basis of a very fine opinion.

L.F .P., Jr.

ss

December 11, 1975
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74-204
Dear Bill:
·J~

"

I deliver to you herewith a first draft, by my clerk,
Greg Palm, of Part II of an opinion in the above case. . "
Part II deals, as you will see, with the . jurisdictional
issue that so troubled us and our brethren.
,
. As you are my guiding mentor on this subject, and
particularly as to how this opinion should be written without diluting the precedential effect of Salfi, I wonder if
you would mind reviewing the draft and givliii me your. ~: ,
'·
comments.
i
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· · Obviously, .the draft is too long. I have made no
·
attempt yet to edit or revise it, or to have Greg condense
it. Before undertaking these ta'ftks, it would be most helpful particularly to know whether you agree that the analysis
d
isS0\JD.
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,jnprttttt <lfonriltf tlft ~tb ,jtaU.s
jfht.s!finghm. ~. <!f. 2llp'!~
CHAMBER S OF

..JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

December 16, 1975

Re:

No. 74-204 Eldridge v. Mathews

Dear Lewis:
I have now had an opportunity to review Greg Palm's
draft of Part II of your proposed opinion in this case,
the part which deals with the jurisdictional issue. I think
the draft generally is a sound and certainly comprehensive
treatment of the problem, and subject only to the minor
suggestion contained in the following paragraph it fully
comports with my understanding of the statute and of Salfi.
On page 10, when describing Eldridge's fulfillment of
the "crucial prerequisite to jurisdiction," I would feel
happier if it were spelled out a little more precisely that
the "claim for benefits" presented to, and denied by, the
state agency was Eldridge's claim that he was still disabled
and that his benefits should not be terminated. This claim,
it seems to me, was presented by Eldridge's March 29, 1972,
~turn of the questionnaire form sent him by the state agency;
his May 25, 1972, letter objecting to the request for further
evidence and continuing to assert his disability, or by both.
These are contained in pages 12 and 13 of the Appendix. I
would not want to go so far as to say that a recipient whose
benefits were terminated without any protest on his part is
entitled to bring a Goldberg type challenge to such a
decision, arguing that he had presented a "claim for benefits"
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in the form of his original, application, which although
originally granted was n~ · in fact denied. If that were
permitted, the sort of large and indefinite class action
which I refer to in my earlier memorandum might be permitted.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell

To: Justice Powell
From: Greg Palm
Re: Matthews v. Eldridge

[No. 74-204]

Salfi construed 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) as precluding federal
question jurisdiction over a suit challenging the duration-of-relationship
requirements of 42 U.S.C, §§ 416(c)(5) & (e)(2). It was there held that
the only avenue of revue was through 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which
as a jurisdictional prerequisite
although Salfi

requires

a final decision by the Secretary. But

rejected the argument that simply because the claimant

challenged the constitutionality of a provision of the SSA rather than an
interpretation of the Act, exhaustion is not required, I think that the
nature of the constitutional claim here makes Salfi distinguishable and
that any further use of the adminisrative process by Eldridge was unecessary.
Salfi indicated that the power to determine when finality has occurred
under § 405(g) ordinarily rests with the Secretary.

This is because he has

ultimate resonsibility for the integrity of the administrative process.

Thus

even when the Secretary is without power to alter an offending provision
exhaustion "assures [him] the opportunity prior to constitutional litigation
to ascertain ... that the particular claims involved are neither invalid
for other reasons nor allowable under the provisions of the Social Security
Act."

Here, Eldridge's challenge to the procedures by which his benefmts

were terminated is an issue wholly collaateral to his substantive claim
for benefits under the SSA.

Unlike in Salfi denying his substantive claim

"for other reasons" or upholding it "under other provisions" is not relevant
to his claim of a denial of procedural due process.

~

Whether or not the

Secretary ultimately determines that his benefits were wrongly terminated
in no way affects his claim to a pre-termination hearing.

[Indeed, the

Secretary's contention that complete reinstatement of benefits(including
retr<hactive payments) would "eliminate the necessity of judicial
..._consideration" of Eldrige's claim that "termination was wrongful"

oegs cne

quesc~on

present:ed: whether an oral evidentiary hearing is

constitutional! required prior to termination of benefitsJ
IIlJ7 •
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I admit that my willingmess to distinguish Salfi is no doubt
colored by my desire to reach the substantive issues here.
yesterday, I,

TID

As I indicated

Dis it may be hard to find a "waiver" here by the Secretary

given its response to Eldridge's complaHint to the effect that: (1) he
had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and (2) the administrative
process was adequate in any event. Of course,his response(part (2)) does
emphasize again the futility of requiring Eldridge to present his procedural
claim in the first instance to the Secretary.

.inprtmt <!Jltttrlcf t!rt ~b ,jtattg
Jfz,wJri:ttgtcn. ~. <!J. 2llbTJ!~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

January 9, 1976

Re: No. 74-204, Mathews v. Eldridge
Dear Lewis,
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court in
this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

Clfomi ~f tlrt ,-mttb ~t:dtg
..N$ltittghn4 ~. elf. 2llgt'!~

,juprtutt
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 12, 1976

Re: No. 74-204 -- Mathews v. Eldridge

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your opinion for the Court.
Sincerely,

~··

~
Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

.iu:pTmtt <!Jottd of t1ft ~t~ ,itattg

Jfa:gfri:nghttt. ~. <!J.

2ll~Jl.~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

January 13, 1976

Re:

No. 74-204 - Mathews v. Eldridge

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Conference

~tm.t

aromt ~ tift ~ttittb ~tatt.

, JruJringt.ott. ~.

ar.

2llc?~&t '

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

January 14, 1976

Re: No. 74-204 - Mathews v. Eldridge

Dear Lewis:

Please join me.

Sincerely,

J~
Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

,§upumt <!Jourt of tqt 1l!nitrh ,§ta.tta

'J.Illaafrington,

p. <q.

20~>!-~

CHAMB E RS Of"

January 26, 1976

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re: No. 74-204 ;- -F. David Mathews v. George H. Eldridge

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,
.._/

:/~t1 T.M.
Mr. Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

I

...

February 19, 1976

No. 74-204 Mathews v. Eldridge
Dear Mr. Putzel:
The line-up in the above case is as follows:
Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Cour~ in
which Burger, C.J., Stewart, White, Blackman, and Rehnquiat,
JJ., joined. Brennan, J: 1 J filed~ dissenting opinion, in
which Marshall, J., joiaea,
post, p.
• Stevens, J.,
took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

L.F.P., Jr.
, cc:

The Print Shop

,jnprtutt <!fouri cf t4t ~b ,jtattg
~asfri:nghrn.. ~.

<!f.

2"ll~~.;l

CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

February 19, 1976

Re:

74-204 - Mathews v. Eldridge

Dear Lewis:
I join your proposed opinion in the above.
Regards,

w(-

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

8~~

!A

~

This case eema& co

~s

_,L

on certiorari from the Court

of Appeals fqr the Fourth Circuit.
It presents a question of what process is

disability benefits are terminated.

~e~hen

Under the Social

Security Act, a worker receiving such

benefits~has

burden of showing continuous~disability.

the

When disability

is put in issue, l as it was with respect to respondent,;'
regulations of the Secretary of HEW/ prescribe an elaborate
administrative review procedure.
But this procedure does not include ~n oral evidentiary

~ ;q~spondent

hearing prior to termination of benefits .
I

challenged the validity of the procedure by a suit in
~

the federal district court.

That court, relying on

th~

Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, held that such a
hearing was constitutionally required.

The Court of

Appeals affirmed.
The decision whether to discontinue disability
benefit, lnormally turns upon documented medical evidence.
The issue of disability tRerei9~ is a focused~and limited
one.

Prior to termination of benefits, the claimant

2.
is given access to the

governme~t

file/

and t .o the reasons

for the tentative decision to discontinue.
also / is afforded an

I.

and arguments.

The claimant

opportunity/=~bmit ~dditional
u-~ ~

Following discontinuance

c.

evidence

.#,

there is a right

to an oral evidentiary hearing ~nd ultimately to judicial
review before the denial

beco~s

In view of the nature of the

final.

inquiry ~and

the care-

fully strus tured system for administrative review; lwe find
no deprivation of procedural due process.

Accordingly, we

reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The Chief Justice, and Justices Stewart, White,
Blackmun and Rehnquist have joined the opinion of the
Court.

--

Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a dissenting opinion,

in which Mr. Justice Marshall has joined.

Mr. Justice

Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of
the case.
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MEMORANDUM
).;.',"'

TO:

Greg Palm

FROM:

'II•~'

~ ·~·

March 2, 1976

;i!':;,.;:•

Powell, Jr. /
Holds for No. 74-204 Mathews v. Eldridge
I agree with your recommendations in the draft of a

memorandum to the Conference, but - as you anticipated
the memorandum is much too long.
See what you can do to summarize the presentations on
on Mattern and Frost.

These should be reduced at least .,;:

some 50% to conform to what is customarily presented.
r

We may assume that most of the Justices have cert memos

in their offices on these cases.
be summary and conciusory.
most.

ss

Thus, our presentation can

Our recommendation is what counts

;§ttJ.!rtmt QJottrt c-f tlrt 'Jlbti:tth ~tetf.tg
~a:$frittgtMt. Ifl.
CHAMB E R S OF

.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR .

Qf.

Zllp>-1~

March 3, 1976

Cases held for No. 74-204, Mathews v. Eldridge
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Two cases currently are being held for Eldrid~e and
one for Eldridge and Norton v. Mathews, No. 74-621 .
1.

No. 74-205, Mathews v. Williams

This case presents the same issue as Eldridge. The
state agency notified respondent that since her disability
had ceased her social security benefits would be terminated.
Respondent demanded a pre-termination evidentiary hearing,
and she brought this action when none was granted. DC and
CAS held, relying on the DC decision in Eldridge, that an
evidentiary hearing is required prior to termination of
benefits. I will vote to grant, vacate and remand in light
of Eldridge.
2.

No. 75-649 Mathews v. Mattern [held for Eldridge
and Norton]

Respondent, a recipient of disabled widows' benefits under

§ 402(e)(l)(B)(ii) of the Social Security Act, was erroneously

paid $1,063.80 by the Social Security Administration (SSA). There
is a dispute whether the SSA notified her by telephone, prior to
receipt of the payment, that she should return it. Several months
later the SSA notified her by letter that future benefits would
be reduced until the overpayment had been recouped. Respondent
was further informed that she was entitled to contest the
finding of overpayment or to request the Secretary to "waive"
the overpayment if she was not at fault in receiving it and
recoupment would cause her severe financial hardship or be
unfair for some other reason. Petitioner requested reconsideration of the recoupment decision, and the SSA affirmed its

- 2 -

initial determination. Although her monthly benefits were then
reduced, respondeqt was thereafter entitled to an evidentiary
hearing, as well as administrative and judicial review.
Meanwhile (after the reconsideration request, but prior
to decision), respondent filed this class action, contending
that the procedures for recovering overpayments violated due
process since they do not afford claimants a prerecoupment
oral hearing. The DC concluded that it has jurisdiction under
the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, declared the recoupment
procedures unconstitutional and enjoined the Secretary from
recovering overpayments until after a hearing. CA3 affirmed,
but remanded for a more limited order that would require a
prior oral hearing only where the Secretary's decision might
turn on the credibility of witnesses.
Under Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) and
Eldridge there is jurisdiction over respondent's constitutional
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) only with respect to those
members of the class who disputed a recoupment decision that
occurred within 60 days of the filing of this action. Since
Norton will make clear that there is no basis for jurisdiction
here other than§ 405(g), the case probably should continue
to be held for that decision.
On the merits the case is not necessarily controlled by
Eldridge. CA3 has limited the orerecoupment hearing right
to cases in which issues of credibility may be important in
the decision, but this requirement will be triggered in a
substantial number of cases. Moreover, under the current
procedures the recipient may personally discuss his case with
officials at the SSA office. Finally, the extent of the
potential deprivation implicated by a reduction in benefits
is less than the total cutoff at issue in Eldrid.~. On the
other hand, this case differs from Eldridge in that issues
of credibility will play a significant role in the agency
decision. Accordingly, I will vote to hold for Norton and
then to grant, vacate, and remand in light of Salfi,
Eldridge and Norton.
3.

No. 75-5220 Frost v. Mathews

Petitioners are the mother and legitimate children of a
deceased wage earner receiving mother's and surviving children's
benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 202. Two other children claim to
be illegitimate offspring. The Secretary determined that
they are illegitimate children of the wage earner and notified

- 3 -

the petitioners that their future payments would be reduced
by the amounts to be paid to the illegitimate children.
Under the Secretary's procedures, after the current
beneficiaries are notified they may submit additional evidence
challenging the determination. If the current beneficiary's
protest is rejected he is so notified, and the benefit payments are adjusted as of the first month after the decision.
He has a right to petition for reconsideration, to an
evidentiary hearing, to administrative appeal, and to judicial
review.
Petitioners apparently did not protest but instead
sought reconsideration and a hearing. Meanwhile the SSA
reduced their benefits. They then filed this class action
seeking an injunction against such reductions until after an
evidentiary hearing and requiring that past reductions be
restored. Petitioners lost their administrative hearing and
the government moved for dismissal on several grounds, including
mootness. The DC certified the class and granted declaratory
relief requiring pre-reduction hearings.
CA2 held that there was mandamus jurisdiction over the
suit (the decision pre-dated Salfi). It also held that the
case was not moot due to the presence of the members of the
class other than the named plaintiffs. Although the class
action was not declared until after the case had arguably
become moot as to petitioners, CA2 pointed to n. 11 in Sosna
v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) and permitted certification to
relate back to the time when the DC deferred its ruling on the
question. On the merits CA2 reversed distinguishing Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) on three grounds:
(1) This
case involved a reduction, not a termination of benefits.
(2) Survivor benefits are not necessarily the recipient's
only resource - if income falls below subsistence, welfare
may be available. (3) Although the government makes payments
in excess of the family maximum during the short period
allowed for protest, it indicates that such payments might
not be made during the longer period until decision after
an evidentiary hearing. Thus, in striking the appropriate
due process balance, the weights against requiring a prereduction hearing include the interest of the illegitimate
children in immediate payments.
Under Salfi, Eldridge and Norton the class is limited
to those persons who contested a decision to reduce their
benefits that occurred within 60 days of the filing of this
action. Assuming that there exist such persons, it is my

- 4 -

view that Sosna supports § 405(g) jurisdiction here.
Although the Conference may want to remand to ascertain
whether any such persons exist, I think it quite likely
that they do. On the merits CA2's holding is consistent
with Eldridge. Accordingly, I will vote to deny.
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APPENDIX A

UNITED

ST~TES
FoR

COURT OF

THE SE co~o

APPE1.tLS~ ~

CrncurT

K o. 5±7-September Term, 1974.
(Argued January.l/, 1975

Decided April17, 1975.)

Docket Ko. 74-2020

Cuu-nu FRosT, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.

CASPAR WED.""BEP.GER, as Secretary of the United States
Department of Health, Education and Welfare,

Defendant-Appellant.
Before:
WATER:ll.,~..~, FRIE~DLY

and GuRFEIN,

Circuit ·Judges.
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court fot t.h e
Eastern District of Xew York, Anthony J. Travia, Judge,
375 F. Supp. 1312 (1974), declaring unconstitutional the
procedures of the Social Security Administration whereby
i;c::::.:~::.: L:.::..; ~:· " ;ri to SllrYi\-ors· c1lildrt:ii. iliigV hP. rP.dnced
because of claims of illegitimate children which would cause
the total benefits to exceed the statutory maxima without
a pre-reduction oral evidentiary hearing.
Reversed, with instructions to dismiss the complaint.

2919
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I.

''·

D.\Y1D )L GoHEx, Esq., Department of Justice,
\\ asbi21gton, D. C. (Carla A. Hills, Assistant ..:\..ttorHey General, David G. Trager,
"Cnited States Attorney, \Yilliam Kanter,
E:;q., of Co~msel), for .Appellant.
llExE H. Rnx...\.CH, Esq., Rochester, Ne'v York
O,Ionroe County Legal Assistance Corporation, Kenneth Cohn, Esq., and Nassau
County Law Services Committee, Inc., of
Counsel), for Appellees.

FRIENDLY,

Circuit Judge:

This appeal displays a new facet in the developing law
of due process with respect to administrative action by
the welfare state. \\J.Jereas such controversies bave typically involved disputes between the Government on the
one hand and a citizen or class of citizens on the other,
here the ultin:w.te conflict is between two categories of ci_iiand the Go\ernment's interest is to pay tbe tight
-zens
....._
<E!_e. Before reaclnng the problem of what due process
requires in this context, we must traverse a procedural
thicket.

I. The Statutory

Bacl;.gr~und

and
the R_egulations in Contr·ove·r sy.

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(c1)(1), (d)(2), and (g) (1),
the dependent children and the spouse, see Weinberger· v.
lVeisenfe!d. 43 li.S.L.W. 1!393 (1975) of an individ.ua1 \\·ho
died as fully insured under the ·Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 41-±(a), are eacb entitled to a monthly payment
for a specified period equi>Rlent generally to tbree-quartcrs ·
of the primary insurance amount of the decedent. In no
case, howe,·er, may the total benefits to a family e:s:ceed

2920
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I

I

\

;

a specified maximtm1, 42 U.S.C. § 403(a), set out in the
table accompanying 42 U.S.C. § 415(a).
Prior to 1:J6.5 the only children eligible for benefits purswmt to ±2 L..S.C. H 402(d) (1) and (d) (2) ·were children
who could inherit from the decedent pursuant to appli- .
cable state la'\\ or whose parents had participated in a
ceremony l':hich \'.-odd have resulted in a valid marriage
except for one of two specified legal impediments. 42
U.S.C. ~§ 416(h)(2) (...--\.) & (B), 402(d) (3). In 1965 Congress amended tbe Act to include other illegitimate chilc1ren, Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L; No.
89-97, § 339(a): 19 Stat. t109, where, inter alia, the decedent
wage earner, before his death, acknowledged paternity in
writing_. was decreed by a court to have been the father,
or ''as ordered by a court to contribute support to the
child because o~ paternity. This was codified as 42 U.S.C.
§ 416(h) (3) (0) (i). 1
·Congress again amended the Act in 1968, Social Security
Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 163(a) (1), 81
Stat. 872, 2 to deal with the situation, apparently not con1

A companion pronsion, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (3) (C) (ii), permitted ille·
gitimate childre!l to recei>e benefits attributable to a deceased wage
earner e;en "here the requirements of § 416 (h) (3) (C) (i) l1avc r..ot been
met if "such :insu red :i.ndi>idual is shown by evidence · satisfactory to the
Secretary ,to ha n~ bee!l the father of tlte applicant, and such insured
indintlual ;,a3 li\·:i.ng with or contributing to the support of the ·applicant at the time such insured indi>idual died." This provision was recently strnck down by _a "district court on the ground that it violated
the rights of affected illegitimate chilurt::n ulltler ~he eCJ_ual protection
clause in that it impo;;ed an additional requirement to establish eligibility-making a showing of sPpport if the i!l~ured v.:;.;,r. earuer wa~
not living with t!:Je illegitimate children-not faced by legitimate children. This was fo·.!nd not to satisfy even a rational basis test :in that
disfa>o.rbg "the offspring of a c"a sual liaison" coulcl not sen·e any legitimate go\·e=eat..'ll interest. Lucas v. HEW, 43 U.S.L.W. 2382 (D . R.I.
Feb. 25, 1975).

2

This amend!::Jent "as codified as 42 U.S.C . § 403(a) (last sentence):
Whene;er a reduction is made under this subsection in the total of
monthly benefits to which the individuals are entitled for any month
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'

l
1templatcd by the 1965 legislation, 'vhere t1w inclusion of
illcg·itima tc children would raise tho total above tho statutory m::n:imum. 3 Tb.c 19GS amendment provided that when
the total be11efits \\ould exceed the maximum, any reduction should first occur ·i n the benefits payable to children
made eligible by the 19G5 amendments; the effec~1is
was to exclude these illegitimate chilrli·en altogether when
th;bene.fits p~e to the widow and other children reached
the mnximum. 4 This provision was held unconstitutional
in Griffin'· Richardson, 34:6 F. Snpp. 1226 (D. 1Id~) (three-

1
I'

on the basi.s of the wages and self-employment income of an insured
individual, eaeh s:1ch benefit other than the old-age or disability
insurance l;enefit shall be proportionately decreased; except that if
such total of benefits for such month includes any benefit or benefits under section 402(d) of this title which are payable solely by
reason of sec tion 416(h) (3) of this title, the reduction shall be
first applied to reduce (proportionately where there is more than
one benefit so payable) . the beuefits so payable (but not below
:zero).
3

The ameutll;Ilent to · 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) was added by the Senate
Finance Committee to H.R. 6575, 89th Cong., J st Sess. (1965) , as new
§ 340. Neither the report of that committee, S.Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1965), nor the Conference Report, H.R. Rep. No. 682, 89th
Cong., Jst Sess. (1955), in which the House acceded to the Senate
amendment, contains any langu age which su:;gests that the legislators
were cognizant of this possibility. See S.Rep. No. 404, s11pra, inl
Code Cong. & Admin. News 1943, 204.9-50, 2206 (1965); H.R. Rep. ·No .
682, s1cpra, in 1 "C.S. Code _Con g. & Admin. News 2228, 2260 (1965).

u:.s.

.'

4

The Senate >ersion would hr:ve lil.ll.ited th, ei(.:lct of th" umendmcnt
to children who were eligible in August, 1965, and whose benefits were
reduced because of the 1965 amendment; children who became eligible
afte,. the 1965 al;Ilendment would be subject to the pluvi•in'1s of that
amendment, i.e., the shares of all children, legitimate and il1egitimate,
would be recluced proportionately to the same amount. See S.Rcp. No.
744, 90th Con g., 1st Se;s. (1967), in 2 U.S. Code Con g. & Admin. News
2834, 2345, 3108 (1967). Tbe Senate version was thus only a "savings
clause." This >ersion was rejected in important part in conference and
the amendment was made applicable for any cl1ildren whose current or
future entitlements were reduced as a result of the 1965 amendment.
See H.R. Rep. :Xo. 1030, 90th Cong., 1st Scss. (1967), in 2 U.S. Code
Con g. & Admin. :l\ews 3179, 3198-99 (1967).
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judge court), S!lii!iiWrily affinl.!;_cd per c7.wiam, 409 U.S. 1069
(1972)," on the g-::ound that the discriminatory classification in it ;er...-cc no legitimate state int .rest and was thus
violatrve of the due process rif•·hts of the class of illegitimate childrer'l. who \\ere plaintiffs in that suit.
'This decision made it necessary for the Social Security
Ac1minisb:ation (SS2•. ) to revise its procedures, uuder authority of 42 "C'.S.C. ~ 205(a), for handling cases where the
addition of cbilclren claiming to be ~ntitled to benefits
under the 1965 amendments would result in exceeding the
statutory ma:s:im::u:n, the validity of which has not been
questioned. Of. Dandridge v. Tflilliams, 397 U.S. 471, 483-87
(1970). The ren3ec1 procedures, incorporated into the SSA
Claims l.Ianual, \\ere designed to permit the re,vorking of
all claims "as though the [1968] provision had never been
enacted," Claims )1anual T305, and to provide all bene- )·
ficiaries whose benefits were going to be reduced with "a ·
detailed explanation of the reason for the reduction.n Id.
T30S(b). Beneficiaries \\hose benefits were to be reclnced .
must be notified prior to the recluction, id. T315, by an SSA
Reviewing Office, ',\hid.l \\Onlc1 process the award for the
newly entitled illegitimate child but would "diary" th.e case
for 45 days and not effectuate a benefit check reduction
until the opetating month after the processing of
protest filed within that period. Icl. T310(c). The notice expJ.ained tnat a "recent court decision" required equality of
treatment for all chllclren of a ·wage earner who died fully
immred and that, as a resuE> ttc r.JOnthly benefits of thebeneficiaries named in the notice had to be reduced to an
amount specified in order to pay benefits to other named
children who qual:..+lecl uncler 42 . U.S.C. § 416(h) (3). The
notice was to specify under w'C.ich subsection of 42 U.S.C.

-------------
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Three Justices would ha>e set the Secretary's appeal for oral argu·
ment.
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416(h) (3) the::~ ch:ldrc·n qualified and show the "exad
for that d~;t e rmina tion. The notice further invited
the b cne:5.c:iar; or his r2yre.:;cntative to submit ~ray evidence
within 30 days to p :·oH· that the illegitimate children do
not q uaEfy- o::- t k: ~ , for some other reason, the benefits of
the beu E: 2 ·:::~ary SDOt<:d not b~ reduced. Claims Manual T315.
If, bas ~ J upon this no~ic e, the beneficiary visited an SSA
District Of'.6c:2, he ';\a:; gi\-en a complete explanation for
the action and had tb.<: right to inspect the original evidence upon v.-hich the SS.A. determined that a child was
entitled to participat e in the benefits under 42
§ 416(h)(3). If that endence -was not immediately available, the District Offi.::e "as to send for it. If the beneficiary ne\ertlleles3 elE-cted to protest and to offer evidence to dispute tbe vaEdity of the determination of new
entitlement, the District Office was to prepare a report
describing the corrtact betv;-een the beneficiary and District
Office personnel and to forn·ard that along with the evidence submitted to the Renewing Office, which would detennille '~whether [the] e-.-idence casts doubt on the original detcrm.ir!.ation." ld. T30S(b).
If a protest was recei...-ec1 by the Reviewing Office prior
~o actual do~mward adjustment in the benefit .checks of
the current benefciaries, that is, within 45 days of notice
and such .additional t ime as effectuating that adjristment
within SS~ would b.ke, id. T310(c) (3) (A), a branch of
the Renewing Office was required to review the file fc r
-the case, requesting an;:- necessary additional information
and clarific-ation. "If tb.e eviC!cnce or argt:GlP.Pt sH1m,itrc0
does not cast doubt on the original detennin.ation that the
child is entitled under[-!~ U.S-C. §416(h)(3)] (a protest
without snbstanti\e proof does not cast doubt upon the
original determination)," the benefits were a·d justed and
the beneficiary w-as infoiTied of the basis of that reduction
basi~''

l

u.s.a.

~

.

-
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and its effecti'e date in a notice which advised him of his
right to petition for reconsideration of tho adjustment. If
a protest was recei\' ed after the adjustment was _made, it
was treated as a request for reconsideration. Claims
l.Ianual T310(c).
If the beneficiary requested recons·i deration, a rcvlewii~g officer in t~e inc1epe:1dcmt Reconsideration Branch reexamined the claim and produced a written Reconsideration Determination, smnmarizing the evidence and law and
delivering a reconsidered determinatl.on. If this was also
aclverse to the beneficiary, he could request a full evjclcntiary hearing before an Administrative L-aw ,Judge of the
Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, with attendant rights
of administrat"iw appeal to the Appeals Council and of
judicial review, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

IT. The Facts and the Proceedings in the District

I

I
J

l·
I
I

t1\
I

i
i'

..

(

I
I

Co~wt.

Plaintiffs, the mdow and two legitimate children of a
fully insured, deceased wage-earner, Charles Frost, Jr.,
had been recei,ing mother's and ,surviving children's insurance during 1973 of $159.30 for Mrs. Frost and a like
amount for each child. The widow, Claudia Frost, had
filed for these benefits on August 26, 1968, five days ~fter
the death ·of her husband, from whom she had bee:ri. separated for some time:· On February 15, 1973, the SSA
notified· these beneficiaries that their benefits would .be
reduced to $95.70 for each claimant as a. result of the
SSA's c, -~i~::;.Jin~tion t:U.at Cnarles Frost, Jr., was the
fat er of two illegitimate children, Charles E. III and
Tina L. Frost, whose mother, Lola Coolidge, had applied
for benefits on behalf of the former on August 26, 1968,
the same day Clauclia Frost filed her application, and
on behalf of both on .April 8, 1969, a short time after
Tina was born. Xo benefits were a\varded at the time
2925
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because of the operation of the 1968 amendment disfavoring illegitimate children, but the application was granted
effective ::\Ir.rc:h, 1973, thereby reducing; the mnounts available to Claudia Frost and her two children fnthered by
Charles Fro ~ t 1 Jr. Seemingly the protest step in the SSA
procedure was omitted, see 375 F. Supp. at 1315 n.5, but
l\Irs. Frost clid request teconsic1eration on February 22,C
after \\·hich she receind written notification that the decision to grant benefits to Charles E. and Tina Frost and
to reduce the benefits payable to herself and her children
was deemed correct in all respects by the Reconsidera- .
tion Branch. She thereupon called for a full evidentiary
!tearinJ.
Before the hearing could be held, Mrs. Jhost filed this
action
...____.. in the District Court for the Eastern Districf of
New York on behalf of herself, of her children fathered
by Charles Frost, Jr., and "of all persons who now or
may in the future be entitled to surviYors' benefits under
the .A.ct -whose benefits have been or may be reduced without a prior hearing." The complaint alleged that the ~
SSA procedures denied c~ne process ~eeause. they f~iled .
to proTI e f oi" an ora ev1 en mry re-rec uc 1 1 heanng;
it sought declaratory and temporary ~mel permmient injunctive relief as -well as restoration of benefit~ . . · The
district ccn1rt denied a temporary restraining order and
a preliminary injunctron on November 12, 1973~ without
prejudice br,t o.~. c1ered the Secretary to conduct a full
hearing \\ithin a month; The hearing was helcl N 6vem.

6

Charles Frost :1dmittei!ly had been living with the mother of the two
illegitimate children and had been named as father on their birth certificates. The only important bases for Mrs. Frost's disagreement with
the initial determination were her statement that Mr. Frost became
impotent early Lrl 1966 and the absence of any written · consent on his
part to being r.am,.d as father in the birth certificates, see New York
Pub. Health L. § 4135(2), something that was manifestly impossible in
the case of the po.:~thcmous child.
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ber 27, 1913, and the administrative law judge, on March
4, 1974, rendered <: decision that the de termination of
Charles' and Tina's status under 42 U.S.C. ~ 416(h) (3)
and the consequent necessity to reduce benefits to :Mrs.
Frost and her two children i.l':-~e correct. \Y e were informed at argument that the mdter was before the Appeals Council.
On X o\ember 16, 1973, plain tiffs moved for a declaration that the action couH be maintained as a class action, F.R.Ci>.P. 23(h) (2), and, at oral argllmen~ on the
motion~ December 8, . 1973, for summary judg·ment. The
Secretary contested class action des-ignation, claimed that
the district cour~'s direction and the holding of a postreduction lH.'?.r!ng had made the action moot and that
plaintiffs had failed to e~haust their administrative remedies, and son;ht snm1nary judgment.both on these grounds
and on the· merits. With the agreement of the parties,
375 F. Supp. at 1316, a ruling on the class action request
was postponed pending determin::ttion of the summary judgment motions. On ~Iay 3. 107±~ the court ruled generally
in p1Eintiff's fa,·or, 375 F. Snpp. 1312 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
It conclucled t'!J.a t phintiffs had sa tisfiecl the requirements
of R~1le 23 JQr the maintenance of a class action;: .that
: siEce p}a~ntiffs co:.1ld · prQperly haYe represented the class
when the <>.ction ;•:as brought, the subsequent holc~ing · of
a pos~-rcdu.ction hearing at the court's direction did not
depri...-c them of f!Ja t sta hls; that the action w~s not moot:
thn t t!.!e court :C.1cl jnrisc1icticn; that defendant's e:s:hanstion ar5.1ment lncS:ecl merit; ~mel that failure to accord
a prt>-reclt.~ction or-d en::'!entiary- hearing was unconstitutionil. 'While d .:.!l:ing an inj~mction, the court granted
decbratc:ry relief. Its order i<;sncd Hay 28, 1974.
Subsequent to the entry of judgment, the Secretary
moved for an orde:::- to amend the judgment. He contended
that the class action ruling was erroneous because notice

•
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to members of the cla::::::, as allegedly required by Eisen v.
Carlisl e cf J tJ.r:g_a:::li,!, - - U.S. - - , 40 L. Ed. 2c1 782
(197±), had not been g:,en and that, the class action having
failed, the ca:::e ·was moot. The motion was denied on
July 1, 197 4:. Tbi::: appeal followed.

TIL Jurisdiction.
Although the Se:?retary has not contended that the action
was not within the stah1tory jurisdiction of the district
court, we mu:;t consider the matter, as Judge Travia did,
375 F. Snpp. at 1319-::0. The problem is the one encountered in most actions questioning the constitutionality or
interpretation o: s~atu~e3 or r'egulations governing federal
welfare or othe-r entitlements, namely, the certainty that
the claims of the na:ned plaintiffs do not satisfy the $10,000
jurisdictional amo<mt requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 133P and
the doubt whether aggregation of the claims of the class
would be permissible under Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 33:2
(1969). See Jlills >.Richardson, 464 F.2d 995, 1001 (2 Cir.
1912). We find it unnecessary to determine \rhether these
difficulties preclude jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 8
since we are w.Jling to redicate federal ·uriscliction on
~61, as oth er courts did in Martinez v. !Jicharclson, 472 F;·2 d 1121, 112.5-26 & n.l2 (10 Cir. 1973) ;· Elliott
7

The amPn.].,..;_ complaint did not allege that the cb.im9 of Claudia
Frost, James Frost, or Kr'..sten Frost satisfied this requirement.

8

But cf. ][oQT:l' ani: Yerr.tont Welfare Rights .Ass'n v. J:etit, No. 741300 (2 Cir., Fe3. 10, 191."'), ~~:: "Jr. !773, v;h.:.rd &. pauel of t~:; court
remanded an ac=:o!l brought by an ind.iridna1 wel.fare recipient and a
welfare rights or;an.izatiro for a determination of the propriety of a •
··trn:;t fund·· apr·roadl fo-: e=:tablishing the e::rist!lnce of the jurisdic·
tional amo:.:nt =~er § B31. See Bass v. Rockefeller, 331 F. Supp. 945
(S.D.KY.), re= with i::rt":-nctioll3 to ;a~ate and dismiss, 464 F.2d 1300
(2 Cir. 1911) (fre panel ceclining to express any jU(1gment on the
correctness of ilie d:stri~t court•s jur!sdictiona1 holding). This theory ·
l:as ·not been u:geC. be!o~e us and, since we find jurisdiction upon
another basi:!, we need not e'l:press any opinion about it.
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v. TVeinberger, 371 F. Supp. 960, 967-GS (D. Hawaii 1974);
and iliatter·n Y. Tr eiilb erger, 377 li'. Supp. 906, 914 (E.D. Pa.
1974). Granted that it may be t~oubLful whether Congress
intended § 1361 to co\er situations of tills sort, see, e.g.,
.1amieson '· TY einberger, 379 Ji'. Supp. 28, 34 (E.D. Pa.
1974), the language: is sufficiently broad to do so, see Note,
The J urisdictiona1 Amount Requirement in Suits Challenging- the Validity of Federal Gon;rnmeut Action, in Hart &
Wechsler, The Federal Courts and tbe. :F'ederal System
1158, 1160-61 (2d ec1. 1973), at least in a case like this where
the sole issue is the type of hearing required. Benign Cl..ti'v\Dv .,..-/neglect by the Supr en::.e Court of the jurisclictiona~
in such cases as Richardson v. TVright, 405 U.S. 208, 1·eh.
denied, 405 U.S. 1033 (1972), and Richardson v. G1·ifjin,
supra, 409 U.S. 1069, must signify at least some degree of
acquiescence in a federal court's proceeding to judgment
in a matter so peculiarly appropi:iate for its decision as
whether the Federal Constitutio11 requires federal officials
administering federalle.;ri::lation to grant a full evidentiary
. hearing.

I
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IV.

jJJ ootness

1.

·.

and Class Action.

Although the dispute over the reduction of plaintiffs'
survivors' be~e:fits c.oncededly remains alive, since if is
before the Appeals Comicil, the Government urges that
the controversy on1· the right to a pre-reduction hearing is
dead. Its argument runs as follows: The named plaintiffs
!1.:-.•c ::lG\Y :Uacl Uu; tn)e of ltearing they so11ght and therefore
nothing remains for the district court to adjudicate with
respect to them. If the decision of t!w administrative law
judge should remain undisturbe':l, they ought not to receive
pre-decision 'reductions to which they are not entitled; if
his result should be overturned, they will receive the
amounts improperly dedncted. \Vhat~ver injury may have

!
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been suffered by an improper intermediate dcpr vation, if
such there were, is beyond the 1)ower of a court o remedy.
A sl ort nn:m-er to the Government's position is that if
plaintiffs' rocec1ural claim includes . 1c nght not onlv to
a full hearing l)l~t to the administrative appeal and judicial
r~i ,,- r~.-ided hy 42 . ' . . § 405(g), plaintiffs, iTCor~
rcct on the due process issue, wou d be entitled to a refund of the amounts deducted right now, without awaiting
a decision by the Appeals Council and a reviewing court.
HoweYer, " -e thinl~ t11at the suggestion of mootncss should
be rejected on broader grounds.
In Goldberg '· Kelly, 307 U.S. 254, 256 n.2 (1970), 9 the
Court noted that "[d]nring the course of this. litigation
most, though not all, of the plaintiffs either receiYed a
'fair b.eriring' . . . or >rere restored to the rolls without
a hearin3'." Yet the Court did not intimate that the cases
of these plaintiffs 11ad become moot. The situation was evi- ·
dently thought to cor.1e within the principle which protects
against a claim of mootness those issues "capable of repetition, ye.Lev-ading re\~E'w." Southern Pacific Terminal Co.
v. ICC, 219 U.S. 49S, 515 (1911). See Carroll v. Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 178-79 (1968);
llfoore v. Ogilvie, 39:1: U.S. 814, 816 (1969) . The Sol/thern
Pacific principle has been expanded in such recent. cases
as Roe Y. n rade, 410 u.s. 113, 125 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 119, 187 (1973), where the pregnancies of
_ the pregnant plaintiffs must have ended long before the
cases reached the S:1preme Court, and in S ·ztper Tire Eng'r
Co. V, McCorl.-le, 416 u.S. 115, 122 (1974), especially as
regards c1ec1ara tory (as opposed to injunctive) relief, id.
at 121, wl1ich was all tbat the Supreme Court suggested
was proper in Super Tire and all that was granted here.
As against this, there is hardly the same liJ;:elihoocl of the
9

\

1
•

-

Go!dberg was not a class action.
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appearance on the scene of more illegitimate children of
f.Ir. Frost as tlccre was of the Interstate Commerce Commission's directing- another short-term order against the
Soathem Pacific T erminal Company, of New York's again
seeking to r cmn,-e the Goldbe·rg plaintiffs from the welfare rolls, or of the R oe and Doe female plaintiffs becoming pregnant again. See Sosna v. Iowa, - - U.S. - - ,
- - (1915), -±3 u.S.L.\Y. 4125, 4127-28 (U.S., Jan. 14,
1975).
Whether or not the case would be moot if Mrs. Frost \
had sued only on behalf of herself and her children, we do )
not think it has become so here. 10 In Sosna v. Iowa, supra,
.
the Court refused to dismiss as moot a class action challenging Iowa's one-year residence requirement for instituting a di~orce suit because the year had long since expired for the plaintiff and she had obtained a divorce
elsewhere. Altho-:1gh considering that the case would have
become moot if 1frs. Sosna had snecl solely on her own
behalf, - - U.S. at - - , 43 U.S.L.W. at 4127, the Court
found that "the controversy ... remains very much alive
for the class of p ersons she has been certified to r epresent,"
at the appellate stage ·when her own claim was no longer
so. - - U.S. at--, 43 U.S.L.W. at 4128. The Go\Ternment argues .that the instant case differs significantly. in
that, although plaintiff pacl moved for designation of the
suit as a class action before the hearing before the SSA
administrati~e law judge was held, the district court, with
the agreement of the parties, had deferred ruling on the
motion until he rendered his opinion on the merits by
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The Secretary's reliance on DeF1mis v. Odeqaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974),
is thus misplaced, since thare plaintiff sought only injunctive relief for ·
himself and :·rud not cast his suit as a class action." Id. at 317. That
being the case, since plaintiff would never again himself face the law
school admh..<:ion process, which he challenged, the question '~>as moot,
because "the question is certainly not 'capable of repetition' so far as
he [the p1ai.:::tiffJ is concerned." Id. at 319.
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which time the henrin6 ltnd been held ancl t1w case decided.
Our attcntioll is c:1Jleu to the statement in Sosna:

The re ::nust 110t onl? be a nmnccl plaintiff who l1as
such a ease or controversy at the time tbe complaint
is filed, ancl nt the time the class action is certi·fied
by tb e District Court pursuant to Rule 23, 11 bnt there
must be a live controversy at the time this Court
renews the caseY SEC v. lvi cdical Committee for
Humo;~ Riolds, supm. The controversy may exist,
ho11e;er, between a named defendant and a member
of the class represented by the named plaintiff, even
though the claim of the named plaintiff has become
moot.
11 Tbere oay be ca ~es in which the controversy involving the named
plaintiifs i.3 such that it becomea moot as to them before the District
Court can r c::tsonably b!' expected to rule on a certification motion. In such
. instances, -;-;nether the certification can be said to "relate back" to the
filing of the complaint may depend upon the circumstances of the particular c:~se and especially the reality of the claim that otherwise the
issue wo!lld e·.-ade review.
12 Whe:1 this Court l1as entertained doubt about the continuing nature
of a case or contro•·crs:;, it has remaudecl the case to the lower court for
consicler:!ticc of .the possibility of mootness. In(1iana Employment Security Dit:ia!o~ \. B~trney, 409 U.S. 540 (1973).

U.S. at - -, 4:3 U.S."L.\V. at 4128. But the apparent
force of ~what was said there in text is largely _c hained
b_y
footnote -.l
11, wbiCil sePms to- re?..d directly on thi~ cmse .
• '
"While fooh~o te 11, which was given speedy effect in Gerstein v. Pug!! , - - U.S. - - , - - n.11 "<1975): 4-~ TT.S.
~o.-.~
.~ .... ~
1 (.,. U. . S . .,..,
' 18, 197-)
·
L •'"(V
l • ·.£-vv,
±~0~ n. 1
.1:1 ·eo.
::> ,lL speak·s 1n
~-

11

In Gentril! it was not clear from the record whether any of the named
r csponde!:!ts, ~•bo challengec1 Florida procedure which permitted the ext ended p:e~:-i :- 1 detention of arrested persons, without a preliminary
hearing, s.,1~1y on the basis of the prosecutor's decision to file· an information, were still in custo(ly when the district conrt certified the class.
See Cron· '1". California Dep't of Human Reso11rces, - - U.S. - - , 43
U.S.L.W. 3~51 (U.S. Feb. 14, 1975), yncating and remanding 490 F.2d
58 (9. Cir. 1973).
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terms of "may'~, it i.s harcl ro think of a case more clearly
qualifying fc:· i!lclu;,;ion tbm t lli.s one. Mrs. Frost hac1
raised an iss Ee 1\l!ic:b wa::; lin to her and the class she J
claimed to represen:. It is readily apparent that the judge
was prepared to grant ciass action status all along.. Since
granting t1 t: cla~s actiol1 request ,,·oulc1 have done nothing
to assist ~Irs. Frost in her immediate and serious :financial plight, the judge as the first order of business compassionately compelled the Secretary to grant within 30
days the po~·t-reductio u hearing to which she was admittedly entitled. To hold that the completion of that bearing and the renr1ition of judgment by the administrat~ve
law judge rendered the case moot for the class would
mean that the important question here at issue could
never be decided unless a plaintiff or the SSA engaged
in foot -dragging v;ith. respec t to the post-reduction hearing sufficiently- long to enable a district judge to make a
class action determination . . Such a principle could have
little to commend it sl?lf. The reason for generally requiring that the conh·o;ersy be ''live" as to the named plaintiff at the time of c1ass acEon designation is. that other'\\ise the court '\\Oulcl have no assurance that the n~mecl
plaintiff will 'igorously represent the class. This has
little applicati.on when, as here, the court has deferred
class action determinatio~, with the ag:-eement of all parties, pending a n11ing on the merit;;;. The Go7crnm'3 nt· has··~···
poi11tecl to no resiJect in which this case would have proceeded differently if the ro11rt horl ccrE.f.ecl this as a cl8s'3
action on :!.\·o 1emoer 16, 1973, rather than in its decision
of May 3, 1974. If as :Mr. Justice \Vbite said with some
justification in bis dissent in Sosna, --U.S. at -. - , 43
U.S.L.W. at 4131-32 (footnote omitted), "The only specific, identifiable individual with an evident continuing
interest in presenting an attack upon the residency requirement is appellant's counsel" and if the Court had
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O\'crcome tl!i~ by a "legal fiction'' consisting of "the reincation of an abstract entity, 'the class', constituted of faceless, nm1::1:1 t: cl inc1i':icl.n:tls v.·ho arc deemed to lHtvo a live
case or conh·o,-er::;y \\·ith ·lippellecs," it scarcely can be
consequc·ntial iii. a ca::e like tllis whether the named plaintiJf ktcl obtained a Leariug in the period \Yhkb, with the
agreement of the parties, tho court took to m.ako its class
action determination.
It was, of course, essential tbat tlte district court assure
itself "that the named representative will adequately protect the interests of the class/' Sosna v. Iowa, S1tpra,
--U.S. at--, 43 U.S.L.\V. at 4128-29. See I~'.R.Civ.P:
23(a). But the judge had ample ground for deciding that
plaintiffs or, more realistically, their counsel, would do this,
indeed had clone this, for persons similarly situated even
after Mrs. Frost hn.c1 re.ccivcd a hearing before an adrninistrati'e law judge. To be surcJ the named plaintiffs could
not represent. the class of illegitimate children whose claims
· would ,,-ork a diminution of amounts previously allowed,
a status they had not songht. 12 But despite some argument
that they could, 375 F. Snpp. at 1317, the district judge
came to re st on the sound proposition that "[p]laintiffs
only purport to represent those recipients of . s\uvivor's
12

The COJnp1:J.int ''as framed on behalf of all persons entitled .uow or
in th e futu re to .rerei>e benefits under the Act "whose bCiicfits have
been or m:>.y be rrdu~ea witltO(t t a prior hearing." Certainly such a class
de~cri;>tion v;onlll not on its face include newly Pntitled illrgitimato children or illegitimate cbilclren whuse entitlements have been increased.
While some such chil<lr!'n might in the future be faced with the prospect
of rerlnctin'l i'1 h<;>nefits, in Sl'Ch in~t~n~cs they r.onlrl he propP.r members
of the cla ~ s . .In any c>ent, a Reply Affidasit in Support of Class Action
:Motion 2-nJ. Renewal of Request · for Temporary Relief filecl by co~msel
for plaint!:?s would ap('Nlr to aclmo-wledge that, where the statutory
ma..~im:tm ·was a1rcac1y being paic1 (and presumably wltere the statutory
ma.."Um l;m '~a3 not being paid but where the ac1dition of the illegitimate
chi!cl or chil.lren v;oulJ pmh the total claims o~·er the statutory m:-~x
imum), the interest of new c1aim:mts ancl o1cl cbimants would be atl·
v er~e; the _.\.ffi.clant takes hsue with the question of how mn.ny sur.h
case3 TI"ould occur.

I ,

1

l

li
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benefits who ba\e b.acl a do\1.-;,v:;:ncl adjustment in benefits
without b eing affcrcled a pr·r·-r.:-c1t:ction oYiclcniiary hG.:ll'ing." Jd. 13 And ,_,-e do not re,;<1n1 thE:- sta.ten.1cnt with respect
to notice in Eise;! 1. C:ulisle, 391l.~d 5:JG, 56!h (2 Ci.r. 19GS ),
as applyi.n6 to class actions EIJcle r F.R.Civ.P. 23(b) (2), see
So slla V. Iou·a, supra,-- r.s. at - - 11.4, 3B ]\[oore, li"ecleral Practice Ti 23.55 (197±) .

.

I
I

1

'

\
_,

V. Th e Jlerits.
In recent years the Supreme Court has had increasing
occasion to con.sider to v:hat e::;:tent clue process requin~s
a. fnll trial-type hearing before administrative action is
taken when one is pronded p:om~tly thereafter. The leading case in faYor of such a. requirement in the welfare .ficlcl
is, of course, Goldb erg v. Kelfy, supra, 397 U.S. 254. Recognizing "that some go,-ernm.:::ntal benefits may be administrati,ely terminated withoat affording the recipient a
pre-termi:nation enclentiary bearing", 397' U.S. at 2G3 (footnote omit.tec1), the Court tho:r;ht n different rule was required for recipients of aid tUJ.der tl1e fed erally assisted.
AFDC program, 42 U.S.C. ~~COl, et seq., and New York's
Home Relief program, X.Y. Soc. Welf. L. §§ 343, et .seq.
The crucial factor \\as tbat sucb aid was g-iven to persons
on the \ery ma-rgin Of subsistence ; in such instances "'tcn:minahon of aid pending resolution of a _controversy OYCL_ _
~!ie,ibility may deprh-e an e;igiuie-rccipient of the verymeans by which to li\e wb.i~e he \\aits", 397 U.S. at 264
.(emphasis in ori0nn l). 14 'I he oilly opposing inl l're:::b:: wore
13

14

_

Since the jur1ge granted class ~ction sbtus after proper procedures
and with r.ecessary cefulit<>ne.s:, »e see no force in the Government's
contention b:uerl on Bt;ard of Sch"Y.JI Commissioners v. Jacobs,-- U.S.
- - , - - (1975), 43 U.S.L_)';'_ 4.23:3 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975), decided
after the argument 1-lefore us.
:Mr. Justice B:e:1::2!1

con~'lued,

id. (footnote omitted) :

Since be hcks in.!ependent re:;;:nuce:!, hi.'! .situation becomes immt>di-
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tho se of the . Go,ernment in preserving fiscal ancl admini::;trnt ive r esources, and the majority thought that "important
goyernm cutal interests are promoted by affording recipients a pre-termination e·vid entiary hearing." Icl. In its final
Vi' eighing of the balance, the Court said, 397 u.s. at 2G6: .
Thus, the interest of .the eligible recipient in uninter rupted r eceipt of public assistance, conr>lecl with the
State's interest that his payments not be erroneously
terminated, clearly outweighs the State's competing
concern to prevent any increase in its fiscal and aclmin~
istrati.-e burdens.
As the Chief Justice pointed out, dissenting in a companion case, Trh eele-r v. JJJ ontgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 284-85
(1970),_2.~ the Goldberg opinion left unanswered whether
due process r equired a full-scale hearing in ad vanee of
aclrninistrati\e action in such matters as ."welfare reductions or denial of increases as opposed to terminations, or
decisions concerning initial applications or requests for
special assistance." The Court has not yet answered these
questions, except perhaps for a passing observation in
Richardson v. TTTright, 405 U.S. 208, 209, 1·eh. denied, 405
U.S. 1033 (1972)/ 6 primarily because the field has Jar.g cly
been occupied by administrative regulation.
The Court has, ho~\·ever, given extensive consic1cratiou
to the problem in other t?ontexts. The most rele\·ant is
A1·nett v. K euner?y, 416- U.S.-134 (1974), sush~i:cillg -the

• •

I

ately des::erate. His l!C e"!. t~ .' on~ c n tra~e t.pvu fmU.in g tl c n•(!::.<:3 for
daily s:.rb si s ~eace, in turn, adYersely affects his ability to seek re dre~ s from the welfare bmcaucracy.
15
16

The

di s s e ::~t

applied also to Golc11Jerg, 397 U .S. at 282.

Mr. Ju s ti ~ t:l \\hite·s opinion in Arne·tt v. Kenne cl.1f, infra, 416 U.S. at
202, treats t hese remarks as more authoritative than we should have
suppo:<ed t2·?L!l· to be. IE that is correct, the Wrigh t decision would
constitute st rong support for tho Government here.
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validity of procedur e-:: "·he rein a federal employee could
be di s mi.s~ecl for c:au~ c . 5 ll.S.C. ~~ 7.JOl(a), on the b:<sis of
of notice of the action soHg-ht anLl any clmrgc~ prefrnec1
again s t him, a copy of the charge, a l'C<1S011ahlc time for
:filing a wi·itten ::ms'.•:er with nffida,·its, and a written deci.sioll, 3 U.S.C. ~ 1501 (h)-a pToccclure closely resemblii1g·
SSA's l)l'e-rcduction procedure here at issuc-·with a full
evidentiary heariEg t!lereafterY The employee received no
pay pending the l:.earing, and delays amounted to more
than three months i.n O\er 50% of the cases ·where the dismissal >\·as appealed, ±16 u.S. at 157 (plurality opinion of
Mr. Justice Relmquist). \Ye find parbicular relevance in
Mr. Justice Powell~s obser\ation18 that the deprivation of
income prior to :final resolution 1vas "considerably less
severe than that in\oh·ed in Goldberg" since ''a public employee- may "i'ell ha\e independent resources to overcome
any temporary harclship'' and, if unable to secure a job in
pri,ate employment, "l':ill he eligible for welfare benefits",
416 U.S. at 169, and in ~Ir. Justice ·white's discussion, 416
U.S. at 186-96 and 200-03.19 The Court's decisions can be

i~
I

i

!
I
I
I

.

:

17

'.

i

By regulation,
U.S. at 142-46.

the ~ e

statutory protections wero enlarged.

See 416

18

:lrr. Justice Po,ell spoke also for :Mr. Justice Blackmun.

19

Speaking
Goldb erg, ::llr. Justice White snid, 416 U.S. at 201-02: ,
The decision to cut
A.PDC welfa ro p;tyments leaves the recipient
)~
literally mthout any means to surl"ive or support a family. While
~l
this level of depri>ation ma)' no~ bQ)nsistt>u upPtt ns a l!c·c cssrrry- - ~,;
conJition ior req:.t~g so:ne kind of prcterminntion hearing, it may
..,-.,JJ b.- de.:'i.•i>e in reqairing the Government to pro\·ide specific
procedure3 at tJe p:·et;,r!illt.ation sbge. The gre:th;r th'J !~1·"1 of
depri>ation which may flow from a decision, the less one may tolerate the risk of a mistaken decision, cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, supm,
and thus the C.:mrt in Goldberg, wl1ile maintaining that the pre·
termination l:earing was in the nature of a probable-cause dctermil;.ation, was le: s willing to allow a margin of error as to probable
co.~se. Rules of proce,lure are often s1mpeL1 by the risk of making
an erroneous c1~termination. See In re Winship, 397 U.S 358, 368
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Indeed, all that was specilicnlly

of'

off

. I
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fairly- smmnarizecl as holding that the required clt:~gree of
proc:cdnral s~fegtw.rds varies directly with the importance
of the private interest oJfcctcd and tlw need for and uscful11ess of tb.~ fJart.icuL:tr safeg·llnrd i11 tl1c g·ivcrl circumstances anc1.im-er:::ely with the burden and nuy other adYerse conseqw~ nces of affordiug it.
Enn apart from tb.e interests of: the new claimants
there would be strong grounds for holding this case to be
attracted by Arnett v. Kennedy rather than by Goldberg
v. Kelly. 1-\..n element crucial to Goldberg was that the
benefits at is~ue -were awar~CT on the basis of need and
represented the last source of income available to the
families. Tb.e benefits here at issue are not based upon
need; a mother recen-ing benefits on behalf of herself and
he"..r..sl.lik~ earn__:!.1P to a statutory maximnm w:lth~
~~~~~--~~~~~----~-------out a reduction of her benefits, 42 U.S.a. § 403 (f) ( 3), and
----------~
in no event do her earnings affect the benefits to the children. See 4:2 -u.s.a. § -±OS(d). Furthermore ,,-hat is here
at stake is not a complete termination of benefits, as in
Goldberg, but a reduction--in the case of Mrs. Frost and
her children from $-.1:/7.90 to $287.10 per month. ·we do not
mean to underestimate the gravity of such a re_duction;

-

not req,:ired in Goldberg was a complete record and a· ~omprehensi>e opi::Uon. 397 U.S. at 267.
·
In thh case, the employee is not_ totally without prospect for
some form of support. during.J.he parlod becw~;eu. the prete1·minaticn
· and :fi.::lal hearing on appeal, though it may not be equivalent earnings or tenure to his prior competitive sernce position. Although
the ernpl<1yee3 mi!y :not La cut!tlcc.l to unemployment compensation,
- see Christian Y. Xew York:, 414 U.S. 614 (197-1), since he l1as been
terminated for cause[,] he may get some form of employment in
the prh·ate sector, ancl, if necessary, may' draw on the welfare system in tile interim. Gi>cn the hasic floor of need, which the system
pro\i<le~, we shoulcl not ho!<l that procedural due process is so iufle:Uble a3 to requ.ire the Court to hold that the procedural protections, of :t \uitten statement and oral presentation to au impartial
hearing e:s:a.n:-llt!r proYidecl by regulation, are insufficient.
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very likely, as the district court stated, 375 F. Snpp. at
1322, many famtiics do depend solely or primarily on SSA
survivors' benefits. But, ns indicated in Anwtt, su~Jm, 416
U.S. at 169 (}lr. Justice Po·w·ell), 201-02 (}Yir. Justice
\Vhite), in ca.ses where a reduction in such benefits would
place a family below the subsistence level, other forms of
government assistance would become available, ho·wever
unattracti,-e resort to them may be. The "\Yeights in favor
of departing from th e ordinary principle t11at something
less than a full-scale evidentiary hearing suffices befor-e
administrative action, when a full hearing is provided
pro~ptly thereafter, are thus substantially less t1wn in
Goldberg.
Even more important, the weights on the opposite side
of the scale are significantly greater thnn in_ Goldbe.r.g
and, for that matter, jn otller types of cases involving
the i:0tal or partial loss of social benefits "\vhich have come
before the courts. In all such cases the opposing weights
have been solely the Govermnent's interests in protecting
its fiscal and administrati,-e resources- the costs of continued payment of invalid claims with no likelihood of
recovery, . and tlle e::s:pense of conducting full evidentiary
hearings prior to action (more accurately, the incremental
over what "\\rould be incurred
costs of snell.. h enrings
. .._
. .in
any post-termination bearings). \Vhile those interests are
present llere, there are imrort(lnt privat~ interests _as
well. 'J.1he ur..c1er5tanclP.ble clesi1~ of the legitimate-c111l:dten of Mr~ -Frost to avoid a reduction of benefits until
there has been a determinati-:>n of the genuiueues::; of tlw
illegitimate claimants after a fuU evidentiary hearing
(and, for that matter, administrative appeal and judicial
review) is counterbalancec.l by the equally understandable desires of the illegitimate children to begin receiving payments to which they claim to be entitled without
waiting so long. \\bile, m ansvi·er to our inquiry, Gov2939
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ernment counsel has advised tLat SSA now makes payments ·in excess of the family maximum during the
relatively sltOrt period allowed for a protest and its resolution, they also state that the course might -..vell be different if the o-..·erpaymcnts had to continue for a longer
period/ 0 which can lwrclly be said to be constitutionally
required, since, in contrast to Goldberg, there would be
·not merely a possibility but a certainty that it would be
paying to someone monies that were not legally due. A
full-scale e\·idcntiary bearing with respect to paternity
is not likely to he of the simple sort characteristic of
Goldb e-rg and most of the cases that have followed it,
where the evidence is readily accessible to the claimant
and the welfare administr~tor and a pre-termination hear- __ -----~---_.i...,.n6g .can ~ be promptly l1eld and- cmt be concluded usually
within a matter of hours. The legitimate and illegitimate
=----=children may not enn be living in the same vicinity, as
js the case here ·with the four children of Charles Frost,
____ Jr.; yet a full evidentiary· hearing would require that
representatins of both sets of cJJildren be afforded an
- - - - - - - -- opporttlnity to he pre<::cnt, as likewi.se occurred here.
1\Ioreover, a- paternity hc2.ring may demand an inquiry
into the habits of a father long before marriage o~· l~mg
after his ·departure from the matrimonial household.
_·while this comiderr..tion cuts both ways, the deeper .c.u_t
i::; in favor of allo-..nng the- SSA-to· act preliminarily-on
tha..has:is . of-somst-l:li-ng-Jess than a full-scale hearing, par- .
ticularly ;:;i-..:~.:e the fact t11at the SSA has no financial
20

It is tr'le that unc~er its present proceclures the SSA may still be
involved in exceeding the ru::u.:imnm i.n a case where a post-rei!ucti.on
full l1e11ring shorrs that the illegitimate children claiming entitl~ment
were not in fact snch and the reductions are required to be restored.
But at ·l::ast the SS_\ ·m.n ha>e clone all it can to a>oid t1tis, and the
amount is nece~sarily less than rrlwt wol11d result from paying both
sets of children tbrou~hout the period without regard to the ma:"timum.
See also Claims :Manual T310(c), T316.

,
' .
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~take and is toLE:.- c1isiute:!. -tC>t1 rs bet-ween the h :o sets
of cbirnants shol< U be1p to iu:-:11 r., a correct pre-reduction
dc·ci:=:ion. Cf. C'r tJ'C -;·. Ca!ifuri!l(' Dcj/t of Huma-n Resources
Der., -±90 F.2c15SJ, .S S-4: (9 Cr. 1973), ?-·acatcd and 1"C11WIIded
for tOliSidcratioii-Oj ;noofizess, --U.S.-- , 43 U.S.L.\V.
3451 (U.S. Feb. 1±, 1975).
\\'" c thus hold th:t t the SS.:l.'s procedures for a preliminary pre-reclnctioll c:e-tcrr.1iuation m1 papers, to be follo·wed
by a full post-reclnction J1earing if 1·equested, conform to
the requirements of due process. In so ruling we make
two as5umpi1cns: One is that persons whose benefits are
--to be reauced sbodd ha\e full access to any SSA :files
relevant to its re-reduction preliminary consideration if
they
so request. 'Il:!e o.ner 1s n
e u hearing should
-------.__;
be scheL1ulecl promp""ly and decided \\·itb. all feasible speed.
The jr!cTgment is rewrsed -..nth instructions to dismiss
the complaint.
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CHAMBERS DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 74-204
F. David Mathews, Secretary
On Writ of Certiorari
of Health, Education, and
to the United States
Welfare, Petitioner,
Court of Appeals for
v.
the Fourth Circuit.
George H. Eldridge.
[January -, 1976]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The issue in this case is whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that prior to
the termination of Social Security disability benefit payments the recipient be afforded an opportunity for a
full evidentiary hearing.
I
Cash benefits are provided to workers, during periods
in which they are completely disabled, under the disability insurance benefits program created by the 1956
amendments to Title II of the Social Security Act. 70
Stat. 815, 42 U. S. C. § 423. 1 Respondent Eldridge was
1 The program is financed by revenues derived from employee
and employer payroll taxes, 26 U. S. C. §§ 3101 (a), 3111 (a); 42
U. S. C. § 401 (b). It provides monthly benefits to disabled persons who have worked sufficiently to have an insured status, id.,
§ 423 (c) (1) (A), and who have had substantial work experience in
a specified interval directly preceding the onset of disability. !d. ,
§ 423 (c) (1) (B). Benefits also are provided to the worker's dependents under specified circmnstances. ld., §402 (b), (c)(d). At
age 65 ·the recipient's disability benefits are automatically converted
to retirement benefits, id., §§ 416 (1)(2) (D), 423 (a) (1). In fiscal
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first awarded benefits in June 1968. In March 1972, he
received a questionnaire from the state agency charged
with monitoring his medical condition. Eldridge completed the questionnaire, indicating that his condition
had not improved and identifying the physicians who had
treated him recently. The state agency then obtained
reports from his physician and a psychiatric consultant.
After considering these reports and other information
in his file the agency informed Eldridge by letter that it
had made tentative determination that his disability
had ceased in May 1972, The letter included a statement of reasons for the proposed action, and advised
Eldridge that he might have reasonable time in which
to obtain and submit additional information pertaining
to his condition.
In his written response, Eldridge disputed one characterization of his medical condition. 2 The state agency
then made its final determination that he had ceased to
be disabled in May 1972. This determination was accepted by the Social Security Administration, which notified Eldridge in July that his benefits would terminate
after that month. The notification also advised him of
his right to seek reconsideration of this initial det ermination within six months.
1974 over 3,760,000 persons received assistan ce under the program.
Social Security Administration, The Year in Review 13 (1975) .
2
Eldridge originally was disabled due to chronic anxiety and
back strain. He subsequently was found to have diabetes. The
tentative determination letter indicated t hat aid would be terminated because available meclical evidence indicated th at his diabetes
was under control, there existed no significa.nt limitations on his
back movements which would impose severe fun ctional restrictions,
and he no longer suffered severe emotional problems that would
preclude him from all work for which he was qualified. App. 12-13.
In his reply let ter he claimed to have arthritis of the spine rather
than a strained back,

,..
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Instead of requesting reconsideration Eldridge commenced this action challenging the constitutional validity of the administrative procedures established by the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare for assessing
whether there exists a continuing disability, and seeking
an immediate reinstatement of benefits pending an oral
hearing on the issue of his disability. 3 361 F. Supp.
520 (WD Va. 1973). The Secretary moved to dismiss on
the grounds that Eldridge's benefits had been terminated
in accordance with valid administrative regulations and
procedures that he had failed to exhaust. Eldridge relied
exclusively upon this Court's decision in Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970), as establishing a right to a
pretermination oral evidentiary hearing. The Secretary
contended that Goldberg was not controlling since eligibility for disability benefits is not based on financial
need and since issues of credibility and veracity do not
play a significant role in the disability entitlement decision, which turns primarily on medical evidence.
The District Court concluded that the administrative
procedures pursuant to which the Secretary had terminated Eldridge's benefits abridged his right to procedural
due process. The court viewed the interest of the disability recipient in uninterrupted benefits as indistinguishable from that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg.
It further noted that decisions subsequent to Goldberg had
demonstrated that the due process requirement of prior
hearings is not limited to situations involving the deprivation of a vital necessity. See Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U. S. 67, 88-89; Bell v. Burson, 403 U.S. 535 (1971).
Reasoning that disability determinations may involve
subjective judgments based on conflicting medical and
nonmedical evidence, the District Court held that prior
8 The District Court ordered reinstatement of Eldridge's benefits
pending its final disposition on the merits.
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to termination of benefits Eldridge must be afforded an
evidentiary hearing of the type required for welfare
beneficiaries under Title IV of the Social Security Act.
!d., at 528. 4 Relying entirely upon the District Court's
opinion, the Court of Appeals for the .Fourth Circuit affirmed the injunction barring termination of Eldridge's
benefits prior to a full evidentiary hearing. 493 .F. 2d
1230 (1974). 5 We reverse.
II
At the outset we are confronted by a serious question
as to whether the District Court had jurisdiction over
this suit. The Secretary contends that our decision last
Term in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1974) , bars
the District Court from considering Eldridge's action.
Salfi construed 42 U. S. C. § 405 (h) 6 as precluding federal question jurisdiction in an action challenging the
duration-of-relationship requirements for surviving wives
The HEW regulations direct that each stat e plan under the
federal categorical assist ance programs must provide for pre-tr rmination hearings containing specified procedural sa feguards, which
include all of the Goldberg requirements. See 20 CFR § 205.10 (a )
(1974).
5 The Court of Appeals for the Fift h Circuit, noting simply that
the issue had been correctly decided by the District Court here,
reached t he same conclusion in Williams v. Weinberger, 494 F . 2d
1191 (CAS) (p er curiam) petition for cert. filed, 43 U. S. L. W.
3175 (U. S., Sept. 8, 1974) (No. 74-205).
6 Title 42 U. S. C. § 405 (h) provides in full :
"Finality of Secret ary's decision
"(h) The findings and decisions of t he Secreta.r y after a hearing
shall be binding upon all individuals who were pa.rties to such hearing. No findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shaJl be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as
herein provided. No action against t he United St at es, the Secret.o't ry, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under
section 41 of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this
subcha.pter."
4
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and stepchildren of deceased wage earners contained in
the Social Security Act. We there held that the only
avenue of judicial review of denials of claimed benefits
was through 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g)/ which requires as a
jurisdictional prerequisite exhaustion of the administrative remedies provided under the Act.
Section 405 (g) in part provides that
"[a]ny individual, after any final decision of the
Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a
party, irrespective of the amount in controversy,
may obtain a review of such decision by a civil
action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such
further time as the Secretary may allow."
On its face § 405 (g) thus bars review in the district
courts of any denial of a claim of disability benefits
until after a "final decision" by the Secretary after a
"hearing." It is uncontested that Eldridge could haYe
obtained full administrative review of the termination
Title 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g) in part provides:
"Judicial review
"(g) Any individual, after any final derision of the Secretary
made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the
amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a
civil action commenced within sixty days afler the mailing to him
of notice of such decision or within such further time a the
SPcretary may allow. Such action shall be brought in the district
court of the United States for the judicial district in which the
plaintilT resides or has his principal place of business, or, if he does
not reside or have his principal place of business within any such
judicial district, in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbi a. . . . Tho court shall have power to enter, upon the
pleadings and transcript of the record, a juclgmenL affirming, modifying , or reversing the decision of the· Secretary, with or without
remanding the cau ·e for a rehearing. The findings of the Secretary
as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive .. . ."
7
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of his benefits, yet failed even to seek reconsideration of
the initial determination. Since the Secretary has not
"waived" the finality requirement as he had in Salfi,
supra, at 767, he concludes that Eldridge cannot properly invoke § 405 (g) as a basis for jurisdiction. We
disagree.
Salfi identified several conditions which must be satisfied in order to obtain judicial review under § 405 (g).
Of these, the requirement that there be a final decision
by the Secretary after a hearing was regarded as "central
to the requisite grant of subject matter jurisdiction."
!d., at 764. 8 Impl"cit in Salfi, however, is the principle
that this condition consists of two elements, only one of
which is purely "jurisdictional" in the sense that it cannot be "waived" by the Secretary in a particular case.
The nonwaivable element is the requirement that a claim
for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary.
Absent such a claim there can be no "decision" of any
typo. And some decision by the Secretary is clearly
required by the statute.
That this requirement is an essential and distinct
pr.econdition for § 405 (g) jurisdiction is evident from
the different conclusions that we reached in Salfi with
respect to the named appellees and the members of the
class. As to the class members the complaint was found
to be jurisdictionally deficient since it "contain [ ed] no
allegations that they have even filed an application with
The other two conditions arc (1) that the civil action be commenced within 60 days after the mailing of notice of such decision,
or within such additional time as the Secretary may permit and
(2) that the action be filed in an appropriate district court. Salfi,
sup.ra, at 763-764. These two requirements specify a statute of
limitations and appropriate venue, and are waivable by the parties.
As in Salfi no question as to whether Eldridge satisfied these requirements was timely raised below, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proo. 8 (c),
12 (h)( 1), and they need not be considered here.
8
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the Secretary." Ibid. With respect to the named appellees, however, we concluded that the complaint was
sufficient since it alleged that they had "fully presented
their claims for benefits to their district Social Security
Office, and upon denial, to the Regional Office for reconsideration." I d., at 764-765. Eldridge has fulfilled this
crucial pre~equisite. Through his answers to the state
agency questionnaire, and his letter in response to the
tentative determination that his disability had ceased,
he presented quite specifically the claim that he was still
disabled and that his benefits should not be terminated.
This claim was denied by the state agency the SSA.
The fact that E ldridge failed to raise with the Secretary his constitutional claim of entitlement to a pretermination oral hearing is not controlling. 9 As construed in Salfi, § 405 (g) requires only that there be a
''final decision" by the Secretary with respect to a claim
of entitlement to benefits. Indeed, the named appellees
in Salfi did not present their constitutional claim to the
Secretary. To be sure, the situation here is not identical to Salfi. The Secretary had no power to amend the
statute alleged to be unconstitutional in that case, and
he does have authority to determine the timing and
content of the procedures challenged here. 42 U. S. C.
§ 405 (a). We do not, however, regard this difference
as significant. It is unrealistic to expect that the Secretary would consider substantial changes in the current
administrative review system at the behest of a single
aid recipient raising a constitutional challenge in an
adjudicatory context. The Secretary would not be required even to consider such a challenge prior to terminating a recipient's benefits.
9
Even if Eldridge had exhausted the full set of available administrative review procedures, failure to have raised his constitutional
claim would not bar him from asserting it later in a district court
See, e. g., Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U . S. 603, 604, 607 (1960).
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As the threshold jurisdictional element was satisfied,
we now consider whether the denial of Eldridge's claim
to continued benefits was a sufficiently "final decision"
with respect to his constitutional claim to satisfy the
statutory exhaustion requirement. Eldridge concedes
that he did not exhaust the full set of internal review
procedures provided by the Secretary. See 20 CFR
§§ 404.910, 404.916, 404.940. As Salfi recognized, the
Secretary may waive the exhaustion requirement if he
satisfies himself, at any stage of the administrative
process, that no further review is warranted either because the internal needs of the agency are fulfilled or
because the relief that is sought is beyond his power to
ocnfer. We also agree that under § 405 (g) the power
to determine when finality has occurred ordinarily rests
with the Secretary since ultimate responsibility for the
integrity of the administrative program is his. But
cases may arise where a claimant's interest in having a
particular issue resolved promptly is so great that deference to the agency's judgment is inappropriate. We
think this is such a case.
Eldridge's constitutional challenge is entirely collateral
to his substantive claim of entitlement. Moreover, there
is a crucial distinction between the nature of the constitutional claim asserted here and that raised in Salfi. A
claim to a predeprivation hearing as a matter of constitutional right rests on the proposition that full relief
cannot be obtained at a postdeprivation hearing. See
Rail Reorganization Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 156 (1974).
In light of prior decisions, see, e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly,
supra; Fuentes v. Shevin, Eldridge raised at least a
colorable claim that because of his physical condition
and dependency upon the disability benefits, an erroneous termination would damage him in a way not
recompensable through retroactive payments. Thus,
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unlike the situation in Salfi, denying Eldridge's substantive claim "for other reasons" or upholding it "under
other provisions," 422 U. S., at 762, would not answer
his constitutional challenge.
We conclude that the denial of Eldridge's request for
benefits constitutes a final decision for purposes of § 405
(g) jurisdiction over his constitutional claim. 10 We now
proceed to the merits of that claim.11
10 Decisions not involving § 405 (g) have emphasized, in different
contexts, that the nature of the claim being asserted and the con equences of deferment of judicial rc1 iew are important factors in
determining whether a statutory requirement of finality has been
satisfied. The role these factors may play in particular cases is
well illustrated by the intensely "practical" approach which we have
adopted, Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546
(1949), when applying the finality requirements of 28 U. S. C.
§ 1291, which grants to courts of appeals review over all "final
decisions" of the district courts, and 2 U. S. C. § 1257, which
empowers this Court to review only "final judgments" of state
courts. Sec, e. g., Local No. 438 Construction & General Laborers
Union v. Curry, 371 U. S. 542, 550 (1963); Mercantile National
Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555, 557-558 (1973); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., supra, at 545-546. To be sure certain
of the policy considerations implicated in § 1257 and § 1291 cases
are different from those that are relevant here. Compare General
Laborers Union, supra, at 550; Mercantile National Bank, supra,
at 558, with McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-195 (1969);
L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action, 424-425 (1965).
But the core principle that even statutorily created finality requirements should, if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial
collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable injuries to
be suffered, remains applicable.
Our conclusion finds strong support in Harris v. Washington,
404 U. S. 55 ( 1971), which presented the issue whether a state
court judgment was final for purpo es of § 1257 jurisdiction. In
Harris the State attempted to try an individual previously acqtutted
of a charge of murder stemming from a bombing death for the
murder of a second person killed in the same explosion. The
[Footnote 11 is on p. 10]
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III
A
Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of "liberty" or "property" interests within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth AmendSupreme Court of Washington rejected the defendant's pretrial
motion that the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy prevented his being tried a second time. Despite the possibility tha,t acquittal after trial might make review here un necess'lry,
or that if convicted the defendant might then challenge the validity
of his conviction, we granted immediate review. Were the defendant subsequently to have prevailed on the merits of his constitutional claim, to have required him to go through the second trial
prior to bringing his clajm to this Court would have forced him
to suffer part of the harm which the Fifth Amendment's guarantee
against double jeopardy is intended to prevent. Similarly, to require Eldridge to exhaust tho administmiive process as a prerequisite to obtaining judicial review would be to force him to
suffer an injury that could not be rectified by posttermina.tion
relief even if he were to prevn il on the merits.
11
Given our conclusion that jurisdiction in the District Court
wa.s propt>r under § 405 (g), we find it unnecessary to consider
Eldridge's contention that notwithstanding § 405 (h) there was
jurisdiction over his claim under the mandamus statute, 28 U.S. C.
§ 1361, or tho Administmtive Procedure Act. 5 U. S. C. § 701
et seq. In view of our dispisition of the constitutional issue in this
case we also find it unn ecessary to consider whether, even if jurisdiction by tho District Court was proper under § 405 (g), the scope
of relief that the court ordered was not. See Weinberger v. Salfi,
supra, at - , n , 8. Section 405 (g) empowers a district court to
enter "a judgment affinning, modifying, or reversing the decision
of the Secretary .. . ." The court below granted equitable relief,
holding inter alia that Eldridge must be given an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of his benefits. Although the parties do
not directly address tllis issue, the Secretary apparently concedes
that declaratory or injunctive remedies may in some circumstances
be appropriate under § 405 (g). Supplemental and Reply Brief for
the Petitioner 9.
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ment. The Secretary does not contend that procedural
due process is inalJ]Jlicable to terminations of social security disability benrfi.ts. He recognizes, as has been
implicit in our prior deciRions, e. g., Richardson v. Belcher,
404 U. S. 78, 80-81 ( 1971); Richardson v. Perales, 402
n. S. 389, 401--402 (1971); Fleming V. Nestor, 363 U. s~
603, 611 (1960), that the interest of an individual in
continued receipt of these benefits is a statutorily created
"property" interest protected by the Fifth Amendment.
Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 166 (PowELL, J.,
concurring); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564,
576-578 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 539
(1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 261-262. Ra_ther
the Secretary contencis that the existing administrative
procedures provide all the process that is constitutionally
due before a recipient can be deprived of that interest.
'This Court consistantly has held that some forn;t of
hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest. See, e. g., Dent v. West
Tfirginia, 129 U. S. 114 (1889); North American Cold
Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306 ( 1908); Phillips ':·
Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589 (1931); Bell v. Burson,
supra; North Georgia Finishing, In c. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,
422 U. S. (1975). The "right to be heard before being
condemned to suffer a grievous loss of any kind, even
though it may not involve the stigr1a and hardships of
criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society."
Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The fundamental
requirement of due process is the c. portunity to be heard
"at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965). See
Grannis v. Ordeau, 234 U. S. 385, 394 ( 1914). The respondent agrees that if disability benefits were continued
until after the evidentiary hearing stage of the admin-
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istrative process, the administrative and judicial procedures that may be invoked by a claimant before the
initial determination of ineligibility becomes final would
be adequate. The dispute centers upon what process is
due prior to the initial termination of benefits, pending
review.
In recent years this Court increasingly has had occasion to consider to what extent due process requires
an evidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation of some
type of property interest even if a full hearing is provided
thereafter. In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly, supra,
has the Court held that a hearing closely approximating
a judicial trial is necessary. In other cases requiring
some type of pretermination hearing the Court has
spoken sparingly about the requisite procedures. Snidach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 ( 1969), involving garnishment of wages, was entirely silent on the
matter. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 ( 1972), the
Court said only that in a replevin suit between two
private parties the initial determination required something more than an ex parte proceeding before a court
clerk. Similarly, Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 540
(1971), held that in the context of the revocation of a
state-granted driver's license, due process required only
that the initial hearing involve a probable-cause determination as to the fault of the licensee, and "need not
take the form of a full adjudication of the question of
liability." More recently, in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134 (1974), we sustained the validity of procedures
by which a federal employee could be dismissed for cause.
They included notice of the action sought, a copy of the
charge, reasonable time for filing a written response, and
an opportunity for an oral appearance. Following dismissal, a full evidentiary hearing was provided. See id.,
at 142-146.
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These decisions serve to underscore the truism that
" 'due process,' unlike some legal rules is not a technical
conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place
and circumstances ...." Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961).
"[D] ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands." Jvi orrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972). Accordingly,
resolution of the issue whether the administrative procedures provided here constitutionally sufficient requires
analysis of the governmental and private interests that
are affected. Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 167-168
(PowELL, J., concurring); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at
263-266; Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v.
McElroy, supra, at 895. More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates
of due process generally requires consideration of three
distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional
procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, included the function involved and the administrative burden that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. See, e. g., Goldberg v.
Kelly, supra, at 263-271.
We turn first to a description of the procedures for
the termination of Social Security disability benefits, and
thereafter consider the factors bearing upon the constitutional adequacy of such procedures.

B
The disability insurance program is administered
through a combination of state and federal agencies.
State agencies make the initial determination whether
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a disability exists, when it began, and when it ceased.
42 U. S. C. § 421. 12 The standards applied and the procedures followed are prescribed by the Secretary, see id.,
§ 421 (b), who has delegated his responsibilities and
powers under the Act to the Social Security Administration (SSA), see 40 Fed. Reg. § 4473.
In order to establish initial and continued entitlement to disability benefits a worker must demonstrate
that he is unable:
"to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months, ..." 42 U.S. C. § 423 (d)(1)(A).
To satisfy this test the worker bears a continuing burden
of showing, by means of "medically acceptable clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques," id., § 423 (d)(3),
a physical or mental impairment of such severity that:
"he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy,
regardless of whether such work exists in the im12

In all but six States the state vocational rehabilitation agency
charged with administering the state plan under the Vocational
Rehabilitation Act, 41 Stat. 735, as amended, 29 U. S. C. (Supp.
III) § 701 et seq., acts as the "state agency" for purposes of the
disability insurance program. Staff of the H. Comm. on Ways and
Means, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Report on the Disability Insurance
Program 148 (1974) (hereinafter Staff Report). This use of state
agencies was intended to encourage rehabilitation contacts by disabled workers and to utilize the well-established relationships of
these local agencies with the medical profession. H. Rep. No. 1698,
83d Cong., 2d Sess., 23-24 (1954) .
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mediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific
job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be
hired if he applied for work." I d., § 423 ( d)(2) (A) .~
3

The principal reasons for benefits terminations arc that
the worker is no longer disabled or has returned to work.
As Eldridge's benefits were terminated because he was
determined to be no longer disabled, we consider only
the sufficiency of the procedures involved in such cases. 14
Determinations that a worker's disability has ceased
because of medical recovery typically occur, as in this
case, as a result of a scheduled medical examination.
The continuing eligibility investigation is made by a
state agency acting through a "team" consisting of a
physician and a nonmedical person trained in disability
evaluation. The agency communicates with the disabled worker, usually by mail- in which case he is sent
a detailed questionnaire-or by telephone, and requests
information conoerning his prercnt condition, including
current medical restrictions and sources of treatment, and
any additional information that he considers relevant to
13 Work which exists in the national economy is in turn defined
as "work which exists in significant numbers either in the region
where such individual lives or in several regions of the country."
42 U.S. C. §423 (d)(2)(A).
14 Because
the continuing disability investigation concerning
whether a claimant has returned to work is usually done directly
by the SSA Bureau of Disability Insurance, without any state agency
involvement, the administrative procedures prior to the posttermination evidentiary hearing differ from those involved in cases of possible medical recovery. They are similar, however, in the important
respect that the process relies principally on written communications
and there is no provision for an oral hearing prior to the cut-off of
benefits. Due to the nature of the relevant inquiry, in cases involving self-employment, agricultural employment, or voluntary report of work activity with a future medical re-examination date,
the SSA office nearest the beneficiary interviews the beneficiary as
part of the pretermination process. CM § 6705.2 (c).
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his continued entitlement to benefits. SSA Claims
Manual § 7605.1 (CM); Disability Insurance State
Manual § 353.3 (DISM) .15
Information regarding the recipient's current condition
is also obtained from his sources of medical treatment.
D ISM § 353.2 (B). If there is a conflict between the
information provided by the beneficiary or his physician
and that obtained from other medical sources, the agency
may arrange for an examination by an independent consulting physician. 16 !d., §§ 353.2E, 353.5. When ever
the agency's tentative assessment of the beneficiary's
condition differs from his own assessment, the beneficiary
is informed of the proposed administrative action, provided a summary of the evidence upon which the determination is based, and afforded an opportunity to review
the medical reports and other evidence in his case file. 17
He also may respond in writing and submit additional
evidence. I d., § 353.6.
The state agency then makes its final determination,
which is reviewed by an examiner in the SSA Bureau
of Disability Insurance. 42 U. S. C. § 421 (c); CM
§ § 6701 (b), (b) .1 8 If as is usually the case, the SSA
15 Information is also requested con coming his belief as to
whether he can return to work, the nature and extent of his employment during the past year, and any vocational services he is
receiving.
16 All medical source evidence used to establish the absence of
continuing disability must be in writing, with the source properly
identified. DISM § 353.4C.
17
The disability recipient is not permitted personally to examine
the medical reports contained in his file. This restriction is not
significant since he is entitled to have any representative of his
choice, including lay friends or family members, examine all medical
evidence. CM § 7314. Sec also 20 CFR § 401.3 (a) (2). The Secretary informs us that this curious limitation is currently under
review.
.
18 The SSA may not itself revise the state agency's determination
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accepts the agency determination it notifies the recipient
in writing, informing him of the reasons for the decision,
and of his right to seek de novo reconsideration by the
state agency. 20 CFR §§ 404.907, 404.909. 19 Upon acceptance by the SSA benefits are terminated effective
two months after the month in which medical recovery is
found to have occurred. 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III)
§ 423 (a).
If the recipient seeks reconsideration from the state
agency and the determination is adverse, he then has a
right to an evidentiary hearing before an administrative
law judge. I d., § 404.927. The hearing is nonadversary;
the SSA is not represented by counsel or other staff. As
at all prior and subsequent stages of the administrative
process, however, the claimant may be represented by
counsel or other spokesmen. I d., § 404.9,34. If this
hearing results in an adverse decision, the claimant is entitled to request discretionary review by the SSA Appeals
Council, id., § 404.9'45, and finally may obtain posttermination judicial review. 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g); 20
CFR § 404.951. 20
Should it be determined at any point after termination
of benefits, that the claimant's disability extended beto be more favorable to the beneficiary. If, however, it believes
that the worker is still disabled, or that the disability lasted longer
than determined by the state agency, it may return the file to the
agency for further consideration in light of SSA's views. The
agency is free to reaffirm its original assessment.
19
The reconsideration assessment is initially made by the state
agency, but usually not by the same persons who considered the
case originally. R. Dixon, Social Security Disability and Mass
Justice 32 (1973). Both the recipient and the agency may adduce
new evidence. The SSA reviews the reconsideration determination and notifies the recipient of the decision.
20 Unlike all prior levels of review, which are de novo, the District Court is required to treat findings of fact as conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S. C.§ 405 (g).
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yond tho date of cessation initially established, the
worker is entitled to retroactive payments. Cf. 42
U.S. C. § 423 (b); 20 CFR §§ 404.501, 404.504. 21 If, on
the other hand, a beneficiary receives any payments to
which he is later determined not to be entitled, the statute authorizes the Secretary to attempt to recoup these
funds in specified circumstances. 42 U. S. C. § 404. 22

c
As in Goldberg, the only function of the pretermination
administrative inquiry is "to produce an initial determination of the validity of the [state agency's] grounds for
discontinuance of payments." 397 U. S., at 267. Despite the elaborate character of the administrative procedures provided by the Secretary, the courts below held
them to be constitutionally inadequate, concluding that
due process requires a full evidentiary hearing. Since
a recipient whoso benefits are terminated is awarded full
retroactive relief if he ultimately prevails, his actual injury consists of the interruption of this source of income
during the interim. His potential injury is thus similar
in nature to that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg, see
397 U. S., at 263-264, the nonprobationary federal employee in Arnett, see 416 U. S., at 146, and the garnished
wage earner in Sniadach, see 395 U. S., at 341-342. 23
Although the statutory basis for these payments is not unnmbiguous, we assume, for purposes of this decision, thaL the Secretary's unchallenged representation that such payments in fact are
made is correct.
22 The Secretary may reduce other payments to which the beneficiary is entitled, or seek the payment of a refund, unless the
beneficiary is "without fault" and such adjustment or recovery would
defeat the purposes of the Act or be "against equity and good
conscience." 42 U. S. C. § 4.04. (b). See generally 20 CFR
§§ 404.501-404.515.
2
~ This, of conrse, assumes that an erronrously garnished employee is subsequently able to recover his back wages.
21
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Only in Goldberg has the Court held that due process re~
quires an evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary deprivation. It was emphasized there that welfare assist~
ance was given to persons on the very margin of
subsistence:
"The crucial factor in this context-a factor not
present in the case of ... virtually anyone else whose
governmental entitlements are ended-is that ter~
minat.ion of aid pending resolution of a controversy
over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of
the very means by which to live while he waits."
397 U.S., at 264 (emphasis in original).
Eligibility for disability benefits is not based upon
financial need. 24 Indeed, it is wholly unrelated to the
worker's income or support from most other sources,
such as employment of other family members, workmen's
compensation awards, 25 savings, tort claims awards, pri.:
vate insurance, public or private pensions, veterans bene~
fits, food stamps, public assistance, or the "many other
important programs both public and private, which con~
tain provisions for disability payments affecting a substantial portion of the work force . .. ." Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 85-87 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See Staff Report on the Disability Insurance Program, House Comm. on Ways & Means, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess., 9-10, 419-429 (1974).
24 The level of benefits is determined by the worker's average
monthly earnings during the period prior to disability, his age,
and other factors not directly related to financial need spccilicd in
42 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 415. See 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III)
§ 423 (a) (2).
25 Workmen's compensation benefits, however, arc deducted in
part in accordance with a statutory formula. 42 U. S. C. (Supp.
III) § 424a; 20 CFR § 404.408; see Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S.
78 (1971).
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The level of deprivation that may be created by a
particular decision is a factor to be considered in assessing the validity of any administrative decisionmaking
process. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
Although the Secretary is correct that the potential
deprivation here is less than in Goldberg, we think he
overstates the degree of difference. As the District Court
emphasized, to remain eligible for benefits a recipient
must be "unable to engage in substantial gainful activity." 42 U. S. C. § 423; 361 F. Supp., at 523. Thus,
in contrast to the discharged federal employee in Arnett,
see 416 U. S., at 169 (PowELL, J., concurring); 416 U. S.,
at 202 (WHITE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), there may be little possibility that the terminated
recipient will be able to find even temporary employment to ameliorate the loss prior to an evidentiary
hearing.
As we recognized lfl~t Term in Fusari v. Steinberg,
422 U.S. 379, 389 (1975), "the possible length of wrongful deprivation of . .. benefits [also] is an important factor
in assessing the impact of official action on private interests." The Secretary concedes that the delay between
a request for an 2Jministrative hearing and a decision
on the claim is currently between 10 and 11 months.
Since a terminated recipient must first obtain a reconsideration decision as a prerequisite to invoking his right
to a hearing, the actual delay between the cut-off of
benefits and final decision after a hearing is over one
year. In view of the torpidity of this administrative review
process, cf. id., at 383-384, 386, and the relatively modest
resources of the family unit of the physical disabled
worker, 26 the hardship imposed upon the erroneously
26
Amici cite statistics compiled by tho Secretary which indicate
that in 1965 the mean income of the family unit of a disabled
worker was $3,803, while the median income for a similar grouping
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terminated disability recipient may in some cases be
significant.
We do not underestimate the potential seriousness of
even a temporary interruption of disability benefits.
Still, the disabled worker's need is likely to be less than
that of a welfare recipient. In addition to the greater
probability of access to private resources, other forms of
government assistance will become available where the
termination of disability benefits places a worker or his
family below the subsistence leveP 7 See Arnett, supra,
at 169 (POWELL, J., concurring), id., at 201-202 (WHITE,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In view
of these potential sources of temporary income, the
weights in favor of departing from the ordinary principle, established by our prior decisions, that something
was $2,836. The mean liquid assets-i. e., cash, stocks, bonds-of
the::>e family units was $4,862; the median was $940. These statistics
do not take into account the family unit's nonliquid assets-i. e.,
automobile, real estate, or the like.
27 Amici emphasize that because an identical definition of disability is employed in both the Title II Social Security Program and in
the companion welfare system for the disabled, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), compare 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d) (1) with id.,
§ 1382c (a)(::!), the terminated di8ability benefits recipient will be
ineligible for the SSI Program. There exist, however, state and
local welfare programs which may supplement the worker's income.
In addition, the worker's household unit can qualify for food stamps
if it meets the financial need requirements. See 7 U. S. C. §§ 2013
(c), 2014 (b); 7 CFR § 271. Finally, in 1974 480,000 of the approximately 2,000,000 disabled workers receiving Social Security
benefits also received SSI benefits. Since financial need is a criterion
for eligibility under the SSI program, those disabled workers who
are most in need will in the majority of cases be receiving SSI benefits when disability insurance aid is terminated. And, under the
SSI program, a pretermination evidrntiary hearing is provided, if
requested. 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 1383 (c); 20 CFR § 416.1336
(c) ; 40 Fed. Reg. 1512; sec Staff Report 346.
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less than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to
administrative action are therefore less than in Goldberg.

D
An additional factor is the fairness and reliability of
the current pretermination procedures, and the probable
value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards. Central to the evaluation of any administrative process is
the nature of the relevant inquiry. In order to remain
eligible for benefits the disabled worker must demonstrate by means of "medically acceptable clinical and
diagnostic techniques," 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d) (3), that
he is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical
or mental impairment .... " !d., § 423 (a) (1) (A) (emphasis supplied). In short, a medical judgment as to the
worker's physical or mental condition is required. This
is a more sharply focused and easily documented inquiry
than the typical determination of welfare, entitlement.
In the latter case, a wide variety of information may be
deemed relevant, and issues of witness "credibility and
voracity" often are critical to the decisionmaking process.
Goldberg noted that in such circumstances "written submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision."
397 U. S., at 269.
By contrast, the decision whether to discontinue disability benefits will turn, in most cases, upon "routine,
standard and unbiased medical reports by physician
specialists" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U, S. 389, 404
( 1971), concerning a subject whom they have personally
examined. 28 In Richardson the Court recognized the
The decision is not purely a question of the accuracy of a medical diagnosis since the ulLimate issue which the state agency must
resolve is whether in light of the particular worker's "age, education,
and work experience" he cannot "engage in any . . . substantial
28

74-20·1-0PINION
MATHEWS v. ELDRIDGE

23

"reliability and probative worth of written medical reports," emphasizing that while there may be "professional disagreement with medical conclusions" the specter of questionable credibility and veracity is not
present." !d., at 405, 407. To be sure, credibility and
veracity may be a factor in the ultimate disability assessment in some cases. But procedural due process rules
are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process as applied to the generality of cases, not
the rare exceptions. The potential value of an evidentiary hearing, or even oral presentation to the decisionmaker, is substantially less in this context than in
Goldberg.
The decision in GoldbPrg was also based on the Court's
conclusion that written submissions were an inadequate
substitute for oral presentation because they did not
provide an effective means of communication. Written
submissions were viewed as an unrealistic option, for
most recipients lacked the "educational attainment necessary to write effectively" and could not afford professional assistance. In addition, such submissions would
not provide the "flexibility of oral presentations" or
g:~i J tful

work which exists in the national economy .... " 42 U.S. C.
Yet information concerning each of these char.Ltleristics is amenable to effective written presentation. The value
of a full evidentiary hearing, or even a limited oral presentation, to
an accurate presentation of those factors to the decisionmaker does
not appear substantial. Similarly, resolution of the inquiry as to
the types of employment that potentially exist in the national
economy for a physically impaired worker with a particular set of
skills would not necessarily be advanced by an oral evidentiary
hraring. Cf, Davis, Admini ~: mtive Law Treatise § 7.06, at 429
(1958) ("legislative facts"). Tho types of statistical i11formation relevant to this judgment are more amenable to written than oral
presentation.
~

123 (d)(~)(A).
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"permit the recipient to mold his presentation to the
issues the decision maker appears to regard as important." 397 U. S., at 269. In the context of the disability benefits entitlement assessment the current administrative procedures fully answer these objections.
The detailed questionnaire which the state agency
sends the recipient when a question arises as to his
continued disability identifies with particularity the
information relevant to the entitlement decision. Moreover, the recipient is invited to obtain assistance from
the local SSA office in completing the questionnaire,
and the supporting medical information usually is
readily available in the form of the treating physician's
written diagnosis. This information may be supported
by X -rays and the results of clinical or laboratory tests.
Thus, the type of information most relevant to a claimant's physical or mental condition is typically more
amenable to written than to oral presentation. Cf.
W. Gellhorn & C. Byse, Admi 1istrative Law-Cases and
Comments 860-863 (6th ed. 1974).
A further safeguard against mistake is th~ policy of
allowing the disability recipient or his representative full
access to all information reli:ed upon by the state agency.
In addition, prior to the c Jtoff of benefits the agency
informs the recipient of its tentative assessment, the
reasons therefor, and provides a summary of the evidence that it considers most relevant. Opportunity is
then afforded the recipient to submit additional evidence or arguments, enabling him to challenge directly
the accuracy of information in his file as well as the
correctness of the agency's tentative conclusions. These
procedures, again as contrasted with those before the
Court in Goldberg, enable the recipient to "mold" his
argument to respond to the precise issues which the
decisionmaker regards as crucial.
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Despite these carefully structured procedures, amtct
point to the significant reversal rate for appealed cases
as clear evidence that the current process is inadequate:
Depending upon the base selected and the line of analysis followed, the relevant reversal rates urged by the
contending parties vary from a high of 58.6% for appealed reconsideration decisions to an overall reversal
rate of only 3.3%. 29 Bare statistics rarely provide a
satisfactory measure of the fairness of the current pretermination process. The administrative review system
under attack here is operated on an open-file basis. A
recipient may always submit new evidence, and such
submissions may result in additional medical examinations. Such fresh examinations are held in approximately 30% to 40% of the appealed cases, either at the
reconsideration or hearing stage of the administrative
process. Staff Report 238. In this context, the value
of reversal rate statistics as one means of evaluating the
adequacy of the pretermination process is diminished.
Thus, although we view such information as relevant, it
is certainly not controlling in this case.
By focusing solely on the reversal rate for appealed reconsideration determinations amici overstate the relevant reversal rate.
As we indicated last Term in Fusari v. Steinberg, 422 U. S., at 383
n. 6, in order fully to assess the reliability and fairness of a system
of procedure, one must also consider the overall rate of error for
all denials of benefits. Here that overall rate is 12.2%. Moreover,
about 75% of these reversals occur at the reconsideration stage of
the administrative process. Since the median period between a
request for reconsideration review and decision is only two months,
Brief for Amici AFL--CIO/Greene, App. 4a, tho deprivation of the
erroneously terminated recipient is significantly less than that concommitant in the more lengthy delay before an evidentiary hearing.
Netting out these reconsideration reversals the overall reversal rate
falls to 3.3%.
29
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E
In striking the appropriate due process balance the
final factor to be assessed is the public interest. This
includes the administrative burden and other societal
costs that would be associated with requiring, as a matter
of constitutional right, an evidentiary hearing upon demand in all cases prior to the termination of benefits.
The more visible burden would be the incremental cost
resulting from the increased number of hear.ings and the
expense of providing benefits to ineligible recipients pending decision. No one can predict the extent of the increase, but the fact that full benefits would continue until
after such hearings would assure the exhaustion in most
cases of this attractive option. Nor would the theoretical
right of the Secretary to recover undeserved benefits
result, as a practical matter, in any substantial offset to
the added outlay of public funds. The parties submit
widely varying estimates of the probable additional cost.
We only need say that experience with the constitutionalizing of government procedures suggests that the ultimate additional cost would be substantial.
In most circumstances, as here, financial cost is not a
compelling weight in the assessment whether due process
requires a particular procedural safeguard prior to some
administrative action. But the Government's interest,
and hence that of the public, in conserving scarce fiscal
and administrative resources, is a factor that must be
weighed. At some point the benefit of an additional
safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative action and to society in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, will be outweighed by the
cost. Significantly, the cost of protecting those who the
preliminary administrative process has identified as likely
to be found undeserving may in the end come out of the
pockets of the deserving since resources available for any
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particular program of social welfare cannot be unlimited.
See Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, J23 Penn. L. Rev.
1267, 1276 (1975).
But more is implicated in cases of this type than ad hoc
balancing of monetary costs against the interests of a
particular class of claimants. The ultimate balance involves a determination as to when, under our constitutional system, judicial type procedures must be imposed
upon administrative action to assure fairness. We reiterate the wise admonishment of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
that differences in the origin and function of administrative agencies "preclude wholesale transplantation of the
rules of procedure, trial, and review which have evolved
from the history and experience of the courts." FCC v.
Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 140 (1940).
The judicial model is neither a required, nor even the
most effective method of decisionmaking in all circum~
~tances. The essence of due process is the requirement
that "a person in jeopardy of serious loss" be given
notice of the case against . him and an opportunity to
meet it." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. M cGrath, supra, at 171-172. (Franldurter, J., concurring).
All that is necessary is that by "tailor[ing] the [procedures] to the capacities and circumstances of those who
are to be heard," Goldberg, supra, at 268-269, they be
given a mean'•1gful opportun~ ty to present their case.
In assessing w·. rt process is due, substantial weight must
be given to the goocl-faith judgments of the individuals
charged by Congress with the administration of the social
welfare system that the procedures they have provided
fairly deal with the entitlement claims of individuals.
See Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 202 (WHITE, J., concurring and dissenting in part). This is especially so where,
as here, the prescribed procedures not only provide the
claimant with an effective process for asserting his claim
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prior to any administrative action, but also assure a
right to an evidentiary hearing, as well as to subsequent
judicial review, before the denial of his claim becomes
final. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 402 U. S. 371, 378
( 1971).
We conclude that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of disability benefits and
that the present administrative procedures fully comport
with due process.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
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The Issue in this case IS whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that prior to
the termination of Social Security disability benefit payments the recipient be afforded an opportunity for a
full evidentiary heanng·.
I
Cash benefits are provided to workers during periods
in which they are completely disabled under the disability insurance benefits program created by the 1956
amendments to Title II of the Social Security Act. 70
Stat. 815, 42 U S C. § 423.1 Respondent Eldridge was
1 The program is financed by revenues derived from employee
and employer payroll taxes. 26 U S. C. §§ 3101 (a), 3111 (a) , 42
U, S. C. § 401 (b) It prov1des monthly benefits to disabled persons who have workerl a sufficient amount of time to have an insured
status, td., § 423 (c) (l) (A), and who have had substantial work expenenc<' m a :>JWclficd mtt'rval duectly preceding the onset of disnlHhty I d., § 423 (c) (1) (B). Benefits also are prov1ded to the
worker's depmdent'5 under ,;pec1fied circumstances. !d., §§ 402 (b)(d). Wht•n tho n·mp1ent reaches age 65 Ius d1sabuity benefits are
~.~.~ttomat.icall ' ~"Onwrted to retir<'moot b<'nefits., ld 1 §§ 416 {Z) (D)»
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first awarded benefits in June 1968. In March 1972, he
received a questionnaire from the state agency charged
with monitoring his medical condition. Eldridge completed the questionnaire, indicating that his condition
had not improved and identifying the medical sources,
including physicians from which he had received treatment recently. The state agency then obtained reports from his physiCian and a psychiatric consultant.
After considering 'these reports and other information
in his file the agency informed Eldridge by letter that it
had made a tentative determination that his disability
had ceased in May 1972, The letter included a statement of reasons for the proposed termination of benefits,
and advised Eldridge that he might request reasonable
time in which to obtain and submit additional information pertaining to his condition.
In his written response, Eldridge disputed one characterization of his medical condition and indicated that
the agency already had enough evidence to establish his
disability. 2 The state agency then made its final determination that he had ceased to be disabled in May 1972.
This determination was accepted by the Social Security
Administration (SSA), which notified Eldridge in July
that his benefits would terminate after that month.
423 (a) (1) . In fiscal1974 approximately 3,700,000 persons received
assistance under the program. Social Security Administration, The
Year in Review 21 (1974) .
2 Eldridge originally was disabled due to chronic anxiety and
back strain. He subsequently was found to have diabetes. The
tentative determination letter indicated that aid would be terminated because available medical evidence indicated that his diabetes
was under control, that there existed no limitations on his back
movements which would Impose severe functional restrictions,
and that he no longer suffered emotional problems that would
preclude him from all work for which he was qualified. App. 12-13.
In his reply letter he claimed to have arthritis of the spine rather
:than a strained back,
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The notification also advised him of his right to seek
reconsideration by the state agency of this initial determination within six months,
Instead of requesting reconsideration Eldridge commenced this action challenging the constitutional valid·
ity of the administrative procedures established by the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare for assessing
whether there exists a continuing disability. He sought
an immediate reinstatement of benefits pending an oral
hearing on the issue of his disability. 3 361 F. Supp.
520 (WD Va. 1973) . The Secretary moved to dismiss on
the grounds that Eldridge's benefits had been terminated
in accordance with valid administrative regulations and
procedures and that he had failed to exhaust these remedies. In support of his contention that due process re·
quires a pretermination hearing, Eldridge relied exclusively upon this Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U. S, 254 (1970), which established a right to an
oral evidentiary hearing prior to termination of welfare
benefits. The Secretary contended that Goldberg was
not controlling since eligibility for disability benefits, unlike eligibility for welfare benefits, is not based on financial need and since issues of credibility and veracity do
not play a significant role in the disability entitlement
decision , which turns primarily on medical evidence.
The District Court concluded that the administrative
procedures pursuant to which the Secretary had terminated Eldridge's benefits abridged his right to procedural
due process. The court viewed the interest of the disability recipient in uninterrupted benefits as indistinguishable from that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg.
It further noted that decisions subsequent to Goldberg
demonstrated that the due process requirement of pre~ The District Court ordered reinstatement of Eldridge's
pendl:n:g it,g final dispo.~tt,ion on the merits."

ben~Jits
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termination heanngs is not limited to situations involvmg the deprivation of vital necessities. See Fuentes v.
Shemn, 407 U. S. 67, 88-89 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402
U. S. 535 (1971) Reasoning that disability determinations may involve subjective judgments based on conflicting medical and nonmedical evidence, the District
Court held that prior to termination of benefits Eldridge
must be afforded an evidentiary hearing of the type reqmred for welfare beneficiaries under Title IV of the
Social Security Act. I d., at 528.4 Relying entirely upon
the District Court's opinion, the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the injunction barring termination of Eldridge's benefits prior to a full evidentiary
hearing. 493 F . 2d 1230 (1974) . ~ We reverse.

II
At the outset we are confronted by a question as
to whether the District Court had jurisdiction over
this suit. The Secretary contends that our decision last
Term in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975), bars
the District Court from considering Eldridge's action.
Salfi was an action challenging the Social Security Act's
duration-of-relationship eligibility requirements for surviving wives and stepchildren of deceased wage earners.
We there held that 42 U. S. C. § 405 (h) 6 precludes fed4 The HEW regulations duect that each state plan under the
federal categorical assistance programs must provide for pretermination heanngs contaming specified procedural safeguards, which
include all of the Goldberg reqUirements. See 20 CFR § 205.10 (a) .
~The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, simply noting that
the Issue had been correctly decided by the District Court in this
C\ase, reached the same conclusion m Williams v. Weinberger, 494 F.
2d 1191 (CA5) (per curiam , petition for cert . filed, 43 U. S. L W.
3175 (U S., St.>pt. 8, 1974) (No. 74-205)
• Title 42 U, S C. § 405 (h) provides m full ·
"Finality of Secretary's deCJsion
" (h) The findings and deciswns of the Secretary after a hearing;
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eral question jurisdiction in an action challenging denial
of claimed benefits. The only avenue for judicial review
is 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g)/ which requires exhaustion of
the administrative remedies provided under the Act as
a jurisdictional prerequisite.
Section 405 (g) in part provides :
" [A] ny individual, after any final decision of the
Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a
party, irrespective of the amount in controversy,
may obtain a review of such decision by a civil
action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such
further time as the Secretary may allow."
shall be bindmg upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findmgs of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as
herein provided. No actwn against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under
section 41 of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this
subchapter."
1 Title 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g) in part provides :
"Judicial review
" (g) Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary
made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the
amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by ·a
civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him
of notice of such decision or within such further time as the
Secretary may allow. Such action shall be brought in the district
court of the United States for the judicial district in which the
plaintiff resides or has his principal place of business, or, if he does
not reside or have hlS principal place of business within any such
judicial district, in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia. . . . The court shall have power to enter, upon the
pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modi.
fying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without
remanding the cause for a rehearing. The findings of the Secretary
as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
cl!l!lclu.sive •.••"

"

\
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On its face § 405 (g) thus bars judicial review of any
denial of a clarrn of disability benefits until after a
"final decisiOn '' by the Secretary after a "hearing."
It is uncontested that Eldridge could have obtained
full administrative review of the termination of his
benefits, yet failed eve11 to seek reconsideration of the
initial determination. Smce the Secretary has not
"waived" the finality requirement as he had in Salfi,
supra, at 767, he concludes that Eldridge cannot properly invoke § 405 (g) as a basis for jurisdiction. We
disagree.
Salfi identified several conditions which must be satisfied in order to obtain judicial review under § 405 (g) .
Of these, the requirement that there be a final decision
by the Secretary after a hearing was regarded as "central
to the requisite grant of subject matter jurisdiction ...."
!d., at 764. 8 Implicit in Salfi, however, is the principle
that this condition consists of two elements, only one of
which is purely "jurisdictional" in the sense that it cannot be "waived" by the Secretary m a particular case.
The waivable element 1s a statutory administrative exhaustion requirement. The nonwaivable element is the
requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been
presented to the Secretary. Absent such a claim there
can be no "decision" of any type. And some decision by
the Secretary is clearly reqmred by the statute.
That this second requirement is an essential and distinct precondition for § 405 (g) jurisdiction is evident
The other two conditions are (1) that the civil action be commenced withm 60 days after the mailing of notice of such decision,
or withm such additional hme as the Secretary may permit, and
(2) that the actiOn be filed m an appropriate district court. These
two reqmremen.ts specify a statute of limitations and appropriate
venue, and are w1avable by thf' partie;, Salfi, supra, at 763-764.
As in Salfi no questiOn as to whether Eldridge satisfied these requirements was timely raised below, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proo. 8 (c)~
12 (h) ( 1) , a.nd thPy nP.ed not be considered here.
8
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from the different conclusions that we reached in Salfi
with respect to the named appellees and the unnamed
members of the class. As to the latter the complaint
was found to be jurisdictionally deficient since it "contain[ed] no allegations that they have even filed an
application with the Secretary . , . Ibid. With respect
to the named appellees, however, we concluded that the
complaint was sufficient since it alleged that they had
"fully presented their claims for benefits 'to their district
Social Security Office, and upon denial, to the Regional
Office for reconsideration.' " I d., at 764-765. Eldridge
has fulfilled this crucial prerequisite. Through his answers to the state agency questionnaire, and his letter in
response to the tentative determination that his disability had ceased, he specifically presented the claim
that his benefits should not be terminated because he
was still disabled and that his benefits should not be terminated. This claim was denied by the state agency and
this decision was accepted by the SSA.
The fact that Eldridge failed to raise with the Secretary his constitutional claim to a pretermination oral
hearing is not controlling,9 As construed in Salfi, § 405
(g) requires only that there be a "final decision" by the
Secretary with respect to a claim of entitlement to benefits. Indeed, the named appellees in Salfi did not present their constitutional claim to the Secretary. Salfi,
App. 11, 17-21. The situation here is not identical to
Salfi, for, while the Secretary had no power to amend
the statute alleged to be unconstitutional in that case,
he does have authority to determine the timing and
content of the procedures challenged here. § 405 (g).
We do not. however, regard this difference as signifiIf Eldridge had exhausted the full set of available administrative review procedures, failure to have raised his constitutional
claim would not bar him from asserting it later in a district court
~P-e~ e. q .Flemmwg v. Ne.~ta, 363 TT. S . 603, 604, 607 (1960),
9
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cant. It is unrealistic to expect that the Secretary
would consider substantial changes in the current administrative review system at the behest of a single
aid recipient raising a constitutional challenge in an
adjudicatory context. The Secretary would not be required even to consider such a challenge.
As the nonwaivable jurisdictional element was satisfied,
we next consider the second elementr--whether the denial
of Eldridge's claim to continued benefits was a sufficiently
"final decision" with respect to his constitutional claim
to satisfy the statutory exhaustion requirement. Eldridge
concedes that he did not exhaust the full set of internal
review procedures provided by the Secretary. See 20 CFR
§§ 404.910, 404.916, 404.940. As Salfi recognized, the
Secretary may waive the exhaustion requirement if he
satisfies himself, at any stage of the administrative·
process, that no further review is warranted either because the internal needs of the agency are fulfilled or
because the relief that is sought is beyond his power to
confer. Salfi suggested that under § 405 (g) the power
to determine when finality has occurred ordinarily rests
with the Secretary since ultimate responsibility for the
integrity of the administrative program is his. But
cases may arise where a claimant's interest in having a
particular issue resolved promptly is so great that deference to the agency's judgment IS mappropriate. This
is such a case.
Eldndge's constitutional challenge is entirely collateral
to his substantive claim of entitlement. Moreover, there·
is a crucial distinction between the nature of the constit utional claim asserted here and that raised in Salfi. A
claim to a predeprivation hearing as a matter of constitutional right rests on the proposition that full relief
cannot be obtained at a post-deprivation hearing. See
Regional Ra.il Reoraanization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 15fij

,.
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(1974). In light of the Court's prior decisions, see, e. g.,
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra; Fuentes v. Shevin, supra,
Eldridge has raised at least a colorable claim that because
of his physical condition and dependency upon the disability benefits, an erroneous termination would damage
him in a way not recompensable through retroactive payments.:10 Thus, unlike the situation in Sal"fi, denying
Eldridge's substantive claim "for other reasons" or upholding it "under other provisions" at the post-termination stage, 422 U. S., at 762, would not answer his constitutional challenge.
We conclude that the denial of Eldridge's request for
benefits coru;titutes a final decision for purposes of § 405
l() Decisions
in different contexts have emphasized that the
nature of the claim being asserted and the consequences of
deferment of judteiai review are important factors in determining whether a statutory reqmrement of finality has been satisfied.
The role these factors may play is illustrated by the intensely
"practical" approach whJCh we have adopted, Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus . Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 ( 1949), when applying
the finality requirements of 28 U. S. C. § 1291, which grants
junsdtet10n, to courts of appeals to review all "final decisions"
of the district courts, and 28 U. S. C. § 1257, which empowers this
Court to rev1ew only "final judgments" of state courts. See, e. g.,
Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55 (1971); Local No. 438 Corvstruction & General Laborers Union v Curry, 371 U. S. 542, 549,
550 (1963); Mercantile Natwnal Bank v Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555,
557-558 (1963), Cohen v Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., supra,
at 545-546. To be sure, certain of the policy considerations
imphcated m § 1257 and § 1291 cases are different from those
that are relevant here. Compare General Laborers Union, supra,
at 550, Mercantile N atwnal Bank, supra, at 558, with M cKart
v United States, 395 U. S. 185, 193-195 (1969); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Adm1mstrat1ve ActiOn, 424-426 (1965). But the
core prmciple that statutorily created finality requirements should,
if poss1ble, be construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims
t.o be lost and potRntJally meparable mjuries to be suffered reznains,
applicable,
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(g) jurisdwtion over his constitutiOnal claim. We now
proceed to the merits of that claim.11

III
A
Procedural due process Imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of "liberty" or "property" interests within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. The Secretary does not contend that procedural
due process is inapplicable to terminations of social security disability benefits. He recognizes, as has been
tmplicit in our prior decisions, e. g., Richardson v. Belcher,
404 U. S. 78, 80-81 (1971); Richardson v. Perales, 402
U. S. 389, 401--402 (1971); Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U. S.
603, 611 (1960), that the interest of an individual in
continued receipt of these benefits is a statutorily created
"property" interest protected by the Fifth Amendment.
Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 164, 166 (PowELL,
J., concurring); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
576-578 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S., at 539
( 1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 261-262. Rather,
the Secretary contends that the existing administrative
procedures provide all the process that is constitutionally
due before a recipient can be deprived of that interest.
This Court consistently has held that some form of
hearing is required before an mdividual is finally deprived of a property mterest. Wolf v. McDonnell, 418
U. S. 539, 557-558 (1974). See, e. g., Phillips v.
Commisswner, 283 U S. 589, 596-597 (1931).. See
n Grven our conclusion that Jum;drctron m the District Court
was proper under § 405 (g), we find it unnecessary to consider
Eldridge's contention that notwithstanding § 405 (h) there was
JUrisdiction over hrs claim under the mandamus statute, 28 U . S. C
~ 1361 , or the Admrmstrative Procedure Act. 5 U. S. G § 701

"( sPq.
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also Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 124-125
(1889). The "right to be heard before being condemned
to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it
may not involve the stigma and hardships of criminal
conviction, is a principle basic to our society." Joint
Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard
"at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.''
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965). See
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 394 (1914). Eldridge
agrees that if disability benefits were continued until
after the evidentiary hearing stage of the administrative process, the administrative and judicial procedures
that may be invoked by a claimant before the initial
determination of ineligibility becomes final would be
adequate. The dispute centers upon what process is
due prior to the initial termination of benefits, pending
review.
In recent years this Court increasingly has had occasion to consider the extent to which due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation of
some type of property interest even if a full hearing is
provided thereafter. In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U. S. 254, 266-271 (1970), has the Court held that
a hearing closely approximating a judicial trial is necessary. In other cases requiring some type of pretermination hearing
a matter of constitutional right the
Court has spoken sparingly about the requisite procedures. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337
(1969), involving garnishment of wages, was entirely
silent on the matter. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67,
96-97 (1972), the Court said only that in a replevin suit
between two private parties the initial determination required something more than an ex parte proceeding
before a court clerk. See also North Georgia Finishing,

as
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Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U. S. 601, 607 (1975). Simi~
larly, Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 540 (1971), held,
in the context of the revocation of a state-granted
driver's license, that due process required only that the
initial hearing involve a probable-cause determination as
to the fault of the licensee, and that the hearing "need
not take the form of a full adjudication of the question
of liability." More recently, in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134 (1974), we sustained the validity of procedures,
by which a federal employee could be dismissed for cause.
They included notice of the action sought, a copy of the
charge, reasonable time for filing a written response, and
an opportunity for an oral appearance. Following dismissal, a full evidentiary hearing was provided. I d., at
142-146.
These decisions underscore the truism that " ' [ d] ue
process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place·
and circumstances." Cafeteria & Restaurant WorkersLocal 473 v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 896 (1961).
"[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands." M orrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (19-72). Accordingly,.
resolution of the issue whether the administrative procedures provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires
analysis of the governmental and private interests that
are affected. Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 167-168
(PowELL, J ., concurring) ; Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at.
263-266; Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v.
McElroy, supra, at 895. More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates
of due process generally requires consideration of three
distinct factors : first, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action ; second, the risk of an
ecroneous deprivation of such interest through the pro-

.
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cedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and
the administrative burden that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. See, e. g.,
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 263-271.
We turn first to a description of the procedures for
the termination of Social Security disability benefits, and
thereafter consider the factors bearing upon the constitutiOnal adequacy of these procedures.
B
The disability insurance program is administered
jointly by state and federal agencies. State agencies
make the initial determination whether a disability
exists, when it began, and when it ceased. 42 U. S. C.
§ 421,12 The standards applied and the procedures followed are prescribed by the Secretary, see § 421 (b),
who has delegated his responsibilities and powers under
the Act to the SSA. See 40 Fed. Reg. § 4473.
In order to establish initial and continued entitlement to disability benefits a worker must demonstrate
that he is unable
"to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or
12 In all but six States the state vocational rehabilitation agency
charged with administering the state plan under the Vocational
Rehabilitation Act, 41 Stat. 735, as amended, 29 U. S. C. (Supp.
III) § 701 et seq., acts as the "state agency" for purposes of the
disability insurance program. Staff of the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, Report on the DISability Insurance Program, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess., p. 148 (1974) . This assignment of responsibility was
intended to encourage rehabil!tatwn contacts for disabled workers
and t<> utilize the well-established relationships of the local rehabihtatwn agencies with the medical profession, H . Rep. No.1698,
83d Cong., 2d Se~s ., 23-24 (1954) .
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mental impairment which can be expected to result
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months, ..•" 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d)(l)(A).
To satisfy this test the worker bears a continuing burden
of showing, by means of "medically acceptable clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques," § 423 (d) ( 3), that
he had a physical or mental impairment of such severity
that
"he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work ex~
perience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy,
regardless of whether such work exists in the im~
mediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific
job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be
hired if he applied for work." § 423 (d) (2) (A) .18
The principal reasons for benefits terminations are that
the worker is no longer disabled or has returned to work,
As Eldridge's benefits were terminated because he was
determined to be no longer disabled, we consider only
the sufficiency of the procedures involved in such cases.14
13 Work which "exists in the national economy" is in turn defined
as "work which exists in significant numbers either in the region
where such individual lives or in several regions of the country."
§ 423 (d) (2) (A) .
14 Because the
continuing disability investigation concerning
whether a claimant has returned to work is usually done directly
by the SSA Bureau of Disability Insurance, without any state agency
involvement, the admirustrative procedures prior to the post-termination evidentiary hearing differ from those involved in cases of possible medical recovery. They are similar, however, in the important
respect that the process relies principally on written communications
and there generally is no prov1sion for an oral hearing prior to the
cut-off of benefits. Due to the nature of the relPvant inquiry in
cert.ain tyP,os of cases, su~h f.\S those involving self-employment and:
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The continuing eligibility investigation is made by a
state agency acting through a "team" consisting of a
physician and a nonmedical person trained in disability
evaluation. The agency periodically communicates with
the disabled workers, usually by mail-in which case he
is sent a detailed questionnair~r by telephone, and
requests information concerning his present condition,
including current medical restrictions and sources of
treatment, and any additional information that he considers relevant to his continued entitlement to benefits.
SSA Claims Manual (CM) § 6705.1; Disability Insurance
State Manual (DISM) § 353.3.15
Information regarding the recipient's current condition
is also obtained from his sources of medical treatment.
DISM § 353.4. If there is a conflict between the
information provided by the beneficiary and that obtained from medical sources, such as his physician, Ol"
between two sources of treatment, the agency may
arrange for an examination by an independent consulting
physician.16 Ibid. Whenever the agency's tentative
assessment of the beneficiary's condition differs from his
own assessment, the beneficiary is informed that benefits
may be terminated, provided a summary of the evidence
upon which the proposed determination to terminate is
based, and afforded an opportunity to review the medical
agricultural employment, the SSA office nearest the beneficiary
conducts an oral interview of the beneficiary as part of the pre-.
termination process. SSA Claims Manual (CM) § 6705.2 (c).
u Information is also requested concerning the recipient belief as
to whether he can return to work, the nature and extent of his employment during the past year; and any vocational services he is
receiving.
16
All medical source evidence used to establish the absence of
continuing disability must be in writing, with the source properly
j4entjfied. DISM § 353.4Q.

,.
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reports and other evidence in his case file. 17 He also
may respond in writing and submit additional evidence.
I d., § 353.6.
The state agency then makes its final determination,
which is reviewed by an examiner in the SSA Bureau
of Disability Insurance. 42 U. S. C. § 421 (c); CM
§§6701 (b), (c). 18 If, as is usually the case, the SSA
accepts the agency determination it notifies the recipient
in writing, informing him of the reasons for the decision,
and of his right to seek de novo reconsideration by the
state agency. 20 CFR §§ 404.907, 404.909. 19 Upon acceptance by the SSA, benefits are terminated effective
two months after the month in which medical recovery is
found to have occurred. 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III)
§ 423 (a),
If the recipient seeks reconsideration by the state
agency and the determination is adverse, the SSA reviews
the reconsideration determination and notifies the recipient of the decision, He then has a right to an eviden17

The disab1hty recipient is not permitted personally to examine
the medical reports contained in his file. This restriction is not
significant smce he is entitled to have any representative of his
choice, mcludmg a lay friend or family member, examine all medical
twidence. CM ~7314 . See also 20 CFR § 401.3 (a) (2). The Secretary informs us that this cunous limitation is currently under
review.
18 The SSA may not itself revise the state agency's determination
in a manner more favorable to the beneficiary. If, however, it believes
that the worker is still disabled, or that the disability lasted longer
than determined by the state agency, it may return the file to the
agency for further consideration m light of SSA's views. The
agency is free to reaffirm its original assessment.
19 The reconsideration assessment is initJally made by the state
agency, but usually not by the same persons who considered the
case originally. R. D1xon, Soc1al Security Disability and Mass
Justice 32 (1973) . Both the recipient and the agency may adduce

vew. Pv1denee•.
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tiary hearing before an SSA administrative law judge.
20 CFR §§ 404.917, 404.927. The hearing is nonadversary; the SSA is not represented by counsel or other staff.
As at all prior and subsequent stages of the administrative process, however, the claimant may be represented
by counsel or other spokesmen. § 404.934. If this
hearing results in an adverse decision, the claimant is entitled to request discretionary review by the SSA Appeals
Council, § 404.945, and finally may obtain judicial review. 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g); 20 CFR § 404._9•51. 20
Should it be determined at any point after termination
of benefits, that the claimant's disability extended beyond the date of cessation initially established, the
worker is entitled to retroactive payments. 42 U. S. C.
§ 404. Cf. 42 U. S. C. ~ 423 (b); 20 CFR §§ 404.501,
404.503, 404.504. If, on the other hand, a beneficiary
receives any payments to which he is later determined
not to be entitled, the statute authorizes the Secretary
to attempt to recoup these funds in specified circumstances. 42 U. S. C. § 404.21

c
As in Goldberg, the only function of the pretermination
administrative inquiry in this case is "to produce an initial determination of the validity of the [state agency's]
grounds for discontinuance of payments . . . ." 397 U. S.,
at 267. Despite the elaborate character of the administrative procedures provided by the Secretary, the courts
Unhke all prior levels of review, which are de novo, the district court is reqwred to t.reat findings of fact as conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U. S. C.§ 405 (g) .
21 The Secreta.ry may reduce other payments to which the beneficiary is entitled, or seek the payment of a refund, unless the
beneficiary is "without fault" and such adjustment or recovery would
defeat the purposes of the Act or be "against equity and good
conscience." 42 U. S. C. § 404 (b). See generally 20 CFlt
§§ 4.()4 501·-404,515.
20
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below held them to be constitutionally inadequate, con~
eluding that due process requires a full evidentiary hearing prior to termination.
Since a recipient whose benefits are terminated is
awarded full retroactive relief if he ultimately prevails,
his potential inJury consists solely of the interruption of
this source of income during the interim. His injury is
thus similar in nature to that of the welfare recipient in
Goldberg, see 397 U. S., at 263-264, the nonprobationary
federal employee m Arnett, see 416 U. S., at 146, and the
wage earner in Sniadach. See 395 U. S., at 341-342.2'2
Only in Goldberg has the Court held that due process
requires an evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary deprivation. It was emphasized there that welfare assistance was given to persons on the very margin of
subsistence:
"The crucial factor in this context-a factor not
present in the case of . .. virtually anyone else whose
governmental entitlements are ended-is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy
over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of
the very means by which to live while he waits."
397 U.S., at 264 (emphasis in original) .
Eligibility for disability benefits, in contrast, is not based
upon financial need. 23 Indeed, it is wholly unrelated to
the worker's income or support from most other sources,
such as earmngs of other family members, workmen's
22 This, of course, a.ssumes that an employee whose wages are
erroneously garmsheed Js subsequently able to recover his back
wages~

23 The level of benefits is determmed by the worker's average
monthly earmngs durmg the penod prior to disability, h1s age,.
and other factors not duectly related t<> financ1al need, specified in:
42 U. S C (Supp III) ~ 415 See id, § 423 (a) (2) .
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compensation awards, 24 tort claims awards, savings, private insurance, public or private pensions, veterans' benefits, food stamps, public assistance, or the "many other
important programs both public and private, which contain provisions for disability payments affecting a substantial portion of the work force .. .. " Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 85-87 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See Staff of the House Comm. on Ways & Means,.
Report on the Disability Insurance Program, 9~3d Cong.,
2d Sess., 9~10, 419-429 (1974) (hereinafter Staff Report).
The level of deprivation that may be created by a
particular decision is a factor to be considered in assessing the validity of any administrative decisionmaking
process. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
Although the potential deprivation here is less than in
Goldberg, the degree of difference can be overstated. As
the District Court emphasized, to remain eligible for
benefits a recipient must be "unable to engage in substantial gainful activity." 42 U. S. C. § 423; 361 F.
Supp., at 523. Thus, in contrast to the discharged federal employee in Arnett, there is little possibility that
the terminated recipient will be able to find even temporary employment to ameliorate the interim loss.
As we recognized last Term in Fusari v. Steinberg,
419 U. S. 379, 389 (1975), "the possible length of wrongful deprivation of ... benefits [also] is an important factor
in assessing the impact of official action on private interests." The Secretary concedes that the delay between
a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge and a decision on the claim is currently between
10 and 11 months. Since a terminated recipient must·
Workmen's compensation benefits are deducted in part in·
accordance with a statutory formula. 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III)
§ 424a ; 20 CFR § 404.408', see Richardson v. Belcher, 404 lL 8 ..
1R (1911).
24
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first obtain a reconsideration decision as a prerequisite
to invoking his right to an evidentiary hearing, the
actual delay between the cut-off of benefits and final
decision after a hearing exceeds one year. In view of
the torpidity of this administrative review process, cf.
id., at 383-384, 386, and the typically modest resources
of the family unit of the physical disabled worker, 2 ~ the
hardship imposed upon the erroneously terminated disability recipient may be significant.
We do not underestunate the potential seriousness of
·even a temporary interruption of disability benefits.
Still, the disabled worker's need is likely to be less than
that of a welfare recipient. In addition to the possibility of access to private resources, other forms of
government assistance will become available where the
termination of disability benefits places a worker or his
family below the subsistence level. 26 See Arnett, supra,
26 Amici cite statistics compiled by the Secretary which indicate that in 1965 the mean income of the family unit of a
-disabled worker was $3,803, while the median mcome for the unit
was $2,836. The mean liquid assets-i. e., cash, stocks, bonds-of
these family units was $4,862; the median was $940. These statistics
do not take into account the family unit's nonliquid assets-i. e.,
automob1le, real estate, and the like. Bnef for Amici AFLCIOjGreen, at 25 n. 29, App. 4a.
26 Amici emphas1ze that because an identical definition of disability IS employed m both the Title II Social Security Program and in
the companion welfare system for the disabled, Supplemental Secunty Income (SRI), compare 42 U S. C. § 423 (d)(l) with id.,
(Supp. III) § 1382c (a) (3), the terminated d1sability benefits recipient
will be ineligible for the SSI Program. There exist, however, state and
local welfare programs which may supplement the worker's income.
In addition, the worker's household umt can qualify for food stamps
if it meets the financial need requirements. See 7 U. S. C. §§ 2013
(c), 2014 (b), 7 CFR § 271. Finally, m 1974 480,000 of the approximately 2,000,000 disabled workers rece1vmg Social Security·
benefits also received SSI benefits. Since financial need is a criterion
(OJ:: eligibility under the SSI program., those disabled workers whOJ
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at 169 (POWELL, J., concurring), id., at 201-202 (WHITE,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In view
of these potential sources of temporary income, the
weights in favor of departing from the ordinary principle, established by our prior decisions, that something
less than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to
adverse administrative action are therefore less than in
Goldberg.
D
An additional factor is the fairness and reliability of
the available pretermination procedures, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards.
Central to the evaluation of any administrative process
is the nature of the relevant inquiry. See Mitchell v.
W . T . Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600, 617 (1974). Friendly,
"Some Kind of Hearing,'' 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1281
( 1975). In order to remain eligible for benefits the disabled worker must demonstrate by means of "medically
acceptable clinical and diagnostic techniques," 42 U. S. C.
§ 423 (d) ( 3), that he is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by r.eason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment ....." § 423
(a) (1 )(A) (emphasis supplied) . In short, a medical
assessment of the worker's physical or mental condition
is required. This is a more sharply focused and easily
documented decision than the typical determination of
welfare entitlement. In the latter case, a wide variety
of information may be deemed relevant, and issues of
witness "credibility and veracity'' often are critical to the
decisionmaking process. Goldberg noted that in such
are most in need will in the majority of cases be receiving SSI benefits when disability insurance aid IS terminated. And, under the
SSI program, a pretermmanon evidentiary heanng IS provided, if
requested. 42 U S. C. (Supp. III) § 1383 (c) , 20 CFR § 416.1336
(c) : 40 Ft'd Reg Hi12 , Hee Staff Report 346.
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circumstances "written submissions are a wholly unsatis..
factory basis for decision." 397 U. S., at 269:.
By contrast, the decision whether to discontinue disability benefits will turn, in most cases, upon "routine,
standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician
specialists," Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S. 389, 404
(1971), concerning a subject whom they have personally
examined. 27 In Richardson the Court recognized the
"reliability and probative worth of written medical reports," emphasizing that while there may be "profes'sional disagreement with the medical conclusions" the
"specter of questionable credibility and veracity is not
present." I d., at 405, 407. To be sure, credibility and
veracity may be a factor in the ultimate disability assessment in some cases. But procedural due process rules
are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process as applied to the generality of cases, not
the rare exceptions. The potential value of an evidentiary hearing, or even oral presentation to the decisionmaker, is substantially less in this context than irr
Goldberg.
27

The decision is not purely a question of the accuracy of a medical diagnosis since the ultimate issue which the state agency must
resolve is whether in light of the particular worker's "age, education,.
and work experience" he cannot "engage in any . . . substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy ...." 42 U. S. C.
§ 423 (d)(2) (A). Yet information concerning each of these worker
characteristics is amenable to effective written presentation. The
-value of a full evidentiary hearing, or even a limited oral presentation,
to an accurate presentation of those factors to the decisionmaker does
not appear substantial. Similarly, resolution of the inquiry as to
the types of employment opportunities that exist in the national
economy for a physically impaired worker with a particular set of
skills would not necessarily be advanced by an oral evidentiary
hearmg. Cf, Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.06, at 429
( 1958) . The statistical information relevant to this judgment is.
more amenable to written than oral presentation.

74-204-0PINION
MATHEWS v. ELDRIDGE

23

The decision in Goldberg was also based on the Court's
conclusion that written submissions were an inadequate
substitute for oral presentation because they did not
provide an effective means of communication with the
decisionmaker. Written submissions were viewed as an
unrealistic option, for most recipients lacked the "educational attainment necessary to write effectively" and
could not afford professional assistance. In addition,
such submissions would not provide the "flexibility of
oral presentations" or "permit the recipient to mold his
argument to the issues the decision maker appears to
regard as important." 397 U. S., at 269. In the context of the disability benefits entitlement assessment the
administrative procedures under review here fully answer these objections.
The detailed questionnaire which the state agency
periodically sends the recipient identifies with particularity the information relevant to the entitlement decision, and the recipient is invited to obtain assistance
from the local SSA office in completing the questionnaire.
More important, the information critical to the entitlement decision usually is derived from medical sources,
such as the treating physician. Such sources are significantly more able to communicate effectively through
written documents than are welfare recipients or the lay
witnesses supporting their cause. These sources' conclusions may be supported by X-rays and the results of
chnical or laboratory tests, information typically more
amenable to written than to oral presentation. Cf.
W. Gellhorn & C. Byse, Administrative Law-Cases and
Comments 860-863 (6th ed. 1974) .
A further safeguard against mistake is the policy of
allowing the disability recipient or his representative full
access to all information relied upon by the state agency,
In .addition, prior to the cut-off of benefits the agencr
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informs the recipient of its tentative assessment, ihe
reasons therefor, and provides· a summary of the evidence that it considers most relevant. Opportunity is
then afforded the recipient to submit additional evi.deuce or arguments, enabling him to challenge directly
the accuracy of information in his file as well as the
correctness of the agency's tentative conclusions. These
procedures, again as contrasted with those before the
1
Court in Goldberg, enable the recipient · to "mold" his
argument to respond to the precise issues which the
decisionmaker regards as crucial.
Despite these carefully structured procedures, amici
point to the significant reversal rate for appealed cases
as clear evidence that the current process is inadequate.
Depending upon the base selected and the line of analysis followed, the relevant reversal rates urged by the
contending parties vary from a high of 58.6% for appealed reconsideration decisions to an overall reversal
rate of only 3.3%.zs Bare statistics rarely provide a
satisfactory measure of the fairness of a decisionmaking
process. Their adequacy is especially suspect here since
the administrative review system is operated on an openfile basis. A recipient may always submit new evidence,
~8

By focusing solely on the reversal rate for appea.Ied recon~
. sideration determinations amict overstate the relevant reversal rate.
As we indicated last Term in Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U. S., at 383
n. 6, in order fully to assess the reliability and fairness of a system
of procedure, one must also consider the overall rate of error for
all denials of benefits. Here that overall rate is 12.2%. Moreover,
about 75% of these reversals occur at the reconsideration stage of
the administrative process. Since the median period between a
request for reconsideration rev1ew and decision is only two months,
Brief for Am1ci AFL--CIO / Green, App. 4a, the deprivation is
significantly less than that concommitant in the more lengthy delay
before an ev1dentiary hearing. Netting out these reconsideration
reversals, the overall reversal rate falls to 3.3%.
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and such submissions may result in additional medical
examinations, Such fresh examinations are held in approximately 307'o to 407'o of the appealed cases, either at
the reconsideration or hearing stage of the administrative
process. Staff Report 238. In this context, the value
of reversal rate statistics as one means of evaluating the
adequacy of the pretermination process is significantly
diminished. Thus, although we view such information
as relevant, it is certainly not controlling in this case.

E
In striking the appropriate due process balance the
final factor to be assessed is the public interest. This
includes the administrative burden and other societal
costs that would be associated with requiring, as a matter
of constitutional right, an evidentiary hearing upon demand in all cases prior to the termination of disability
benefits. The more visible burden would be the incremental cost resulting from the increased number of hearings and the expense of providing benefits to ineligible
recipients pending decision. No one can predict the
extent of the increase, but the fact that full benefits
would continue until after such hearings would assure
the exhaustion in most cases of this attractive option.
Nor would the theoretical right of the Secretary to recover undeserved benefits result, as a practical matter,.
in any substantial offset to the added outlay of public
funds. The parties submit widely varying estimates of
the probable additional cost. We only need say that
experience with the constitutionalizing of government
procedures suggests that the ultimate additional cost
would be substantial.
In most circumstances, as here, financial cost is not a
compelling weight in the assessment whether due process
requires a particular procedural safeguard prior to some
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administrative action. But the Government's interest,
and hence that of the public, in conserving scarce fiscal
and administrative resources, is a factor that must be
weighed. At some point the benefit of an additional
safeguard to the individual affected by the administra~
tive action and to society in terms of increased assur~
ance that the action is just, will be outweighed by the
cost. Significantly, the cost of protecting those whom the
preliminary administrative prooess has identified as likely
to be found undeserving may in the end come out of the
pockets of the deserving since resources available for any
particular program of social welfare are not unlimited.
See Friendly, supra, at 1276, 1303.
But more is implicated in cases of this type than ad hoc
balancing of monetary costs against the interests of a
particular class of claimants. The ultimate balance involves a determination as to when, under our constitu~
tional system, judicial-type procedures must be imposed
upon administrative action to assure fairness. We reiterate the wise admonishment of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
that differences in the origin and function of administrative agencies "preclude wholesale transplantation of the
rules of procedure, trial, and review which have evolved
from the history and experience of the courts." FCC v.
Pottsville Broadcasting Co. , 309 U. S. 134, 143 (1940).
The judicial model of a full evidentiary hea.r ing is
neither a required, nor even the most effective, method
of decisionmaking in all circumstances. The essence of
due process is the requirement that "a person in jeop~
ardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case against
him and opportunity to meet it." Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S., at 171-172.
(Frankfurter, J. , concurring.) All that is necessary is·
that that the procedures be "tailor [ ed] the capacities and
circumstances of those who are to be heard," Goldber(J;·
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v. Kelly, supra, at 268- 269, to insure that they are
given a meaningful opportunity to present their case.
In assessing what process is due, substantial weight must
be given to the good-faith judgments of the individuals
charged by Congress with the administration of the social
welfare system that the procedures they have provided
deal fairly with the entitlement claims of individuals.
See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S., at 202 (WHITE, J.,
concurring and dissenting in part). This is especially so
where, as here, the prescribed procedures not only provide the claimant with an effective process for asserting
his claim prior to any administrative action~ but also
assure a right to an evidentiary hearing, as well as to
subsequent judicial review, before the denial of his claim
becomes final. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371,
378 (1971).
We conclude that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of disability benefits and
that the present administrative procedures fully comport
with due process.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
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The issue in this case is whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that prior to
the termination of Social Security disability benefit payments the recipient be afforded an opportunity for an
evidentiary hearing.
I
Cash benefits are provided to workers during periods
in which they are completely disabled under the disability insurance benefits program created by the 1956
amendments to Title II of the Social Security Act. 70
Stat. 815, 42 U. S, C. § 423. 1 Respondent Eldridge was
The program is financed by revenues derived from employee
and employer payroll taxe:,. 26 U S. C. §§ 3101 (a), 3111 (a) ; 42
U, S. G § 401 (h). It provides monthly benefits to disabled persons who havr worked sufficiently long to have an insured
Rtatus, id., §423 (c)(1)(A), and who have had substantial work expenence m a t·rpecified interval directly prl'ceding the onset of disability Jd., § 423 (c) (1) (D) Benefits also are provided to the
worker's dependents under specified Circumstances. ld., §§ 402 (b)(d). When the reCipient reaches age 65 his disability benefits are
automatically converted to retlr~'rnent benefits, !d., §§ 416 (2) (D),
1

i
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first awarded benefits in June 1968. In March 1972, he
received a questionnaire from the state agency charged
with monitoring his medical condition. Eldridge completed the questionnaire, indicating that his condition
had not improved and identifying the medical sources,
including physicians, from whom he had received treatment recently. The state agency then obtained reports from his physician and a psychiatric consultant.
After considering these reports and other information
in his file the agency informed Eldridge by letter that it
had made a tentative determination that his disability
had ceased in May 1972. The letter included a statement of reasons for the proposed termination of benefits,
and advised Eldridge that he might request reasonable
time in which to obtain and submit additional information pertaining to his condition.
In his written response, Eldridge disputed one characterization of his medical condition and indicated that
the agency already had enough evidence to establish his
disability. 2 The state agency then made its final determination that he had ceased to be disabled in May 1972.
This determination was accepted by the Social Security
Administration ( SSA), which notified Eldridge in July
that his benefits would terminate after that month.
423 (a) (1) . In fiscal 1974 approximately 3,700,000 persons received
assistance under the program. Social Security Administration, The
Year in Review 21 (1974)
2 Eldridge originally was disabled due to chronic anxiety and
back strain. He subsequently was found to have diabetes. The
tentative determination letter indicated that aid would be terminated because available medical evidence indicated that his diabetes
was under control, that there existed no limitations on his back
mo~ements which would impose severe functional restrictions,
and that he no longer suffered emotional problems that would
preclude him from all work for which he was qualified. App. 12-13.
In his reply letter he claimed to have arthritis of the spine rather
than a strained back.
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The notification also advised him of his right to seek
reconsideration by the state agency of this initial determination within six months.
Instead of requesting reconsideration Eldridge commenced this action challenging the constitutional validity of the administrative procedures established by the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare for assessing
whether there exists a continuing disability. He sought
an immediate reinstatement of benefits pending a
hearing on the issue of his disability. 8 361 F. Supp.
520 (WD Va. 1973). The Secretary moved to dismiss on
the grounds that Eldridge's benefits had been terminated
in accordance with valid administrative regulations and
procedures and that he had failed to exhaust available
remedies. In support of his contention that due process
requires a pretermination hearing, Eldridge relied exclusively upon this Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U. S. 254 (1970), which established a right to an
"evidentiary hearing" prior to termination of welfare
benefits.4 The Secretary contended that Goldberg was
not controlling since eligibility for disability benefits, unlike eligibility for welfare benefits, is not based on financial need and since issues of credibility and veracity do
8 The District Court ordered reinstatement of Eldridge's benefits
pending its final disposition on the merits.
4 In Goldberg the Court held that the pretermination hearing must
include the followmg elements : ( 1) "timely lmd adequate notice detailing the reasons for the proposed termination"; (2) "an effective
opportunity [for the recipH'nt] to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting h1~ own arguments and evidence
orally"; (3) retained counsel, if desired ; (4) an " impartial"
decisionmaker ; (5) a deciswn resting "solely on the legal rules and
evidence adduced at the hearing"; (6) a ~tatement of reasons for
the decision and the evidence relied on . 397 U. S., at 266-271. In
this opinion the term "evidentiary hearing " refer,; to a hearing
generally of the type reqmred m Goldberg.

"(·
,,,

.
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not play a significant role in the disability entitlement
decision, which turns primarily on medical evidence.
The District Court concluded that the administrative
procedures pursuant to which the Secretary had terminated Eldridge's benefits abridged his right to procedural
due process. The court viewed the interest of the disability recipient in uninterrupted benefits as indistinguishable from that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg.
It further noted that decisions subsequent to Goldberg
demonstrated that the due process requirement of pretermination hearings is not limited to situations involving the deprivation of vital necessities. See Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 88-89 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402
U. S. 535 (1971). Reasoning that disability determinations may involve subjective judgments based on conflicting medical and nonmedical evidence, the District
Court held that prior to termination of benefits Eldridge
must be afforded an evidentiary hearing of the type required for welfare beneficiaries under Title IV of the
Social Security Act. ld., at 528. 5 Relying entirely upon
the District Court's opinion, the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the injunction barring termination of Eldridge's benefits prior to an evidentiary
hearing. 493 F . 2d 1230 (1974) .6 We reverse.

II
At the outset we are confronted by a question as
ThP HEW regulations direct that each state plan under the
federal categoncal assistance programs must provide for pretermination hearings contaimng specified procedural safeguards, which
include all of the Goldberg reqmrements. See 45 CFR § 205.10 (a);
5

n 4 supra
b The Court of Appeals for the Fifth CirCUit, simply noting that
the issue had been correctly demded by the District Court in this
case, reached the same conclusion m Williams v. Weinberger, 494 F.
2d 1191 (per curiam) , petition for cert. filed, 43 U. S. L. W.
3F5 (U. S., Sept. 8, 1974) (No. 74-205) .
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to whether the District Court had jurisdiction over
this suit. The Secretary contends that our decision last
Term in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975), bars
the District Court from considering Eldridge's action.
Salfi was an action challenging the Social Security Act's
duration-of-relationship eligibility requirements for surviving wives and stepchildren of deceased wage earners.
We there held that 42 U. S. C. § 405 (h)7 precludes federal question jurisdiction in an action challenging denial
of claimed benefits. The only avenue for judicial review
is 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g), which requires exhaustion of
the administrative remedies provided under the Act as
a jurisdictional prerequisite.
Section 405 (g) in part provides:
"Any individual, after any final decision of the
Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a
party, irrespective of the amount in controversy,
may obtain a review of such decision by a civil
action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such
further time as the Secretary may allow." 8
T1tle 42 U. S. C. § 405 (h) provides in full :
"Finality of Secretary's decision
" (h) The findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing
shall be binding upon all mdividuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings of fact or deciSion of the Secreta.ry shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as
herem provided. No action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under
section 41 of Title 28 to recover on any clrum arising under this
7

~ubchapter."

Sect10n 405 (g) further providel:> ·
"Such action shall be brought m the d1stnct court of the United
States for the judicial district in whiCh the plaintiff resides or has
h1s prmCJpal place of busmess, or, 1f he does not reside or have his
principal place of business within any such judicial district, in the
UmtPd States Distnct Court for the District of Columbia. . . . The
co11rt ~ha ll hn vc powPr to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript
8
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On its face § 405 (g) thus bars judicial review of any
denial of a claim of disability benefits until after a
"final decision " by the Secretary after a "hearing."
It is uncontested that Eldridge could have obtained
full administrative review of the termination of his
benefits, yet failed even to seek reconsideration of the
initial determination . Since the Secretary has not
"waived" the finality requirement as he had in Salfi,
supra, at 767, he concludes that Eldridge cannot properly invoke § 405 (g) as a basis for jurisdiction. We
·disagree.
Salfi identified several conditions which must be satisfied in order to obtain judicial review under § 405 (g).
Of these, the requirement that there be a final decision
by the Secretary after a hearing was regarded as "central
to the requisite grant of subject matter jurisdiction .... "
l d., at 764. 9 Implicit in Salfi, however, is the principle
that this condition consists of two elements, only one of
which is purely "jurisdictional" in the sense that it cannot be "waived" by the Secretary in a particular case.
The waivable element is the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted. The nonwaivable element is the requirement
that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the
of the record, a judgmE-nt affi rming, modifying, or reversing the decisiOn of the SecrE-tary, with or without remanding the cause for a
rehearing. The findings of the SecrPtary as to any fact , if supported
by substantial evidencE>, shall be conclusive ...."
9 The other two conditions are ( 1) that the civil action be commenced w1thm 60 days after the maihng of notice of such decision,
or withm such add1honal time as the Secretary may permit, and
(2) that the actiOn be filed m an appropriate district court. These
two reqmrements spemfy a statute of limitations a.nd appropriate
venue, and are wa1vable by the parties. Salfi, supra, at 763-764.
As in Salfi no questiOn as to whether Eldridge satisfied these requirements was timely raised below, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proo. 8 (c) ,
12 (h) (1), and thf'y need not be considered here.
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Secretary. Absent such a claim there can be no "decision" of any type. And some decision by the Secretary
is clearly required by the statute.
That this second requirement is an essential and distinct precondition for § 405 (g) jurisdiction is evident
from the different conclusions that we reached in Salfi
with respect to the named appellees and the unnamed
members of the class. As to the latter the complaint
was found to be jurisdictionally deficient since it "contain [ed] no allegations that they have even filed an
application with the Secretary . . .." Ibid. With respect
to the named appellees, however, we concluded that the
complaint was sufficient since it alleged that they had
"fully presented their claims for benefits 'to their district
Social Security Office, and upon denial, to the Regional
Office for reconsideration.'" !d., at 764-765. Eldridge
has fulfilled this crucial prerequisite. Through his answers to the state agency questionnaire, and his letter in
response to the tentative determination that his disability had ceased, he specifically presented the claim
that his benefits should not be terminated because he
was still disabled. This claim was denied by the state
agency and its decision was accepted by the SSA.
The fact that Eldridge failed to raise with the
Secretary his constitutional claim to a pretermination
hearing is not controlling. 10 As construed in Salfi, § 405
(g) requires only that there be a "final decision" by the
Secretary with respect to the claim of entitlement to benefits. Indeed, the named appellees in Salfi did not preent their constitutional claim to the Secretary. Salfi,
App. 11, 17-21. The situation here is not identical to
If Eldridge had exhausted the full set of available administrative review procedures, failure to have raised his constitutional
claim would not bar hun from asserting it later in a district court
See, e. g., F/Pmm1ng v. NPstor, :363 U.S 603, 604, 607 (1960).
10

74-204-0PINTON
MATHEWS v. ELDRIDGE
Salfi, for, while the Secretary had no power to amend

the statute alleged to be unconstitutional in that case,
he does have authority to determine the timing and
content of the procedures challenged here. § 405 (a).
We do not, however, regard this difference as signifi~
cant. It is unrealistic to expect that the Secretary
would consider substantial changes in the current administrative review system at the behest of a single
aid recipient raising a constitutional challenge in an
adJudwatory context. The Secretary would not be reqUired even to consider such a challenge.
As the nonwa1vable jurisdictional element was satisfied,
we next consider the waivable element. The question is
whether the demal of Eldridge's claim to continued benefits was a sufficiently "final decision" with respect to his
constitutional claim to satisfy the statutory exhaustion
reqmrement. Eldridge concedes that he did not exhaust
the full set of internal review procedures provided by the
Secretary. See 20 CFR §§ 404.910, 404.9,16, 404.940. As
Salfi recognized, the Secretary may waive the exhaustion
requirement if he satisfies himself, at any stage of the
administrative process, that no further review is warranted either because the internal needs of the agency are
fulfilled or because the relief that is sought is beyond his
power to confer. Salfi suggested that under§ 405 (g) the
power to determine when finality has occurred ordinarily
rests with the Secretary since ultimate responsibility for
the mtegrity of the administrative program is his. But
cases may anse where a claimant's mterest in having a
particular Issue resolved promptly is so great that deference to the agency's judgment is inappropriate. This
is such a case.
Eldridge's const1tut10nal challenge is entirely collateral
to his substantive claim of entitlement. Moreover, there
is a cruCial rhstinction betwPen the nature of the consti-
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tutional claim asserted here and that raised in Salfi. A
claim to a predeprivation hearing as a matter of constitutional right rests on the proposition that full relief
cannot be obtained at a post-deprivation hearing. See
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 156
(1974). In light of the Court's prior decisions, see, e. g.,
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra; Fuentes v. Shevin, supra,
Eldridge has raised at least a colorable claim that because
of his physical condition and dependency upon the disability benefits, an erroneous termination would damage
him in a way not recompensable through retroactive payments.11 Thus, unlike the situation in Salfi, denying:
Eldridge's substantive claim "for other reasons" or upholding it "under other provisions" at the post-terminaDecisions in different contexts have emphasized that the
nature of t,he clarrn being asserted and the consequences of
deferment of JUdicial review are important factors in determining whether a statutory requirement of finality has been satisfied.
The role these factors may play IS illustrated by the intensely
"practiCal" approach which the Court has adopted, Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949), when applymg
the finality requirements of 28 U S. C. § 1291, which grants
jurisdiction, to courts of appeals to review all "final decisions"
of the distnct courts, and 28 U. S. C. § 1257, which empowers this
Court to review only "final Judgments" of state courts. See, e. g.,
Harns v Washmgton, 404 U. S 55 (1971); Local No. 438 Constructwn & General Laborers Union v. Curry, 371 U. S. 542, 549,
550 (1963), Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555,
557-558 (1963), Cohen v Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., supra,
at 545-546. To be sure, certam of the policy considerations
1mphcated m § 1257 and § 1291 cases are different from those
that are relevant here Compare General Laborers Union, supra,
at 550, Mercantile Natwnal Bank, supra, at 558, with McKart
v United States, 395 U S. 185, 193-195 (1969); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of AdministratJve Actwn, 424-426 (1965) But the
core prmCiple that statutorily created finality requirements should,
if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims·
to be lost. and potentially Irreparable miuries to be suffered remams
J.pl)licahlP.
11
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tion stage, 422 U. S., at 762, would not answer his constitutiOnal challenge.
We conclude that the denial of Eldridge's request for
benefits constitutes a final decision for purposes of § 405
(g) Jurisdiction over his constitutional claim. We now
proceed to the merits of that claim/ 2

TTI
Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of "liberty" or "property'' interests within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. The Secretary does not contend that procedural
due process IS inapplicable to terminations of social security disability benefits. He recognizes, as has been
implicit in our prior decisions, e. g., Richardson v. Belcher,
404 U. S. 78, 80-81 (1971); Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401-402 (1971); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S.
603, 611 ( 1960), that the interest of an individual in
continued receipt of these benefits is a statutorily created
"property'' interest protected by the Fifth Amendment.
Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 166 (PowELL,
J ., concurnng); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564,
576-578 ( 1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S., at 539;
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 261-262.
Rather, the
Secretary contends that the existing administrative
procedures, detailed below, provide all the process that is
constitutionally due before a recipient can be deprived of
that m to rest
12 GlVen our conclusiOn that JUnsdJCt!On m the D1strict Court
was proper under § 405 (g), we find 1t unnecessary to consider
Eldndge's content10n that notwithstanding § 405 (h) there was
JUnsdJctwn over his cla1m under the mandamus statute, 28 U. S. C.
§ 1361, or the AdnumstrahvP Procedure Act. 5 U. S. C. § 701
P,f snz
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Th1s Court consistently has held that some form of
hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest. Wol f-v. McDonnell, 418
U. S. 539, 557-558 (1974). See, e. g., Phillips v.
Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 596-597 (1931). See
also Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 11'4, 124-125
(1889). The "right to be heard before being condemned
to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it
may not involve the stigma and hardships of criminal
convictwn, is a principle basic to our society." Joint
Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) . The fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard
'' at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965). See
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 394 (1914). Eldridge
agrees that the review procedures available to a claimanV
before the initial determination of ineligibility becomes
final would be adequate, if disability benefits were not
terminated until after the evidentiary hearing stage of
the administrative process. The dispute centers upon
what process is due prior to the initial termination of
benefits, pending review.
In recent years this Court increasingly has had occasiOn to consider the extent to which due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation of
some type of property interest even if such a hearing is
provided thereafter. In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U. S. 254, 266- 271 (1970) , has the Court held that
a hearing closely approximating a judicial trial is necessary In other cases requiring some type of pretermination hearmg as a matter of constitutional right the
Court has spoken sparingly about the requisite procedures. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337
( 196!"-l), mvolving 11;arnishment of wages, was entirely

'14-204-0PINION
MATHEWS v. ELDRIDGE

silent on the matter. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67,
96-97 (1972), the Court said only that in a replevin suit
between two private parties the initial determination required somethmg more than an ex parte proceeding
before a court clerk. Similarly, Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S.
535, 540 ( 1971), held, in the context of the revocation of
a state-granted driver's license, that due process required
only that the prerevocation hearing involve a probablecause determination as to the fault of the licensee, noting
that the hearing "need not take the form of a full adjudication of the question of liability." See also North
Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U. S.
601, 607 (1975). More recently, in Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U. S. 134 (1974), we sustained the validity of procedures by which a federal employee could be dismissed
for cause. They mcluded notice of the action sought, a
copy of the charge, reasonable time for filing a written
response, and an opportunity for an oral appearance.
Following dismissal, an evidentiary hearing was provided. Td., at 142- 146.
These decisions underscore the truism that " ' [ d] ue
process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conceptiOn with a fixed content unrelated to time, place
and circumstances." Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961).
" [D] ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands." M ornssey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972). Accordingly,
resolution of the issue whether the administrative procedures provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires
analysis of the governmental and private interests that
are affected. Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 167-168
( PowELL, J., concurring); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at
263-266; Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v.
McElroy, supra, at 895. More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates
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of due process generally requires consideration of three
distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional )
or substitute procedural requirement would entail. See,
e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 263-271.
We turn first to a description of the procedures for
the termination of Social Security disability benefits, and
thereafter consider the factors bearing upon the constitutional adequacy of thesE:' procedures.

B
The disability insurance program is administered
jointly by state and federal agencies. State agencies
make the initial determination whether a disability
exists, when it began, and when it ceased. 42 U. S. C.
§ 421. 1 3 The standards applied and the procedures followed are prescribed by the Secretary, see § 421 (b),
who has delegated his responsibilities and powers under
the Act to the SSA. See 40 Fed. Reg. § 44 73.
In order to establish initial and continued entitle13 In all but six States the state vocational rehabilitation agency
charged with administermg the state plan under the Vocational
Rehabilitation Act, 41 Stat. 735, as amended, 29 U. S. C. (Supp.
III) § 701 et seq., acts as the "state agency" for purposes of the
disability insurance program. Staff of the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, Report on the DISability Insurance Program, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess., p 148 (1974). ThiS assignment of responsibility was
intended to encourage rehabilitation contacts for disabled workers
and t<> utilize the well-established relationships of the local rehabilitatiOn agencies with the medical profession. H. Rep. No.1698,
83d Cong., 2rl Srss 23-24 (1 954).
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ment to disability benefits a worker must demonstrate
that he is unable
uta engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous penod of not less than 12
months, .. ," 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d) (1) (A) .
To satisfy this test the worker bears a continuing burden
of showing, by means of "medically acceptable clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques," § 423 (d) (3), that
he has a physical or mental rmpamnent of such severity
that
"he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work expenence, engage m any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy,
regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he hves, or whether a specific
job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be
hired If he applied for work." § 423 (d) (2) (A).14
The prinCipal reasons for benefits terminations are that
the worker is no longer disabled or has returned to work.
As Eldridge's benefits were terminated because he was
determmed to be no longer disabled, we consider only
the suffiClency of the procedures involved in such cases.13
Work which "exists in the national economy" is in turn defined
a "work whtch ex1sts m significant numbers either in the region
where such individual lives or in several regions of the country."
§ 423 (d) (2) (A) .
15 Because
the rontmuing dlsabliity investigation concerning
whether a cla1mant has returned to work ts usually done directly
by the SSA Bureau of Disabliity Insurance, without any state agency
involvement, the admuustmtivc procedurrs pnor to the post-termination ev1dentlary hearmg differ from those involved in cases of pos14
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The continuing eligibility investigation is made by a
state agency acting through a "team" consisting of a
physician and a nonmedical person trained in disability
evaluation. The agency periodically communicates with
the disabled worker, usually by mail-in which case he
is sent a detailed questionnaire-or by telephone, and
requests information concerning his present condition,
including current medical restrictions and sources of
treatment, and any additional information that he considers velevant to his continued entitlement to benefits.
SSA Claims Manual (CM) § 6705.1; Disability Insurance
State Manual (DISM) § 353.3.16
Information regarding the recipient's current condition
is also obtained from his sources of medical treatment.
DISM § 353.4. If there is a conflict between the
information provided by the beneficiary and that obtained from medical sources such as his physician, or
between two sources of treatment, the agency may
arrange for an examination by an independent consulting
physician. 17 Ibid. Whenever the agency's tentative
assessment of the beneficiary's condition differs from his
sible medical recovery. They are similar, however, in the important
respect that the process relies principally on written communications
and there is no provision for an evidentiary hearing prior to the
cut-off of benefits. Due to the nature of the relevant inquiry in
certain types of cases, such as those mvolving self-employment and
agricultural employment, the SSA office nearest the beneficiary
conducts an oral interview of the beneficiary as part of the pretermination process. SSA Claims Manual (CM) § 6705.2 (c).
16 Information 1s also requested concerning the recipient's belief as
to whether he can return to work, the nature and extent of his employment during the past year, and any vocational services he is
receiving.
n All medical source evidence used to establish the absence of
continuing disability must be in writing, with the source pr.operly
j.d.entifi.ed. DISM § 353.40,
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own assessment, the beneficiary is informed that benefits
may be terminated, provided a summary of the evidence
upon which the proposed determination to terminate is
based, and afforded an opportunity to review the medical
reports and other evidence in his case file. 18 He also
may respond in writing and submit additional evidence.
Id., § 353.6.
The state agency then makes its final determination,
which is reviewed by an examiner in the SSA Bureau
of Disability Insurance. 42 U. S. C. § 421 (c); CM
§§ 6701 (b), (c) .19 If, as is usually the case, the SSA
accepts the agency determination it notifies the recipient
in writing, informing him of the reasons for the decision,
and of his right to seek de novo reconsideration by the
state agency. 20 CFR §§ 404.907, 404.909.w Upon acceptance by the SSA, benefits are terminated effective
two months after the month in which medical recovery is
found to have occurred. 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III)
§ 423 (a).
18 The disability recipient is not permitted personally to examine
the medical reports contained in his file . This restriction is not
significant since he is entitled to have any representative of his
choice, including a lay friend or family member, examine all medical
evidence. CM § 7314. See also 20 CFR § 401.3 (a) (2). The Secretary informs us that this curious limitation is currently under
review.
19 The SSA may not itself revise the state agency's determination
in a manner more favorable to the beneficiary. If, however, it believes
that the worker is still disabled, or that the disability lasted longer
than determined by the state agency, it may return the file to the
agency for further consideration in light of SSA's views. The
agency is free to reaffirm its original assessment .
.w The reconsideration assessment is initially made by the state
agency, but usually not by the same persons who considered the
case originally. R. Dixon, Social Security Disability and Mass
Justice 32 (1973) . Both the recipient and the agency may adduce:
new evidence.

,
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If the recipient seeks reconsideration by the state
agency and the determination is adverse, the SSA reviews
the reconsideration determination and notifies the recipient of the decision. He then has a right to an evidentiary hearing before an SSA administrative law judge.
20 CFR §§ 404.917, 404.927. The hearing is nonadversary, and the SSA is not represented by counsel. As
at all prior and subsequent stages of the administrative process, however, the claimant may be represented
by counsel or other spokesmen. § 404.934. If this
hearing results in an adverse decision, the claimant is entitled to request discretionary review by the SSA Appeals
Council, § 404.945, and finally may obtain judicial review. 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g); 20 CFR § 404.951. 21
Should it be determined at any point after termination
of benefits, that the claimant's disability extended beyond the date of cessation initially established, the
worker is entitled to retroactive payments.. 42 U. S. C.
§ 404, Cf. id., § 423 (b); 20 CFR §§ 404.501, 404.503,
404.504. If, on the other hand, a beneficiary receives
any payments to which he is later determined not to
be entitled, the statute authorizes the Secretary to
attempt to recoup these funds in specified circumstances.
42

u. s. c.

§ 404.22

c

Despite the elaborate character of the administrative procedures provided by the Secretary, the courts
21 Unlike all prior levels of review, which are de novo, the district court is required to treat findings of fact as conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U. S. C.§ 405 (g) .
22 The Secretary may reduce other payments to which the beneficiary is entitled, or seek the payment of a refund, unless the
beneficiary is "without fault" and such adjustment or recovery would
defeat the purposes of the Act or be "against equity and good
conscience." 42 U. S. C. § 404 (b). See generally 20 CFR
§§ 404.501-404.515.
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below held them to be constitutionally inadequate, concluding that due process requires an evidentiary hearing
prior to termination. In light of the private and governmental interests at stake here and the nature of the
existing procedures, we think this was error.
Since a recipient whose benefits are terminated is
awarded full retroactive relief if he ultimately prevails,
his sole interest is in the uninterrupted receipt of this
source of income pending final administrative decision
on his claim. His potential injury is thus similar in
nature to that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg,
see 397 U. S., at 263-264, the nonprobationary federal
employee in Arnett, see 416 U. S., at 146, and the wage
earner in Sniadach. See 395 U. S., at 341-342. 23
Only in Goldberg has the Court held that due process
requires an evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary
deprivation. It was emphasized there that welfare
assistance is given to persons on the very margin of
subsistence:
"The crucial factor in this context-a factor not
present m the case of . .. virtually anyone else whose
governmental entitlements are ended-is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy
over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of
the very means by which to live while he waits."
397 U.S., at 264 (emphasis in original) .
Eligibility for disability benefits, in contrast, is not based
upon financial need. 21 Indeed, it is wholly unrelated to
23

This, of course, assumes that an employee whose wages are
garnisheed erroneously is subsequently able to recover his back
wages.
24
The level of benefits is detcrmmed by the worker's average
monthly earmngs dunng the penod prior to disability, his age,
and other factors not directly related to financial need, specified in
42 U. S C (Supp III) § 415 See id ., § 423 (a) (2) .
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the workerrs income or support from many other sources,
such as earnings of other family members, workmen's
compensation awards, ~ tort claims awards, savings, private insurance, public or private pensions, veterans' benefits, food stamps, public assistance, or the "many other
important programs both public and private, which contain provisions for disability payments affecting a substantial portion of the work force .. .. " Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U. S., at 85-87 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See Staff of the House Comm. on Ways & Means,
Report on the Disability Insurance Program, 9,3d Cong.,
2d Sess., 9~10, 419-429 (1974) (hereinafter Staff Report).
As Goldberg illustrates, the degree of potential deprivation that may be created by a particular decision is
a factor to be considered in assessing the validity of
any administrative decision making process. Cf. M orrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972). The potential
deprivation here is generally likely to be less than in
Goldberg, although the degree of difference can be overstated. As the District Court emphasized, to remain
eligible for benefits a recipient must be "unable to engage
in substantial gainful activity." 42 U. S. C. § 423; 361 F.
Supp., at 523. Thus, in contrast to the discharged federal employee in Arnett, there is little possibility that
the terminated recipient will be able to find even temporary employment to ameliorate the interim loss.
As we recognized last Term in Fusari v. Steinberg,
419 U. S. 379, 389 (1975), "the pot3sible length of wrongful deprivation of ... benefits [also] is an important factor
in assessing the impact of official action on private interests." The Secretary concedes that the delay between
2

2

~ Workmen's compensation benefits are deducted in part. in
accordance with a statutory formula. 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III)
§ 424a; 20 CFR § 404.408; see Richardson v. Belcher» 404. U. 15.
18 (1911).
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a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge and a decision on the claim is currently between
10 and 11 months. Since a terminated recipient must
first obtain a reconsideration decision as a prerequisite
to invoking his right to an evidentiary hearing, the
delay between the actual cut-off of benefits and final
decision after a hearing exceeds one year,
In view of the torpidity of this administrative review
process, cf. id., at 383-384, 386, and the typically modest
resources of the family unit of the physically disabled
worker, 26 the hardship imposed upon the erroneously terminated disability recipient may be significant. Still,
the disabled worker's need is likely to be less than that
of a welfare recipient. In addition to the possibility of
access to private resources, other forms of government
assistance will become available where the termination of
disability benefits places a worker or his family below the
subsistence leveP 7 See Arnett v. Kennedy, supra,
26 Amici cite statistics compiled by the Secretary which indicate that in 1965 the mean income of the family unit of a
disabled worker was $3,803, while the median income for the unit
was $2,836. The mean liquid assets-i. e., cash, stocks, bonds-of
t hese family units was $4,862; the median was $940. These statistics
do not take mto account the family unit's nonliquid assets-i. e.,
automobile, real estate, and the like. Brief for Amici AFLCIOjGreen, at 25 n . 29, App. 4a.
27 Amw~ emphasize that because an identical definition of disability is employed m both the Title II Soe1al Security Program and in
the compamon welfare system for the disabled, Supplemental Secunty Income (SSI), compare 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d) (1) with id.,
(Supp. III) § 1382c (a) (3), the terminated disability-benefits recipient
will be ineligible for the SSI Program. There exist, however, state and
local welfare programs which may supplement the worker's income.
In addition, the worker's household unit can qualify for food stamps
if It meets the financial need requirements. See 7 U. S. C. §§ 2013
(c) , 2014(b) , 7 CFR §271. Finally, m 1974 480,000 of the approximately 2,000,000 disabled workers receiving Social Security
benefits also rPceived ssr benefits Since financial need is a criterion
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at 169 (POWELL, J., concurring), id., at 201-202 (WHITE,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In view
of these potential sources of temporary income, there is
less reason here than in Goldberg to depart from the ordinary principle, established by our ~ decisions, that
something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient
prior to adverse administrative action.

D
An additional factor to be considered here is the fairness and reliability of the existing pretermination procedures, and the probable value, if any, of additional
procedural safeguards. Central to the evaluation of any
administrative process is the nature of the relevant inquiry. See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600,
617 (1974); Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1281 (1975). In order to remain eligible for benefits the disabled worker must demonstrate
by means of "medically acceptable clinical and diagnostic
techniques," 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d)(3), that he is unable
"to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . .. ." § 423 (a)(1)(A) (emphasis supplied). In
short, a medical assessment of the worker's physical or
mental condition is required. This is a more sharply
focused and easily documented decision than the typical
determination of welfare entitlement. In the latter case,
a wide variety of information may be deemed relevant,
and issues of witness credibility and veracity often are
critical to the decisionmaking process. Goldberg noted
for eligibility under the SSI program, those disabled workers who
are most in need will m the majority of cases be receiving SSI benefits when disability insurance aid is terminated. And, under the
SSI program, a pretermmation evidentiary hearing is provided, if
requested. 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 1383 (c) ; 20 CFR § 416.1336
(c) ; 40 Fed Reg 1512 ; see Staff Report 346.
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that in such circumstances "written submissions are a
wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision." 397 U. S., at
269.
By contrast, the decision whether to discontinue disability benefits will turn, in most cases, upon "routine,
standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician
specialists," Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S., at 404,
concerning a subject whom they have personally examined. 28 In Richardson the Court recognized the
"reliability and probative worth of written medical reports," emphasizing that while there may be "professional disagreement with the medical conclusions" the
(!specter of questionable credibility and veracity is not
present." I d., at 405, 407. To be sure, credibility and
veracity may be a factor in the ultimate disability assessment in some cases. But procedural due process rules
are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process as applied to the generality of cases, not
the rare exceptions. The potential value of an evidentiary hearing, or even oral presentation to the decision28 The decision is not purely a question of the accuracy of a medical diagnosis since the ultimate issue which the state agency must
resolve is whether in hght of the particular worker's "age, education,.
and work experience" he cannot "engage in any . . . substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy . .. ." 42 U. S. C.
§ 423 (d) (2) (A) . Yet information concerning each of these worker
characteristics is amenable to effective written presentation. The
value of an evidentiary hearmg, or even a limited oral presentation,
to an accurate presentation of those factors to the decisionmaker does
not appear substantial. Similarly, resolution of the inquiry as to
the types of employment opportunities that exist in the national
economy for a physically Impaired worker with a particular set of
~kills would not necessarily be advanced by an evidentiary hearing. Cf. K. Davis, Admmistrative Law Treatise § 7.06, at 429
(1958) . The statistical mformation relevant to this judgment is,
more amenable to written than to oral presentation.
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maker, is substantially less in this context than m
Goldberg.
The decision in Goldberg also was based on the Court's
conclusion that written submissions were an inadequate
substitute for oral presentation because they did not
provide an effective means for the recipient to communicate his case to the decisionmaker. Written submissions
were viewed as an unrealistic option, for most recipients
lacked the "educational attainment necessary to write
effectively" and could not afford professional assistance.
In addition, such submissions would not provide the
"flexibility of oral presentations" or "permit the recipient
to mold his argument to the issues the decision maker
appears to regard as important." 397 U. S., at 269.. In
the context of the disability-benefits-entitlement assesment the administrative procedures under review here
fully answer these objections.
The detailed questionnaire which the state agency
periodically sends the recipient identifies with particularity the information relevant to the entitlement decision, and the recipient is invited to obtain assistance
from the local SSA office in completing the questionnaire.
More important, the information critical to the entitlement decision usually is derived from medical sources,
such as the treating physician. Such sources are likely
to be able to communicate more effectively through written documents than are welfare recipients or the lay witnesses supporting their cause. The conclusions of physicians often are supported by X-rays and the results of
clinical or laboratory tests, information typically more
amenable to written than to oral presentation. Cf.
W. Gellhorn & C. Byse, Administrative Law-Cases and
Comments 860-863 (6th ed. 1974) .
A further safeguard against mistake is th~ policy of
ttllowing the disability recipient or his representative full
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access to all information relied upon by the state agency.
In addition, prior to the cut-off of benefits the agency
informs the recipient of its tentative assessment, the
reasons therefor, and provides a summary of the evidence that it considers most relevant. Opportunity is
then afforded the rempient to submit additional evidence or arguments, enabling him to challenge directly
the accuracy of information in his file as well as the
correctness of the agency's tentative conclusions. These
procedures, again as contrasted with those before the
Court in Goldberg, enable the recipient to "mold" his
argument to respond to the precise issues which the
decisionmaker regards as crucial.
Despite these carefully structured procedures, amici
point to the significant reversal rate for appealed cases
as clear evidence that the current process is inadequate.
Depending upon the base selected and the line of analysis followed, the relevant reversal rates urged by the
contending parties vary from a high of 58.6% for appealed reconsideration decisions to an overall reversal
rate of only 3.3%. 29 Bare statistics rarely provide a
satisfactory measure of the fairness of a decisionmaking
process. Their adequacy is especially suspect here since
21l By focusing solely on the reversal rate for appealed reconsideratiOn determinations am~c~ overstate the relevant reversal rate.
As we mdu•.a.ted last Term in Pusan v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 383
n 6 (1975), in order fuly to assess the rPliability and fairness of a
system of procedure, one must also consider the overall rate of error
for all denials of benefits. Here that ovPrall rate is 12.2%. Moreover, about 75% of these reversals occur at the reconsideration stage
of the adrrumstrative process. Smce the median period between a
request for reconsideration review and decision is only two months,
Brief for Amici AFL-CIOjGrcen, App. 4a, the deprivation is
sigmficantly less than that concomitant m the lengthier delay
before an evidentiary hearmg. Netting out these reconsideration
reversals, the overall revprsal rate falls to 3.3% See Supplemental
and RPplv Bmf for tht> PrtttionPr J4.
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the administrative review system is operated on an openfile basis. A recipient may always submit new evidence,
and such submissions may result in additional medical
examinations. Such fresh examinations are held in approximately 30% to 40% of the appealed cases, either at
the reconsideration or evidentiary hearing stage of the
administrative process. Staff Report 238. In this context, the value of reversal rate statistics as one means of
evaluating the adequacy of the pretermination process is
diminished. Thus, although we view such information
as relevant, it is certainly not controlling in this case.

E
In striking the appropriate due process balance the
final factor to be assessed is the public interest. This
includes the administrative burden and other societal
costs that would be associated with requiring, as a matter
of constitutional right, an evidentiary hearing upon demand in all cases prior to the termination of disability
benefits. The most visible burden would be the incremental cost resulting from the increased number of hearings and the expense of providing benefits to ineligible
recipients pending decision. No one can predict the
extent of the increase, but the fact that full benefits
would contmue until after such hearings would assure
the exhaustion in most cases of this attractive option.
Nor would the theoretical right of the Secretary to recover undeserved benefits result, as a practical matter,
in any substantial offset to the added outlay of public
funds. The parties submit widely varying estimates of
the probable additional financial cost. We only need say
that experience with the constitutionalizing of government procedures suggests that the ultimate additional
cost 111 terms of money and administrative burden would
not be immbstantial.
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Financial cost alone is not a controlling weight in determining whether due process requires a particular procedural safeguard prior to some administrative decision.
But the Government's interest, and hence that of the
public, in conserving scarce fiscal and administrative resources, is a factor that must be weighed. At some point
the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual
affected by the administrative action and to society in
terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may
be outweighed by the cost. Significantly, the cost of
protecting those whom the preliminary administrative
process has identified as likely to be found undeserving
may in the end come out of the pockets of the deserving
since resources available for any particular program of
social welfare are not unlimited. See Friendly, supra, at
1276, 1303.
But more is implicated in cases of this type than ad hoc
weighing of fiscal and administrative burdens against the
interests of a particular category of claimants. The ultimate balance involves a determination as to when, under
our constitutional system, judicial-type procedures must
be imposed upon administrative action to assure fairness.
We reiterate the wise admonishment of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter that differences in the origin and function of
administrative agencies "preclude wholesale transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial, and review which
have evolved from the history and experience of the
courts." FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309' U. S.
134, 143 (1940). The judicial model of an evidentiary
hearing is neither a required, nor even the most effective,
method of decisionmaking in all circumstances. The essence of due process is the requirement that "a person in
Jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case
against him and opportunity to meet it." Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S., at 171-

I
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172. (Frankfurter, J., concurring.) All that is necessary
is that the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision
to be made, to "the capacities and circumstances of those
who are to be heard," Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 268269 (footnote omitted), to insure that they are given a
meaningful opportunity to present their case. In assessing what process is due in this case, substantial weight
must be given to the good-faith judgments of the individuals charged by Congress with the administration of
the social welfare system that the procedures they have
provided assure fair consideration of the entitlement
claims of individuals. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S.,
at 202 (WHITE, J .. concurring and dissenting in part).
This is especially so where, as here, the prescribed procedures not only provide the claimant with an effective
process for asserting his claim prior to any administrative
action, but also assure a right to an evidentiary hearing,
as well as to subsequent judicial review, before the denial
of his claim becomes final. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971).
We conclude that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of disability benefits and
that the present administrative procedures fully comport
with due process.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration
or decision of this case.
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The issue in this case is whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that prior to
~he termination of Social Security disability benefit pay-:
ments the recipient be afforded an opportunity for an
evidentiary hearing.
I
Cash benefits are provided to workers during periods
in which they are completely disabled under the disability insurance benefits program created by the 1956
amendments to Title II of the Social Security Act. 70
Stat. 815, 42 U. S. C. § 423. 1 Respondent Eldridge was
I The program is financed by revenues derived from employee
and employer payroll taxes. 26 U. S. C. §§ 3101 (a), 3111 (a); 42
U, S. C. § 401 (b). It provides monthly benefits to disabled persons who have worked sufficiently long to have an insured
status, id., §423 (c)(1)(A), and who have had substantial work experience in a specified interval directly preceding the onset of disability. I d., § 423 (c) ( 1) (B). Benefits also are provided to the
worker's dependents under specified circumstances. !d., §§ 402 (b)(d). When the recipient reaches age 65 his disability benefits are
automatically converted to retirement benefits, !d., §§ 416 (2) (D);
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first awarded benefits in June 1968. In March 1972, he
received a questionnaire from the state agency charged
with monitoring his medical condition. Eldridge completed the questionnaire, indicating that his condition
had not improved and identifying the medical sources,
including physicians, from whom he had received treatment recently. The state agency then obtained reports from his physician and a psychiatric consultant.
After considering these reports and other information
in his file the agency informed Eldridge by letter that it
had made a tentative determination that his disability
had ceased in May 1972. The letter included a statement of reasons for the proposed termination of benefits,
and advised Eldridge that he might request reasonable
time in which to obtain and submit additional information pertaining to his condition.
In his written response, Eldridge disputed one characterization of his medical condition and indicated that
the agency already had enough evidence to establish his
disability. 2 The state a.gency then made its final determination that he had ceased to be disabled in May 1972.
This determination was accepted by the Social Security
Administration (SSA), which notified Eldridge in July
that his benefits would terminate after that month.
423 (a) (1). In fiscal 1974 approximately 3,700,000 persons received
assistance under the program. Social Security Administration, The
Year in Review 21 (1974).
2 Eldridge originally was disabled due to chronic anxiety and
back strain. He subsequently was found to have diabetes. The
tentative determination letter indicated that aid would be terminated because available medical evidence indicated that his diabetes
was under control, that there existed no limitations on his back
movements which would impose severe functional restrictions,
and that he no longer suffered emotional problems that would
preclude him from all work for which he was qualified. App. 12-13.
In his reply letter he claimed to have arthritis of the spine rather
than a strained back,
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The notification also advised him of his right to seek
reconsideration by the state agency of this initial determination within six months.
Instead of requesting reconsideration Eldridge commenced this action challenging the constitutional validity of the administrative procedures established by the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare for assessing
whether there exists a continuing disability. He sought
an immediate reinstatement of benefits pending a
hearing on the issue of his disability. 8 361 F. Supp.
520 (WD Va. 1973). The Secretary moved to dismiss on
the grounds that Eldridge's benefits had been terminated
in accordance with valid administrative regulations and
procedures and that he had failed to exhaust available
remedies. In support of his contention that due process
requires a pretermination hearing, Eldridge relied exclusively upon this Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U. S. 254 (1970), which established a right to an
"evidentiary hearing" prior to termination of welfare
benefits. 4 The Secretary contended that Goldberg was
not controlling since eligibility for disability benefits, unlike eligibility for welfare benefits, is not based on financial need and since issues of credibility and veracity do
The District Court ordered reinstatement of Eldridge's benefits
pending its final disposition on the merits.
4 In Goldberg the Court held that the pretermination hearing must
include the iollowing elements: (1) "timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for the proposed termination"; (2) "an effective
opportunity [for the recipient] to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evidence
orally"; (3) retained counsel, if desired; (4) an "impartial"
decisionmaker; (5) a decision resting "solely on the legal rules and
evidence adduced at the hearing"; (6) a statement of reasons for
the decision and the evidence relied on. 397 U. S., at 266-271. In
this opinion the term "evidentiary hearing" refers to a hearing
generally of the type required in Goldberg.
8
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not play a significant role in the disability entitlement
decision, which turns primarily on medical evidence.
The District Court concluded that the administrative
procedures pursuant to which the Secretary had terminated Eldridge's benefits abridged his right to procedural
due process. The court viewed the interest of the disability recipient in uninterrupted benefits as indistinguishable from that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg.
It further noted that decisions subsequent to Goldberg
demonstrated that the due process requirement of pretermination hearings is not limited to situations involving the deprivation of vital necessities. See Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 88-89 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402
U. S. 535 ( 1971). Reasoning that disability determinations may involve subjective judgments based on conflicting medical and nonmedical evidence, the District
Court held that prior to termination of benefits Eldridge
must be afforded an evidentiary hearing of the type required for welfare beneficiaries under Title IV of the
Social Security Act. !d., at 528. 5 Relying entirely upon
the District Court's opinion, the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the injunction barring termination of Eldridge's benefits prior to an evidentiary
hearing. 493 F. 2d 1230 (1974). 6 We reverse.
II
At the outset we are confronted by a question as
The HEW regulations direct that each state plan under the
federal categorical assistance programs must provide for pretcrmination hearings containing specified procedural safeguards, which
include all of the Goldberg requirements. See 45 CFR § 205.10 (a);
n. 4 supra.
6 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, simply noting that
the issue had been correctly decided by the District Court in this
case, reached the same conclusion in Williams v. Weinberger, 494 F.
2d 1191 (per curiam), petition for cert. filed, 43 U. S. L. W.
3175 (U. S., Sept. 8, 1974) (No. 74-205).
5
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to whether the District Court had jurisdiction over
this suit. The Secretary contends that our decision last
Term in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975), bars
the District Court from considering Eldridge's action.
Salfi was an action challenging the Social Security Act's
duration-of-relationship eligibility requirements for surviving wives and stepchildren of deceased wage earners.
We there held that 42 U. S. C. § 405 (h) 7 precludes federal question jurisdiction in an action challenging denial
of claimed benefits. The only avenue for judicial review
is 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g), which requires exhaustion of
the administrative remedies provided under the Act as
a jurisdictional prerequisite.
Section 405 (g) in part provides:
"Any individual, after any final decision of the
Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a
party, irrespective of the amount in controversy,
may obtain a review of such decision by a civil
action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such
further time as the Secretary may allow." 8
Title 42 U. S. C. § 405 (h) provides in full:
"Finality of Secretary's decision
"(h) The finclings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing
shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings of fact or decision of the Secreta.r y shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as
herein provided. No action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under
section 41 of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this
subchapter."
8 Section 405 (g) further provides:
"Such action shall be brought in the district court of the United
States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides or has
his principal place of business, or, if he does not reside or have his
principal place of business within any such judicial district, in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia. . . . The
court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript
7
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On its face § 405 (g) thus bars judicial review of any
denial of a claim of disability benefits until after a
"final decision" by the Secretary after a "hearing."
It is uncontested that Eldridge could have obtained
full administrative review of the termination of his
benefits, yet failed even to seek reconsideration of the
initial determination. Since the Secretary has not
"waived" the finality requirement as he had in Salfi,
supra, at 767, he concludes that Eldridge cannot prop~
erly invoke § 405 (g) as a basis for jurisdiction. We
disagree.
Salfi identified several conditions which must be satisfied in order to obtain judicial review under § 405 (g).
Of these, the requirement that there be a final decision
by the Secretary after a hearing was regarded as "central
to the requisite grant of subject matter jurisdiction .... "
Id., at 764. 9 Implicit in Salfi, however, is the principle
that this condition consists of two elements, only one of
which is purely "jurisdictional" in the sense that it cannot be "waived" by the Secretary in a particular case.
The waivable element is the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted. The nonwaivable element is the requirement
that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the
of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a
rehearing. The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported
by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ...."
9 The other two conditions are (1) that the civil action be commenced within 60 days after the mailing of notice of such decision,
or withln such additional time as the Secretary may permit, and
(2) that the action be filed in an appropriate district court. These
two requirements specify a statute of limitations and appropriate
venue, and are waivable by the parties. Salfi, supra, at 763-764.
As in Salfi no question as to whether Eldridge satisfied these requirements was timely raised below, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proo. 8 (c),
12 (h)(l), and they need not be considered here.
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Secretary. Absent such a claim there can be no "decision" of any type. And some decision by the Secretary
is clearly required by the statute.
That this second requirement is an essential and distinct precondition for § 405 (g) jurisdiction is evident
from the different conclusions that we reached in Salfi
with respect to the named appellees and the unnamed
members of the class. As to the latter the complaint
was found to be jurisdictionally deficient since it "contain [ ed] no allegations that they have even filed an
application with the Secretary .... " Ibid. With respect
to the named appellees, however, we concluded that the
complaint was sufficient since it alleged that they had
"fully presented their claims for benefits 'to their district
Social Security Office, and upon denial, to the Regional
Office for reconsideration.' " I d., at 764-765. Eldridge
has fulfilled this crucial prerequisite. Through his answers to the state agency questionnaire, and his letter in
response to the tentative determination that his disability had ceased, he specifically presented the claim
that his benefits should not be terminated because he
was still disabled. This claim was denied by the state
agency and its decision was accepted by the SSA.
The fact that Eldridge failed to raise with the
Secretary his constitutional claim to a pretermination
hearing is not controlling. 10 As construed in Salfi, § 405
(g) requires only that there be a "final decision" by the
Secretary with respect to the claim of entitlement to benefits. Indeed, the named appellees in Salfi did not present their constitutional claim to the Secretary. Salfi,
App. 11, 17-21. The situation here is not identical to
If Eldridge had exhausted the full set of available administrative review procedures, failure to have raised his constitutional
claim would not bar him from asserting it later in a district court
See, e. g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 604, 607 (1960).
10
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Salfi, for, while the Secretary had no power to amend
the statute alleged to be unconstitutional in that case,
he does have authority to determine the timing and
content of the procedures challenged here. § 405 (a).
We do not, however, regard this difference as significant. It is unrealistic to expect that the Secretary
would consider substantial changes in the current administrative review system at the behest of a single
aid recipient raising a constitutional challenge in an
adjudicatory context. The Secretary would not be required even to consider such a challenge.
As the nonwaivable jurisdictional element was satisfied,
we next consider the waivable element. The question is
whether the denial of Eldridge's claim to continued benefits was a sufficiently "final decision" with respect to his
constitutional claim to satisfy the statutory exhaustion
requirement. Eldridge concedes that he did not exhaust
the full set of internal review procedures provided by the
Secretary. See 20 CFR §§ 404.910, 404.916, 404.940. As
Salfi recognized, the Secretary may waive the exhaustion
requirement if he satisfies himself, at any stage of the
administrative process, that no further review is warranted either because the internal needs of the agency are
fulfilled or because the relief that is sought is beyond his
power to confer. Salfi suggested that under§ 405 (g) the
power to determine when finality has occurred ordinarily
rests with the Secretary since ultimate responsibility for
the integrity of the administrative program is his. But
cases may arise where a claimant's interest in having a
particular issue resolved promptly is so great that deference to the agency's judgment is inappropriate. This
is such a case.
Eldridge's constitutional challenge is entirely collateral
to his substantive claim of entitlement. Moreover, there
is a crucial distinction between the nature of the consti-
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tutional claim asserted here and that raised in Salfi. A
claim to a predeprivation hearing as a matter of constitutional right rests on the proposition that full relief
cannot be obtained at a post-deprivation hearing. See
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 156
(1974). In light of the Court's prior decisions, see, e. g.,
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra; Fuentes v. Shevin, supra,
Eldridge has raised at least a colorable claim that because
of his physical condition and dependency upon the disability benefits, an erroneous termination would damage
him in a way not recompensable through retroactive payments.11 Thus, unlike the situation in Salfi, denying
Eldridge's substantive claim "for other reasons" or upholding it "under other provisions" at the post-termina11 Decisions in different contexts have emphasized that the
nature of the claim being asserted and the consequences of
deferment of judicial review are important factors in determining whether a statutory requirement of finality has been satisfied.
The role these factors may play is illustrated by the intensely
"practical" approach which the Court has adopted, Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 (1949), when applying
the finality requirements of 28 U. S. C. § 1291, which grants
jurisdiction to courts of appeals to review all "final decisions"
of the district courts, and 28 U. S. C. § 1257, which empowers this
Court to review only "final judgments" of state courts. See, e. g.,
Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55 (1971); Local No. 4-88 Construction & General Laborers Union v. Curry, 371 U. S. 542, 549,
550 (1963); Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555,
557-558 (1963); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus . Loan Corp., supra,
at 545-546. To be sure, certain of the policy considerations
implicated in § 1257 and § 1291 cases are different from those
that arc relevant here. Compare General Laborers Union, supra,
at 550; Mercantile National Bank, supra, at 558, with McKart
v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 193-195 (1969); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action, 424--426 ( 1965). But the
core principle that statutorily created finality requirements should,
if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims
to be lost and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered remains
applicable.
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tion stage, 422 U. S., at 762, would not answer his constitutional challenge.
We conclude that the denial of Eldridge's request for
benefits constitutes a final decision for purposes of § 405
(g) jurisdiction over his constitutional claim. We now
proceed to the merits of that claim. 12

III
A
Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of "liberty" or "property" interests within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. The Secretary does not contend that procedural
due process is inapplicable to terminations of social security disability benefits. He recognizes, as has been
implicit in our prior decisions, e. g., Richardson v. Belcher,
404 U. S. 78, 80-81 (1971); Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401-402 (1971); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S.
603, 611 ( 1960), that the interest of an individual in
continued receipt of these benefits is a statutorily created
"property" interest protected by the Fifth Amendment.
Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 166 (PowELL,
J., concurring); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564,
576-578 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S., at 539;
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 261-262.
Rather, the
Secretary contends that the existing administrative
procedures, detailed below, provide all the process that is
constitutionally due before a recipient can be deprived of
that interest.
Given our conclusion that jurisdiction in the District Court
was proper under § 405 (g), we find it unnecessary to consider
Eldridge's contention that notwithstanding § 405 (h) there was
jurisdiction over his claim under the mandamus statute, 28 U. S. C.
§ 1361, or the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U. S. C. § 701
et seq.
12

74--204-0PINION
MATHEWS v. ELDRIDGE

11

This Court consistently has held that some form of
hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a propery interest. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U. S. 539, 557-558 (1974). See, e. g., Phillips v.
Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 596- 597 (1931). See
also Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 124-125
( 1889). The "right to be heard before being condemned
to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it
may not involve the stigma and hardships of criminal
conviction, is a principle basic to our society." Joint
Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard
"at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965). See
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 394 (1914). Eldridge
agrees that the review procedures available to a claimant
before the initial determination of ineligibility becomes
final would be adequate, if disability benefits were not
terminated until after the evidentiary hearing stage of
the administrative process. The dispute centers upon
what process is due prior to the initial termination of
benefits, pending review.
In recent years this Court increasingly has had occasion to consider the extent to which due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation of
some typo of property interest even if such a hearing is
provided thereafter. In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U. S. 254, 266- 271 ( 1970), has the Court held that
a hearing closely approximating a judicial trial is necessary. In other cases requiring some type of pretermination hearing as a matter of constitutional right the
Court has spoken sparingly about the requisite procedures. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337
(1969), involving garnishment of wages, was entirely
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silent on the matter. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67,
96-97 ( 1972), the Court said only that in a replevin suit
between two private parties the initial determination required something more than an ex parte proceeding
before a court clerk. Similarly, Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S.
535, 540 (1971), held, in the context of the revocation of
a state-granted driver's license, that due process required
only that the prerevocation hearing involve a probablecause determination as to the fault of the licensee, noting
that the hearing "need not take the form of a full adjudication of the question of liability." See also North
Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U. S.
601, 607 (1975). More recently, in Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U. S. 134 (1974), we sustained the validity of procedures by which a federal employee could be dismissed
for cause. They included notice of the action sought, a
copy of the charge, reasonable time for filing a written
response, and an opportunity for an oral appearance.
Following dismissal, an evidentiary hearing was provided. Id., at 142-146.
These decisions underscore the truism that "'[d]ue
process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place
and circumstances." Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961).
"[D] ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands." M orrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972). Accordingly,
resolution of the issue whether the administrative procedures provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires
analysis of the governmental and private interests that
are affected. Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 167-168
(PowELL, J., concurring); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at
263-266; Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v.
McElroy, supra, at 895. More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates
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f}f due process generally requires consideration of three
distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail. See,
e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 263-271.
We turn first to a description of the procedures for
the termination of Social Security disability benefits, and
thereafter consider the factors bearing upon the constitutional adequacy of these procedures.
B
The disability insurance program is administered
jointly by state and federal agencies. State agencies
make the initial determination whether a disability
exists, when it began, and when it ceased. 42 U. S. C.
§ 421,1 3 The standards applied and the procedures followed are prescribed by the Secretary, see § 421 (b),
who has delegated his responsibilities and powers under
the Act to the SSA. See 40 Fed. Reg. § 4473.
In order to establish initial and continued entitleJ.s In all but six States the state vocational rehabilitation agency
charged with administering the state plan under the Vocational
Rehabilitation Act, 41 Stat. 735, as amended, 29 U. S. C. (Supp.
III) § 701 et seq., acts as the "state agency" for purposes of the
disability insurance program. Staff of the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, Report on the Disability Insurance Program, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess., p. 148 (1974). This assignment of responsibility was
intended to encourage rehabilitation contacts for disabled workers
and to utilize the well-established relationships of the local re~
habilitation agencies with the medical profession. H. Rep. No.1698,
83d Cong., 2d Sess., 23-24 ( 1954).
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ment to disability benefits a worker must demonstrate
that he is unable
"to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months, ..." 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d) (1) (A).
To satisfy this test the worker bears a continuing burden
of showing, by means of "medically acceptable clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques,"§ 423 (d)(3), that
he has a physical or mental impairment of such severity
that
"he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy,
regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific
job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be
hired if he applied for work." § 423 (d) (2)(A) .14
The principal reasons for benefits terminations are that
the worker is no longer disabled or has returned to work.
As Eldridge's benefits were terminated because he was
determined to be no longer disabled, we consider only
the sufficiency of the procedures involved in such cases.u
Work which "exists in the national economy" is in turn defined
as "work which exists in significant numbers either in the region
where such individual lives or in several regions of the country."
§423 (d)(2)(A).
15 Because
the continuing disability investigation concerning
whether a claimant has returned to work is usually done directly
by the SSA Bureau of Disability Insurance, without any state agency
involvement, the administrative procedures prior to the post-termination evidentiary hearing differ from those involved in cases of pos14
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The continuing eligibility investigation is made by a
state agency acting through a "team" consisting of a
physician and a nonmedical person trained in disability
~valuati0n. 'The agency periodically communicates with
the disabled worker, usually by mail-in which case he
is sent a detailed questionnaire-or by telephone, and
requests information concerning his present condition,
including current medical restrictions and sources of
t:t;"eatment, and any additional information that he con·. ~iders r:elevant to his continued entitlement to benefits.
SSA Claims Manual (CM) § 6705.1; Disability Insurance
State Manual (DISM) § 353.3.16
Information regarding the recipient's current condition
is also obtained from his sources of medical treatment.
DISM § 353.4. If there is a conflict between the
infor:mation provided by the beneficiary and that obtained from medical sources such as his physician, or
between two sources of treatment, the agency may
arrange for an examination by an independent consulting
physician.17 Ibid. Whenever the agency's tentative
assessment of the beneficiary's condition differs from his
sible medical 'recovery. They are similar, however, in the important
respect that the process relies principally on written communications
and there is no provision for an evidentiary hearing prior to the
cut-off of benefits. Due to the nature of the relevant inquiry in
~rtain types of cases, such as those involving self-employment and
~gr'icultural employment, the SSA office nearest the beneficiary
~onducts an oral interview of the beneficiary as part of the pretermination process. SSA Claims Manual (CM) § 6705.2 (c).
16 Information is also requested concerning the recipient's belief as
to whether he can return to work, the nature and extent of his employment during the past year, and any vocational services he is
receiving.
H All medical source evidence used to establish the absence of
continuing disability must be in writing, with the source properly
identified. DISM § 353.4C.
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own assessment, the beneficiary is informed that benefits
may be terminated, provided a summary of the evidence
upon which the proposed determination to terminate is
based, and afforded an opportunity to review the medical
reports and other evidence in his case file. 18 He also
may respond in writing and submit additional evidence.
Id., § 353.6.
The state agency then makes its final determination,
which is reviewed by an examiner in the SSA Bureau
of Disability Insurance. 42 U. S. C. § 421 (c); CM
§§ 6701 (b), (c). 19 If, as is usually the case, the SSA
accepts the agency determination it notifies the recipient
in writing, informing him of the reasons for the decision,
and of his right to seek de novo reconsideration by the
state agency. 20 CFR §§ 404.907, 404.909. 20 Upon acceptance by the SSA, benefits are terminated effective
two months after the month in which medical recovery is
found to have occurred. 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III)
§ 423 (a).
18 The disability recipient is not permitted personally to examine
the medical reports contained in his file. This restriction is not
significant since he is entitled to have any representative of his
choice, including a lay friend or family member, examine all medical
evidence. CM § 7314. See also 20 CFR § 401.3 (a) (2). The Secretary informs us that this curious limitation is currently under
review.
19 The SSA may not itself revise the state agency's determination
in a manner more favorable to the beneficiary. If, however, it believes
that the worker is still disabled, or that the disability lasted longer
than determined by the state agency, it may return the file to the
agency for further consideration in light of SSA's views. The
agency is free to reaffirm its original assessment.
20 The reconsideration assessment is initially made by the state
agency, but usually not by the same persons who considered the
case originally. R. Dixon, Social Security Disability and Mass
Justice 32 (1973). Both the recipient and the agency may adduce
new evidence.
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If the recipient seeks reconsideration by the state
agency and the determination is adverse, the SSA reviews
the reconsideration determination and notifies the recipient of the decision., He then has a right to an evidentiary hearing before an SSA administrative law judge.
20 CFR §§ 404.917, 404.927. The hearing is nonadversary, and the SSA is not represented by counsel. As
at all prior and subsequent stages of the administrative process, however, the claimant may be represented
by counsel or other spokesmen. § 404.934. If this
hearing results in an adverse decision, the claimant is entitled to request discretionary review by the SSA Appeals
Council, § 404.945, and finally may obtain judicial review. 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g); 20 CFR § 404.951. 21
Should it be determined at any point after termination
of benefits, that the claimant's disability extended beyond the date of cessation initially established, the
worker is entitled to retroactive payments. 42 U. S. C.
§ 404. Cf. id., § 423 (b); 20 CFR §§ 404.501, 404.503,
404.504. If, on the other hand, a beneficiary receives
any payments to which he is later determined not to
be entitled, the statute authorizes the Secretary to
attempt to recoup these funds in specified circumstances.
42 u. s. c. § 404.22

c

Despite the elaborate character of the administrative procedures provided by the Secretary, the courts
Unlike all prior levels of review, which are de novo, the district court is required to treat findings of fact as conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g).
22 The Secretary may reduce other payments to which the beneficiary is entitled, or seek the payment of a refund, unless the
beneficiary is "without fault" and such adjustment or recovery would
defeat the purposes of the Act or be "against equity and good
conscience." 42 U. S. C. § 404 (b). See generally 20 CFR
§§ 404.501-404.515.
21
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below held them to be constitutionally inadequate, concluding that due process requires an evidentiary hearing
prior to termination. In light of the private and governmental interests at stake here and the nature of the
existing procedures, we think this was error.
Since a recipient whose benefits are terminated is
awarded full retroactive relief if he ultimately prevails,
his sole interest is in the uninterrupted receipt of this
source of income pending final administrative decision
on his claim. His potential injury is thus similar in
nature to that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg,
see 397 U. S., at 263- 264, the nonprobationary federal
employee in Arnett, see 416 U. S., at 146, and the wage
earner in Sniadach. See 395 U. S., at 341-342. 23
Only in Goldberg has the Court held that due process
requires an evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary
deprivation. It was emphasized there that welfare
assistance is given to persons on the very margin of
subsistence:
"The crucial factor in this context-a factor not
present in the case of ... virtually anyone else whose
governmental entitlements are ended-is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy
over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of
the very means by which to live while he waits."
397 U.S., at 264 (emphasis in original).
Eligibility for disability benefits, in contrast, is not based
upon financial need. 24 Indeed, it is wholly unrelated to
This, of course, assumes that an employee whose wages are
garnisheed erroneously is subsequently able to recover his back
wages.
24 The level of benefits is determined by the worker's average
monthly earnings during the period prior to disability, his age,
and other factors not directly related to financial need, specified in
42 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 415. See id., § 423 (a) (2).
23
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the worker's income or support from many other sources,
such as earnings of other family members, workmen's
compensation awards/ 5 tort claims awards, savings, private insurance, public or private pensions, veterans' benefits, food stamps, public assistance, or the "many other
important programs both public and private, which contain provisions for disability payments affecting a substantial portion of the work force ...." Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U. S., at 85-87 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See Staff of the House Comm. on Ways & Means,
Report on the Disability Insurance Program, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess., 9~10, 419-429 (1974) (hereinafter Staff Report).
As Goldberg illustrates, the degree of potential deprivation that may be created by a particular decision is
a factor to be considered in assessing the validity of
.any administrative decisionmaking process. Cf. M orrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972). The potential
deprivation here is generally likely to be less than in
Goldberg, although the degree of difference can be overstated. As the District Court emphasized, to remain
eligible for benefits a recipient must be "unable to engage
in substantial gainful activity." 42 U.S. C.§ 423; 361 F.
Supp., at 523. Thus, in contrast to the discharged federal employee in Arnett, there is little possibility that
the terminated recipient will be able to find even temporary employment to ameliorate the interim loss.
As we recognized last Term in Fusari v. Steinberg,
419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975), "the possible length of wrongful deprivation of ... benefits [also] is an important factor
in assessing the impact of official action on private interests." The Secretary concedes that the delay between
25 Workmen's compensation benefits are deducted in part in
accordance with a statutory formula . 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III)
§ 424a; 20 CFR § 404.408; see Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S.
78 (1971).
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a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge and a decision on the claim is currently between
10 and 11 months. Since a terminated recipient must
first obtain a reconsideration decision as a prerequisite
'to invoking his right to an evidentiary hearing, the
delay between the actual cut-off of benefits and final
decision after a hearing exceeds one year.,
In view of the torpidity of this administrative review
process, cf. id., at 383-384, 386, and the typically modest
resources of the family unit of the physically disabled
worker, 26 the hardship imposed upon the erroneously terminated disability recipient may be significant. Still,
the disabled worker's need is likely to be less than that
of a welfare recipient. In addition to the possibility of
access to private resources, other forms of government
assistance will become available where the termination of
disability benefits places a worker or his family below the
subsistence leveP 7 See Arnett v. Kennedy, supra,
Amici cite statistics compiled by the Secretary which indicate that in 1965 the mean income of the family unit of a
disabled worker was $3,803, while the median income for the unit
was $2,836. The mean liquid assets-i. e., cash, stocks, bonds-of
these family units was $4,862; the median was $940. These statistics
do not take into account the family unit's nonliquid assets-i. e.,
automobile, real estate, and the like. Brief for Amici AFLCIOjGreen, at 25 n. 29, App. 4a.
27 Amici emphasize that became an identical definition of disability is employed in both the Title II Social Security Program and in
the companion welfare system for the disabled, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), compare 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d) (1) with id.,
(Supp. III) § 1382c (a) (3), the terminated disability-benefits recipient
will be ineligible for the SSI Program. There exist, however, state and
local welfare programs which may supplement the worker's income.
In addition, the worker's household unit can qualify for food stamps
if it meets the financial need requirements. See 7 U. S. C. §§ 2013
(c), 2014 (b); 7 CFR § 271. Finally, in 1974 480,000 of the approximately 2,000,000 disabled workers receiving Social Security
benefits also received SSI benefits. Since financial need is a criterion
26
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at 169 (POWELL, J., concurring), id., at 201-202 (WHITE,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In view
of these potential sources of temporary income, there is
less reason here than in Goldberg to depart from the ordinary principle, established by our decisions, that something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior
to adverse administrative action.
D
An additional factor to be considered here is the fairness and reliability of the existing pretermination procedures, and the probable value, if any, of additional
procedural safeguards. Central to the evaluation of any
administrative process is the nature of the relevant inquiry. See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600,
617 (1974); Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1281 (1975). In order to remain eligible for benefits the disabled worker must demonstrate
by means of "medically acceptable clinical and diagnostic
techniques," 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d) (3), that he is unable
"to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment ...." § 423 (a) (1) (A) (emphasis supplied). In
short, a medical assessment of the worker's physical or
mental condition is required. This is a more sharply
focused and easily documented decision than the typical
determination of welfare entitlement. In the latter case,
a wide variety of information may be deemed relevant,
and issues of witness credibility and veracity often are
critical to the decisionmaking process. Goldberg noted
for eligibility under the SSI program, those disabled workers who
are most in need will in the majority of cases be receiving SSI benefits when disability insurance aid is terminated. And, under the
SSI program, a pretermination evidentiary hearing is provided, if
requested. 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 1383 (c); 20 CFR § 416.1336
(c); 40 Fed. Reg. 1512; see Staff Report 346.
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that in such circumstances "written submissions are a
wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision." 397 U. S., at
269.
By contrast, the decision whether to discontinue disability benefits will turn, in most cases, upon "routine,
standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician
specialists," Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S., at 404,
concerning a subject whom they have personally examined.28 In Richardson the Court recognized the
"reliability and probative worth of written medical reports," emphasizing that while there may be "professional disagreement with the medical conclusions" the
"specter of questionable credibility and veracity is not
present." I d., at 405, 407. To be sure, credibility and
veracity may be a factor in the ultimate disability assessment in some cases. But procedural due process rules
are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process as applied to the generality of cases, not
the rare exceptions. The potential value of an evidentiary hearing, or even oral presentation to the decision28 The decision is not purely a question of the accuracy of a medical diagnosis since the ultimate issue which the state agency must
resolve is whether in light of the particular worker's "age, education,
and work experience" he cannot "engage in any . . . substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy ...." 42 U. S. C.
§423 (d)(2)(A). Yet information concerning each of these worker
characteristics is amenable to effective written presentation. The
value of an evidentiary hearing, or even a limited oral presentation,
to an accurate presentation of those factors to the decisionmaker does
not appear substantial. Similarly, resolution of the inquiry as to
the types of employment opportunities that exist in the national
economy for a physically impaired worker with a particular set of
skills would not necessarily be advanced by an evidentiary hearing. Cf. K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.06, at 429
(1958) . The statistical information relevant to this judgment is
more amenable to written than to oral presentation.
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maker, is substantially less in this context than m
Goldberg.

The decision in Goldberg also was based on the Court's
conclusion that written submissions were an inadequate
substitute for oral presentation because they did not
provide an effective means for the recipient to communicate his case to the decisionmaker. Written submissions
were viewed as an unrealistic option, for most recipients
lacked the "educational attainment necessary to write
effectively" and could not afford professional assistance.
In addition, such submissions would not provide the
"flexibility of oral presentations" or "permit the recipient
to mold his argument to the issues the decision maker
appears to regard as important." 397 U. 8., at 269. In
the context of the disability-benefits-entitlement assesment the administrative procedures under review here
fully answer these objections.
The detailed questionnaire which the state agency
periodically sends the recipient identifies with particularity the information relevant to the entitlement decision, and the recipient is invited to obtain assistance
from the local SSA office in completing the questionnaire.
More important, the information critical to the entitlement decision usually is derived from medical sources,
such as the treating physician. Such sources are likely
to be able to communicate more effectively through written documents than are welfare recipients or the lay wit. nesses supporting their cause. The conclusions of physicians often are supported by X-rays and the results of
clinical or laboratory tests, information typically more
amenable to written than to oral presentation. Cf.
W. Gellhorn & C. Byse, Administrative Law-Cases and
Comments 860-863 (6th ed. 1974).
A further safeguard against mistake is the policy of
allowing the disability recipient or his representative full
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access to all information relied upon by the state agency.
In addition, prior to the cut-off of benefits the agency
informs the recipient of its tentative assessment, the
reasons therefor, and provides a summary of the evidence that it considers most relevant. Opportunity is
then afforded the recipient to submit additional evidence or arguments, enabling him to challenge directly
the accuracy of information in his file as well as the
correctness of the agency's tentative conclusions. 1These
procedures, again as contrasted with those before the
Court in Goldberg, enable the recipient to "inold" his
argument to respond to the precise issues which the
decisionmaker regards as crucial.
Despite these carefully structured procedures, amici
point to the significant reversal rate for appealed cases
as clear evidence that the current process is inadequate.
Depending upon the base selected and the line of analysis followed, the relevant reversal rates urged by the
contending parties vary from a high of 58.6% for appealed reconsideration decisions to an overall reversal
rate of only 3.3o/o. 29 Bare statistics rarely provide a
satisfactory measure of the fairness of a decisionmaking
process. Their adequacy is especially suspect here since
211 By focusing solely on the reversal rate for appealed reconsideration determinations amici overstate the relevant reversal rate.
As we indicated last Term in Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U. S. 379, 383
n. 6 (1975), in order fuly to assess the reliability and fairness of a
system of procedure, one must also consider the overall rate of error
for all denials of benefits. Here that overall rate is 12.2%. Moreover, about 75% of these reversals occur at the reconsideration stage
of the administrative process. Since the median period between a
request for reconsideration review and decision is only two months,
Brief for Amici AFL-CIO /Green, App. 4a, the deprivation is
significantly less than that concomitant in the lengthier delay
before an evidentiary hearing. Netting out these reconsideration
reversals, the overall reversal rate falls to 3.3%. See Supplemental
a.nd Reply Brief for the Petitioner 14.
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the administrative review system is operated on an openfile basis. A recipient may always submit new evidence,
and such submissions may result in additional medical
examinations, Such fresh examinations are held in approximately 30% to 40% of the appealed cases, either at
the reconsideration or evidentiary hearing stage of the
administrative process. Staff Report 238. In this context, the value of reversal rate statistics as one means of
evaluating the adequacy of the pretermination process is
diminished. Thus, although we view such information
as relevant, it is certainly not controlling in this case.

E
In striking the appropriate due process balance the
final factor to be assessed is the public interest. This
includes the administrative burden and other societal
costs that would be associated with requiring, as a matter
of constitutional right, an evidentiary hearing upon demand in all cases prior to the termination of disability
benefits. The most visible burden would be the incremental cost resulting from the increased number of hearings and the expense of providing benefits to ineligible
recipients pending decision. No one can predict the
extent of the increase, but the fact that full benefits
would continue until after such hearings would assure
the exhaustion in most cases of this attractive option.
Nor would the theoretical right of the Secretary to recover undeserved benefits result, as a practical matter,
in any substantial offset to the added outlay of public
funds. The parties submit widely varying estimates of
the probable additional financial cost. We only need say
that experience with the constitutionalizing of government procedures suggests that the ultimate additional
cost in terms of money and administrative burden would
not be insubstantial.
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Financial cost alone is not a controlling weight in determining whether due process requires a particular procedural safeguard prior to some administrative decision.
But the Government's interest, and hence that of the
public, in conserving scarce fiscal and administrative resources, is a factor that must be weighed. At some point
the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual
affected by the administrative action and to society in
terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may
be outweighed by the cost. Significantly, the cost of
protecting those whom the preliminary administrative
process has identified as likely to be found undeserving
may in the end come out of the pockets of the deserving
since resources available for any particular program of
social welfare are not unlimited. See Friendly, supra, at
1276, 1303.
But more is implicated in cases of this type than ad hoc
weighing of fiscal and administrative burdens against the
interests of a particular category of claimants. The ultimate balance involves a determination as to when, under
our constitutional system, judicial-type procedures must
be imposed upon administrative action to assure fairness.
We reiterate the wise admonishment of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter that differences in the origin and function of
administrative agencies "preclude wholesale transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial, and review which
have evolved from the history and experience of the
courts." FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S.
134, 143 ( 1940) . The judicial model of an evidentiary
hearing is neither a required, nor even the most effective,
method of decisionmaking in all circumstances. The essence of due process is the requirement that "a person in
jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case
against him and opportunity to meet it." Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S., at 171-
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172. (Frankfurter, J., concurring.) All that is necessary
is that the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision
to be made, to "the capacities and circumstances of those
who are to be heard," Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 268269 (footnote omitted), to insure that they are given a
meaningful opportunity to present their case. In assessing what process is due in this case, substantial weight
must be given to the good-faith judgments of the individuals charged by Congress with the administration of
the social welfare system that the procedures they have
provided assure fair consideration of the entitlement
· claims of individuals. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S.,
at 202 (WHITE, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
This is especially so where, as here, the prescribed procedures not only provide the claimant with an effective
process for asserting his claim prior to any administrative
' action, but also assure a right to an evidentiary hearing,
as well as to subsequent judicial' review, before the denial
of his claim becomes final. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971).
We conclude that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of disability benefits and
that the present administrative procedures fully comport
with due process.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration
or decision of this case.
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MATHEWS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE v. ELDRIDGE
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 74--204. Argued October 6, 1975-Decided February -, 1976
In order to establish initial and continued entitlement to disability
benefits under the Social Security Act (Act), a worker must
demonstrate that, inter alia, he is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment . . . ." The worker bears the
continuing burden of showing, by means of "medically acceptable ... techniques" that his impairment is of such severity that
he cannot perform his previous work or any other kind of gainful
work A state agency makes the continuing assessment of the
worker's eligibility for benefits, obtaining information from the
worker and his sources of medical treatment, The agency may
arrange for an independent medical examination to resolve conflicting information. If the agency's tentative assessment of the
beneficiary's condition differs from his own, the beneficiary is
informed that his benefits may be terminated, is provided a
summary of the evidence, and afforded an opportunity to review
the agency's evidence. The state agency then makes a final
determination, which is reviewed by the Social Security Agency
(SSA). If the SSA accepts the agency determination it gives
written notification to the beneficiary of the reasons for the decision and of his right to de novo state agency reconsideration.
Upon acceptance by the SSA, benefits are terminated effective
two months after the month in which recovery is found to have
occurred. If, after reconsideration by the state agency and SSA
review, the decision remains adverse to the recipient, he is notified
of his right to an evidentiary hearing before an SSA administrative law judge. If an adverse decision results, the recipient may
I
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request discretionary review by the SSA Appeals Council, and
finally may obtain judicial review. If it is determined after
benefits arc terminated that the claimant's disability extended
beyond the date of cessation initially established, he is entitled
to retroactive payments. Retroactive adjustments are also made
for overpayments. A few years after respondent was first
awarded disability benefits he received and completed a questionnaire from the monitoring state agency. After considering the
information contained t herein and obtaining reports from hi · doctor
and an independent medical consultant, t he agency wrote respondent
that it had tentatively determined that his disability had ceased in
May 1972 and advised him that he might request a reasonable
time to furnish additional information. In a reply letter respondent disputed one characterization of his medical condition and
indicated that the agency had enough evidence to establish his
disability. The agency then made its final determination reaffirming its tentative decision. This determination was accepted by
the SSA, which notified respondent in July that his benefits would
end after that month and that he had a right to state agency
reconsideration within six months. Instead of requesting such
reconsideration respondent brought this action challenging the
constitutionality of the procedures for terminating disability benefits and seeking reinstatement of benefits pending a hearing. The
District Court, relying in part on Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S.
254, held that the termination procedures violated procedural due
process and concluded that prior to termination of benefits respondent was entitled to an evidentiary hearing of the type
provided welfare beneficiaries under Title IV of the Act. The
Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioner contends, inter alia, that
the District Court is barred from considering respondent's action
by Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, which held that district
courts are precluded from exercising jurisdiction over an action
seeking a review of a decision of the Secretary of HEW regarding
benefits under the Act except as provided in 42 U.S. C.§ 405 (g),
which grants jurisdiction only to review a "final" decision of the
Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party. Held:
1. The District Court had jurisdiction over respondent's constitutional claint, since the denial of his request for benefits was
a final decision with respect to that claim for purposes of § 405 (g)
jurisdiction. Pp. 4-10.
(a) The § 405 (g) finality requirement consists of the waivable requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by
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the Secretary be exhausted and the nonwaivable requirement that
a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary.
Respondent's answers to the questionnaire and his letter to the
state agency specifically presented the claim that his benefits
should not be terminated because he was still disabled, and thus
satisfied the nonwaivable requirement. Pp. 6-8.
(b) Although respondent concededly did not exhaust the
Secretary's internal-review procedures and ordinarily only the
Secretary has the power to waive exhaustion, this is a case where
the claimant's interest in having a particular issue promptly
resolved is so great that deference to the Secretary's judgment
is inappropriate. The facts that respondent's constitutional challenge was collateral to his substantive claim of entitlement and
that (contrary to the situation in Salfi) he colorably claimed that
an erroneous termination would damage him in a way not compensable through retroactive payments warrant the conclusion
that the denial of his claim to continued benefits was a sufficiently
"final decision" with respect to his constitutional claim to satisfy
the statutory exhaustion requirement. Pp. 8-10.
2. An evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of Social Security disability payments and the administrative
procedures prescribed under the Act fully comport with due
process. Pp. 10-27.
(a) "[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands," Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481, Resolution of the issue here involving the constitutional sufficiency of administrative procedures prior
to the initial termination of benefits and pending review, requires
consideration of three factors: ( 1) the private interest that will
be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and
(3) the Government's interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures would
entail. Pp. 10-13.
(b) The private interest that will be adversely affected by
an erroneous termination of benefits is likely to be less in the
case of a disabled worker than in the case of a welfare recipient,
like the claimants in Goldberg, supra. Eligibility for disability
payments is not based on financial need, and although hardship
may be imposed upon the erroneously terminated disability recipient, his need is likely less than the welfare recipient. In view
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of other forms of government assistance available to the terminated disability recipient, there is less reason than in Goldberg
to depart from the ordinary principle that something less than
an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative
action. Pp. 17-21.
(c) The medical assessment of the worker's condition implicates a more sharply focused and easily documented decision than
the typical determination of welfa.re entitlement. The decision
whether to discontinue disability benefits will normally turn upon
"routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician
specialists," Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S. 389, 404. In a
disability situation the potential value of an evidentiary hearing
is thus substantially less than in the welfare context. Pp. 21-23.
(d) Written submissions provide the disability recipient with
an effective means of communicating his case to the decisionmaker. The detailed questionnaire identifies with particularity
the information relevant to the entitlement decision. Information critical to the decision is derived directly from medical
sources. Finally, prior to termination of benefits, the disability
recipient or his representative is afforded full access to the information relied on by the state agency, is provided the reasons
underlying its tentative assessment, and is given an opportunity to
submit additional arguments and evidence. Pp. 23-24.
(e) Requiring an evidentiary hearing upon demand in all
cases prior to the termination of disability benefits would entail
fiscal and administrative burdens out of proportion to any countervailing benefits The judicial model of an evidentiary hearing is
neither a required, nor even the most effective, method of
decisionmaking in all circumstances, and here where the prescribed
procedures not only provide the claimant with an effective process
for asserting his claim prior to any administrative action but also
a right to an evidentiary hearing as well as subsequent judicial
review before the denial of his claim becomes final, there is no
deprivation of procedural due process, Pp. 26-27.
493 F. 2d 1230, reversed.
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In order to establish initial and continued entitlement to disability
benefits under the Social Security Act (Act), a worker must
demonstrate that, inter alia, he is unable "to engage in any sub·
stantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment • • . ." The worker bears the
continuing burden of showing, by means of "medically acceptable ... techmques" that his impairment is of such severity that
he cannot perform his previous work or any other kind of gainful
work. A state agency makes the continumg assessment of the
worker's eligibility for benefits, obtaining information from the
worker and his sources of medical treatment. The agency may
arrange for an independent medical examination to resolve conflicting information. If the agency's tentative assessment of the
beneficiary's conditiOn differs from his own, the beneficiary is
informed that his benefits ma,y be terminated, is provided a
summary of the evidence, and afforded an opportunity to review
the agency's evidence. The state agency then makes a final
. determination, which is reviewed by the Social Security Agency
(SSA) . If the SSA accepts the agency determination it gives
written notification to the beneficiary of the reasons for the decision and of his nght to de novo state agency reconsideration.
Upon acceptance by the SSA, benefits are terminated effective
two months after the month in which recovery is found to have
occurred. If, after reconsideration by the state agency and SSA
review, the decision remains adverse to the recipient, he is notifie9
. of his right to an evidentiary hearmg before an SSA administra~
,tive law judge. If .an adverse decision results, the recipient may
I

II

MATHEWS v. ELDRIDGE
yllabus
request discretionary review by the SSA Appeals Council, and
finally may obtam JUdiCial review. If it is determined after
benefits arc termmated that the claimant's disability extended
beyond the date of cessation mitially established, he is entitled
to retroactive payments. Retroactive adJustments are also made
for overpayments. A few years after respondent was first
awarded disability benefits he received and completed a questionnaire from the monitoring state agency. After considering the
informatiOn contmncd therem and obtaining reports from his doctor
and an independPnt medical consultant, the agency wrote respondent
that it had tentatively determined that his disability had ceased in
May 1972 and advised him that he might request a reasonable
time to furnish additional mformation. In a reply letter respondent disputed one characterization of his medical condition and
indicated that the agency had enough evidence to establish his
disability. The agency then made its final determination reaffirming its tentative decis10n. This determmation was accepted by
the SSA, which notified respondent in July that his benefits would
end after that month and that he had a right to state agency
reconsideratiOn within six months. Instead of requesting such
reconsideration respondent brought this action challenging the
constitutionality of the procedures for terminating disability benefits and seeking remstatement of benefits pending a hearing. The
District Court, relying in part on Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S.
254, held that the terminatiOn procedures violated procedural due
process and concluded that prior to termination of benefits respondent was entitled to an evidentiary hearing of the type
provided welfare beneficianes under Title IV of the Act. The
Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner contends, inter alia, that
the District Court is barred from considering respondent's action
by Wemberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, which held that district
courts are precluded from exercising jurisdiction over an action
seeking a review of a decision of the Secretary of HEW regarding
benefits under the Act except as provided in 42 U.S. C. § 405 (g),
which grants JunsdictJOn only to review a "final" decision of the
Secretary made after a hearmg to which he was a party. Held:
1. The District Court had jurisdiction over respondent's constitutional clalffi, smce the denial of his request for benefits was
a final decis10n with respect to that claim for purposes of § 405 (g)
jurisdiction. Pp. 4-10.
(a) The § 405 (g) finality requirement consists of the waivable reqmrement that the adm.Jmstrative remedies prescribed by

MATHEWS v. ELDRIDGE

m

Sylla.bus
the Secretary be exhausted and the nonwaivable requirement that

a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary.
Respondent's answers to the questionnaire and his letter to the
state agency specifically presented the claim that his benefits
should not be terminated because he was still disabled, and thus
satisfied the nonwaivable requirement. Pp. 6-8.
(b) Although respondent concededly did not exhaust the
Secretary's internal-review procedures and ordinarily only the
Secretary has the power to waive exhaustion, this is a case where
the claimant's interest in having a particular issue promptly
resolved is so great that deference to the Secretary's judgment
is inappropriate. The facts that respondent's constitutional challenge was collateral to his substantive claim of entitlement and
that (contrary to the situatiOn in Salfi) he colorably claimed that
an erroneous terminatiOn would damage him in a way not compensable through retroactive payments warrant the conclusion
that the denial of his claun to continued benefits was a sufficiently
"final decision" with respect to his constitutional claim to satisfy
the statutory exhaustion requirement. .P p. 8-10.
2. An evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of Social Security disability payments and the administrative
procedures prescribed under the Act fully comport with due
process. Pp. 10-27.
(a) "[D]ue process IS flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands," Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481. Resolution of the issue here involving the constitutional sufficiency of administrative procedures prior
to the initial termination of benefits and pending review, requires
consideratiOn of three factors: ( 1) the pnvate interest that will
be affected by the offiCial actwn, (2) t1w risk of an erroneous
deprivatiOn of such interest through the procedures used, and
probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and
(3) the Government's interest, includmg the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additiOnal or substitute procedures would
entail. Pp. 10-13.
(b) The private interest that will be adversely affected by
an erroneous termination of benefits is likely to be less in the
case of a cli&-ibled worker than in the case of a welfare recipient,
like the claunants m Goldberg, supra. Eligibility for disability
payments is not based on finanCial need, and although hardship
may be imposed upon the erroneously terminated disability recipi·ent, his need is hkely less tha.n the welfare reCipient. In view
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of other forms of government assistance available to the terminated disability recipient, there is less reason than in Goldberg
to depart from the ordinary principle that something less than
an evidentiary hearmg IS sufficient prwr to adverse administrative
action. Pp. 17-21.
(c) The medical assessment of the worker's condition implicates a more sharply focused and easily documented decision than
the typical determination of welfare entitlement. The decision
whether to discontinue disability benefits will normally turn upon
"routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician
specialists," Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S. 389, 404. In a
disability situation the potential value of an evidentiary hearing
is thus substantially less than m the welfare context. Pp. 21-23.
(d) Written submiSSIOns provide the disability recipient with
an effective means of commumcatmg his case to the decisionmaker. The detailed questionnaire identifies with particularity
the information relevant to the entitlement decision. Information critical to the decision is denved directly from medical
sources. Finally, prior to termination of benefits, the disability
recipient or his representative IS afforded full access to the information rehed on by the state agency, IS provided the reasons
underlying its tentative assessment, and is given an opportunity to
submit additional arguments and evidence. Pp. 23-24.
(e) Requirmg an evidentiary hearing upon demand in all
cases prior to the termination of disability benefits would entail
fiscal and administrative burdens out of proportion to any countervailing benefits The JUdrcial model of an evidentiary hearing is
neither a required, nor even the most effective, method of
decisionmaking m all circumstances, and here where the prescribed
procedures not only provide the claimant with an effective process
for asserting his claim prior to any admmistratlVe action but also
a right to an evidentiary hearing as well as subsequent judicial
review before the demal of his claim becomes final, there is no
deprivation of procedural due process. Pp 26-27.
493 F . 2d 1230, reversed.

PowELL, J., ddivcred the opmwn of the Court, m which BunGER,
C. J., and STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUI::>T, JJ.,
joined. BRENNAN, .J. , filed a dissenting opimon, in which MAR::>HALL,.
J ., joined. STEVENl:l, J , took no part in t.hr considrration or decision.
·<ll the cas&.
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Court of Appeals for
v.
the Fourth Circuit.
George H . Eldridge.
[February 24, 1976]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The issue in th1s case is whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that prior to
the termination of Social Security disability benefit payments the recipient be afforded an opportunity for an
evidentiary hearing.
I
Cash benefits are provided to workers during periods
in which they are completely disabled under the disability insurance benefits program created by the 1956
amendments to Title II of the Social Security Act. 70
Stat. 815, 42 U. S. C. § 423. 1 Respondent Eldridge was
The program is financed by revenues derived from employee
and employer payroll taxes. 26 U. S. C. §§ 3101 (a), 3111 (a); 42
U. S. C. § 401 (b) . It provides monthly benefits to disabled persons who have worked sufficiently long to have an insured
status, id., § 423 (c)(1)(A), and who have had substantial work experience in a specified mterval directly preccdmg the onset of disability. !d., § 423 (c) (1) (B). Benefits also are provided to the
worker's dependents under specified cirCumstances. !d., §§ 402 (b)~
(d) . When the recipient reaches age 65 his disability benefits are
automatically converted to ret1rement benefits, !d., §§ 416 (2) (D) ,
1
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first awarded benefits in June 1968. In March 1972, he
received a questionnaire from the state agency charged
with monitoring his medical condition. Eldridge com.;
pleted the questionnaire, indicating that his condition
had not improved and identifying the medical sources,
including physicians, from whom he had received treat.;
ment recently. The state agency then obtained reports from his physician and a psychiatric consultant.
After considering these reports and other information
in his file the agency informed Eldridge by letter that it
had made a tentative determination that his disability
had ceased in May 1972. The letter included a statement of reasons for the proposed termination of benefits,
and advised Eldridge that he might request reasonable
time in which to obtain and submit additional information pertaining to his condition.
In his written response, Eldridge disputed one characterization of his medical condition and indicated that
the agency already had enough evidence to establish his
disability. 2 The state agency then made its final determination that he had ceased to be disabled in May 1972.
This determination was accepted by the Social Security
Administration (SSA), which notified Eldridge in July
that his benefits would terminate after that month.
423 (a) (1) . In fiscal1974 approximately 3,700,000 persons received
assistance under the program. SoCial Security Administration, The
Year in Review 21 (1974) .
2 Eldridge originally was disabled due to chronic 8Jl.Xiety and
back strain. He subsequently was found to have diabetes. The
tentative determination letter indicated t.h at aid would be terminated because available medical evidence indicated that his diabet~
was under control, that there existed no limitations on his back
movements which would impose severe functional restrictions,
and that he no longer suffered emotional problems that would
preclude him from all work for which he was qualified. App. 12-13.
In his reply letter he claimed to have arthritis of the spine rather
rthan a stramed back.
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The notification also advised him of his right to seek
reconsideration by the state agency of this initial determination within six months.
Instead of requesting reconsideration Eldridge commenced this action challenging the constitutional validity of the administrative procedures established by the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare for assessing
whether there exists a continuing disability. He sought
an immediate reinstatement of benefits pending a
hearing on the issue of his disability. 8 361 F. Supp.
520 (WD Va. 1973). The Secretary moved to dismiss on
the grounds that Eldridge's benefits had been terminated
in accordance with valid administrative regulations and
procedures and that he had failed to exhaust available
remedies. In support of his contention that due process
requires a pretermination hearing, Eldridge relied exclusively upon this Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U. S. 254 (1970), which established a right to an
"evidentiary hearing" prior to termination of welfare
benefits.4 The Secretary contended that Goldberg was
not controlling since eligibility for disability benefits, unlike eligibility for welfare benefits, is not based on financial need and since issues of credibility and veracity do
The District Court ordered reinstatement of Eldridge's benefits
pending its final disposition on the merits.
4 In Goldberg the Court held that the pretermination hearing must
include the following elements: (1) "timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for the proposed termmation"; (2) "an effective
opportunity [for the recipient] to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evidence
orally"; (3) retained counsel, if desired ; (4) an "impartial"'
decisionmaker ; (5) a decision resting "solely on the legal rules and
evidence adduced at the hearing"; (6) a statement of reasons for
the decision and the evidence relied on . 397 U. S., at 266-271. In
this opinion the term "evidentiary hearing" refers to a hearing:
generally of the type required in Goldberg.
8

1
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not play a significant role in the disability entitlement
decision, which turns primarily on medical evidence.
The District Court concluded that the administrative
procedures pursuant to which the Secretary had termi•
nated Eldridge's benefits abridged his right to procedural
due process. The court viewed the interest of the disability recipient in uninterrupted benefits as indistinguishable from that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg,
It further noted that decisions subsequent to Goldberg
·demonstrated that the due process requirement of pretermination hearings is not limited to situations involving the deprivation of vital necessities. See Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 88-89 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402
U. S. 535 (1971). Reasoning that disability determinations may involve subjective judgments based on conflicting medical and nonmedical evidence, the District
Court held that prior to termination of benefits Eldridge
must be afforded an evidentiary hearing of the type required for welfare beneficiaries under Title IV of the
Social Security Act. !d., at 528. 5 Relying entirely upon
the District Court's opinion, the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the injunction barring termination of Eldridge's benefits prior to an evidentiary
hearing. 493 F. 2d 1230 (1974) .6 We reverse.

II
At the outset we are confronted by a question as
5 The HEW regulations direct that each state plan under the
federal categorical assistance programs must provide for pretermination hea.rings containmg specified procedural safeguards, which
include [l!l of the Goldberg re(]uirements. See 45 CFR § 205.10 (a);
n . 4 supra.
6 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, simply noting that
the issue had bem correctly derided by the District Court in this
case, reached the same conrlusion in Williarns v. Weinberger, 494 F.
2d 1191 (per curiam) , petition for cert. filed, 43 U. S. L. W.
'3175 (U S., Sept. 8, '1974) (No. 74-205)
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to whether the D1stnct Court had JUrisdiction over
this suit. The Secretary contends that our decision last
Term in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975), bars
the District Court from considering Eldridge's action.
Salfi was an action challenging the Social Security Act's
duration-of-relationship eligibility requirements for surviving wives and stepchildren of deceased wage earners.
We there held that 42 U. S. C. § 405 (h) 7 precludes federal question JUrisdiction in an action challenging denial
of claimed benefits. The only avenue for judicial review
is 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g), which requires exhaustion of
the admimstrative remedies provided under the Act as
:a jurisdictional prerequisite.
Section 405 (g) m part provides :
"Any individual, after any final decision of the
Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a
party, irrespective of the amount in controversy,
may obtaiu a review of such decision by a civil
action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decisiOn or within such
further time as the Secretary may allow." 8
7

Title 42 U S.C. § 405 (h) provides m full
"Fmahty of Secretary's dectsion
"(h) The :findmgs and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing
shall br bmdmg upon nil mdividuals who wrre parties to such hear. in g. No findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tnbunaJ, or governmentnl agency except as
'herem provided. No actiOn agamiit the Umtcd States, the Secretary, or any officrr or employee thereof shall be brought under
section 41 of Titlo 28 to recover on any claim arising under this
subchapter "
8 RectJon 405 (g) further prov1de::,
''Such act JOn shall hr brought m the d1strict conrt of the United
Statt's for the juctl('Jal <hstnct in whJCh the plaintiff resides or has
· hts prmc1pal phcc of busme.:;s, or, tf he does not reside or have his
prinr1pal plrtre of buHmess withm any such JUdicial district, m the
Umted Statrs D1stnct Court for the Distnct of Columbia. . . . The
.('0\11'( shall have powrr to mt('r, upon. !he pleadings an_
d transcnpt
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On its face 405 (g) thus bars judicial review of any
denial of a claun of disability benefits until after a
"final decision" by the Secretary after a "hearing.' 1
It is uncontested that Eldridge could have obtained
full administrative review of the termination of his
benefits, yet failed even to seek reconsideration of the
initial determmat10n,
mce the ecretary has not
"waived" the finality requirement as he had in Salfi,
supra, at 767, he concludes that Eldridge cannot properly invoke § 405 (g) as a basis for jurisdiction. We
disagree.
Salfi identified several conditions which must be satisfied in order to obtain judicial review under § 405 (g).
Of these, the requirement that there be a final decision
by the Secretary after a hearing was regarded as "central
to the requisite grant of subJect matter jurisdiction .... "
Id., at 764. 9 Implicit m Salfi, however, is the principle
that this condition consists of two elements, only one of
which is purely "jurisdiCtiOnal" in the sense that it can·
not be "waived" by the Secretary in a particular case.
The waivable element IS the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted. The nonwaivable element is the requirement
that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the
of the record, a JUdgment aiJmning, modifying, or reversing the decisiOn of the Secretary, with or without remandmg the cause for a
rehearmg. The findmg~ of the Secretary as to any fact, tf supported
by substantial ev1dence, shall be conclusive
"
9 The other two conditiOns are (1) that the ctvil action be commenced withm 60 days after the mmlmg of notice of such decision,
or withm such addttional t1me as the Secretary may permit, and
(2) that the action be filed m an appropriate district court. These
two reqmrements specify a statute of bm1tations and appropriate
venue, and arc> wa~vable by the parties. Salfi, supra, at 763-764.
As in Salfi no questiOn as to whether Eldridge satisfied these requirements was timely rmsed below, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8 (c) ,
'12 (h) (1) , and they nc>Pn not be consHlered her .
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Secretary. Absent such a claim there can be no 11 de"'
cision" of any type. And some decision by the Secretary
is clearly required by the statute,
That this second requirement is an essential and distinct precondition for § 405 (g) jurisdiction is evident
from the different conclusions that we reached in Salfi
with respect to the named appellees and the unnamed
members of the class. As to the latter the complaint
was found to be jurisdictionally deficient since it "contain [ed] no allegations that they have even filed an
application with the Secretary , , . ,'' Ibid. With respect
to the named appellees, however, we concluded that the
complaint was sufficient since it alleged that they had
"fully presented their claims for benefits 'to their district
Social Security Office, and upon denial, to the Regional
Office for reconsideration.' " I d., at 764-765. Eldridge
has fulfilled this crucial prerequisite. Through his answers to the state agency questionnaire, and his letter in
response to the tentative determination that his disltbility had ceased, he specifically presented the claim
that his benefits should not be terminated because he
was still disabled, This claim was denied by the state
ltgency and its decision was accepted by the SSA.
The fact that Eldridge failed to raise with the
Secretary his constitutional claim to a pretermination
hearing is not controlling.10 As construed in Salfi, § 405
(g) requires only that there be a "final decision" by the
Secretary with respect to the claim of entitlement to benefits. Indeed, the named appellees in Salfi did not present their constitutional claim to the Secretary. Salfi,
App. 11, 17-21. The situation here is not identical to'
10 If Eldridge had exhausted the full set of available administrative review procedures, failure to have raised his constitutional
claim would not bar him from asserting it later in a district court
See, e. g., Flemming v. Nestor,. 363 U. S. 603, 604, 607 (1960).
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Salfi, for, while the Secretary had no power to amend

the statute alleged to be unconstitutional in that case,
he does have authority to determine the timing and
content of the procedures challenged here. § 405 (a).
We do not, however, regard this difference as signifi~
cant. It is unrealistic to expect that the Secretary
would consider substantial changes in the current administrative review system at the behest of a single
aid recipient raising a constitutional challenge in an
adjudicatory context. The Secretary would not be required even to consider such a challenge.
As the nonwaivable jurisdictional element was satisfied,
we next consider the waivable element. The question is
whether the denial of Eldridge's claim to continued benefits was a sufficiently "final decision" with respect to his
constitutional claim to satisfy the statutory exhaustion
requirement. Eldridge concedes that he did not exhaust
the full set of internal review procedures provided by the
Secretary. See 20 CFR §§ 404.910, 404.916, 404.940. As
Salfi recognized, the Secretary may waive the exhaustion
requirement if he satisfies himself, at any stage of the
administrative process, that no further review is warranted either because the internal needs of the agency are
fulfilled or because the relief that is sought is beyond his
power to confer. Salfi suggested that under§ 405 (g) the
power to determine when finality has occurred ordinarily
rests with the Secretary since ultimate responsibility for
the integrity of the administrative· program is his. But
cases may arise where a claimant's interest in having a
particular issue resolved promptly is so great that deference to the agency's judgment is inappropriate. This
is such a case.
Eldridge's constitutional challenge is entirely collatera!l
'to his substantive claim of entitlement. Moreover, there
is a 0rucial distinction between the nature of the consti-
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tutional claim asserted here and that raised in Salfi. A
claim to a predeprivation hearing as a matter of constitutional right rests on the proposition that full relief
cannot be obtained at a post-deprivation hearing. See
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 156
(1974). In light of the Court's prior decisions, see, e. g.,
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra; Fuentes v. Shevin, supra,
Eldridge has raised at least a colorable claim that because
of his physical condition and dependency upon the disability benefits, an erroneous termination would damage
him in a way not recompensable through retroactive payments.11 Thus, unlike the situation in Salfi, denying
Eldridge's substantive claim "for other reasons" or upholding it "under other provisions" at the post-termina11 Decisions in d1fferent contexts have emphasized that the
nature of the claim being asserted and the consequences of
deferment of judic1al review are important factors in determining whether a statutory requirement of finality has been satisfied.
The role these factors may play is illustrated by the intensely
"practical" approach which the Court has adopted, Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., '337 U. S. 541, "5413 (1949), when applying
the finality requirements of 28 U. S. 'C. § 1291, which grants
jurisdiction to courts of appeals to review all "final decisions"
of the district courts, and 28 U. S. C. §1257, which empowers this
Court to review only "final judgments" of state courts. See, e. g.,
Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55 (1971); Local No. 438 Construction & Genetal 'Laborers Unwn v. Curry, 371 U. S. 542, 549,
550 (1963); Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555,
557-558 (1963); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., supra,
at 545-546. To be sure, certain of the policy considerations
implicated in § 1257 and § 1291 cases are different from those
that are relevant here. Compare General Laborers Union, supra,
at 550; Mercantile Natwnal Bank, supra, at 558, with McKart
v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 193-195 (1969); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Admimstmtive Action, 424-426 ( 1965). But the
core principle that statutorily created finality requirements should,
if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims
to be lost and potentially irreparable injunes to be suffered remai11s
·applicable.
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tion stage, 422 U. S., at 762, would not answer his con ..
stitutional challenge.
We conclude that the denial of Eldridge's request for
benefits constitutes a final decision for purposes of § 405
(g) jurisdiction over his constitutional claim. We now
proceed to the merits of that claim.12

III
Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of "liberty" or "property" interests within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. The Secretary does not contend that procedural
due process is inapplicable to terminations of social security disability benefits. He recognizes, as has been
implicit in our prior decisions, e. g., Richardson v. Belcher,
404 U. S. 78, 80-81 ( 1971); Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401-402 (1971); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S.
603, 611 ( 1960), that the interest of an individual in
continued receipt of these benefits is a statutorily created
"property" interest protected by the Fifth Amendment.
Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 166 (PowELL,
J., concurring); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564,
576-578 ( 1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S., at 539;
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 261-262.
Rather, the
Secretary contends that the existing administrative
procedures, detailed below, provide all the process that is
constitutionally due before a recipient can be deprived of
that interest.
12 Given our conclusiOn that Jtmsdiction in the District Court
was proper under § 405 (g), we find it unnecessary to consider
Eldridge's contention that notwithstc'tnding § 405 (h) there was
jurisdiction over his clmm under the mandamus statute, 28 U. S. C.
§ 1361, or the AdmimstratJvc Procedure Act. 5 U. S. C. § 701

et seq.
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This Court consistently has held that some form of
hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a propery interest. liVolff v. McDonnell, 418
U. S. 539, 557-558 (1974). See, e. g., Phillips v.
Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 596-597 (1931). See
also Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 124-125
(1889). The "right to be heard before being condemned
to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it
may not involve the stigma and hardships of criminal
conviction, is a principle basic to our society." Joint
Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168
. (19.51) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The fundamental
. requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard
"at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965). See
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 394 (1914). Eldridge
agrees that the review procedures available to a claimant
before the initial determination of ineligibility becomes
final would be adequate if disability benefits were not
terminated until after the evidentiary hearing stage of
the administrative process. The dispute centers upon
what process is due prior to the initial termination of
benefits, pending review.
In recent years this Court increasingly has had occasion to consider the extent to which due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation of
some type of property interest even if such a hearing is
provided thereafter. In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U. S. 254, 266- 271 (1970), has the Court held that
a hearing closely approximating a judicial trial is necessary. In other cases requiring some type of pretermination hearing as a matter of constitutional right the
Court has spoken sparingly about the requisite procedures. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337
1
(1969), involving garnishment of wages, was entirely
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silent on the matter. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 61,
96-97 (1972), the Court said only that in a replevin suit
between two private parties the initial determination required something more than an ex parte proceeding
before a court clerk. Similarly, Ben v. Burson, 402 U. S.
535, 540 (1971), held, in the context of the revocation of
a state-granted driver's license, that due process required
only that the prerevocation hearing involve a probablecause determination as to the fault of the licensee, noting
that the hearing "need not take the form of a full adjudication of the question of liability." See also North
Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U. S.
601, 607 (1975). More recently, in Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U. S. 134 (1974), we sustained the validity of procedures by which a federal employee could be dismissed
for cause. They included notice of the action sought, a
· copy of the charge, reasonable time for filing a written
response, and an opportunity for an oral appearance.
Following dismissal, an evidentiary hearing was pro~
vided. I d., at 142-146.
These decisions underscore the truism that " ' [ d] ue
process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical con. ception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place
and circumstances." Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961).
·" [D] ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands." M orrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972). Accordingly,
resolution of the issue whether the administrative proce,dures provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires
analysis of the governmental and private interests that
are affected. Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 167-168
(PowELL, J., concurring); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at
263-266; Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v.
McElroy, supra, at 895. More precisely, our prior de,.
•cisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates
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of due process generally reqmres consideration of three
distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail. See,
e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 263-271.
We turn first to a description of the procedures for
the termination of Social Security disability benefits, and
thereafter consider the factors bearing upon the constitutional adequacy of these procedures.

B
· The disabihty insurance program is administered
jointly by state and federal agencies. State agencies
make the imtial determination whether a disability
exists, when it began, and when it ceased. 42 U. S. C.
§ 421,1 8 The standards applied and the procedures followed are prescribed by the Secretary, see § 421 (b),
who has delegated his responsibilities and powers under
the Act to the SSA. See 40 Fed. Reg. § 4473.
In order to establish initial and continued entitle18 In all but six
t,1te the state vocational rehabilitation agency
charged with admmistermg the state plan under the Vocational
Rehabilitation Act, 41 Stat. 735, as amended, 29 U. S. C. (Supp.
III) § 701 et seq., acts as the "state agency" for purposes of the
disability insurance program. Staff of the House Comm. on Ways·
and Means, Report on the DISability Insurance Program, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess., p. 148 (1974) Tlu;; assignment of responsibility was
intended to encourage rehabilitation contacts for disabled workers
and t{) utilize the well-established relationships of the local rehabilitation agencies With the medical profession. H. Rep. No.16981,
.83d Cong., 2d Sess., 23-24 (1954)
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ment to disability benefits a worker must demonstrate'
that he is unable
"to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or·
mental impairment which can be expected to result
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12'
months...." 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d) (l)(A).
To satisfy this test the worker bears a continuing burden
of showing, by means of "medically acceptable clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques," § 423 (d) (3), that··
he has a physical or mental impairment of such severity
that
"he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial'
gainful work which exists in the national economy,
regardless of whether such work exists in the im..
mediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific·
job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be·
hired if he applied for work." § 423 (d)(·2) (A).1 '
The principal reasons for benefits terminations are that
the worker is no longer disabled or has returned to work.
As Eldridge's benefits were terminated because he waa
determined to be no longer disabled, we consider only
the sufficiency of the procedures involved in such cases. 1~
14 Work which "exists in the national economy" is in turn defined
as "work whtch exists in significant numbers either in the region
where such individual lives or in several regions of the country."

§423 (d)(2)(A) .
15 Because the
continumg disability investigation concerning
whether a claimant has returned to work is usually done directly
by the SSA Bureau of Disability Insurance, without any state agency
involvement, the administrative procedures prior to the post-termination evidentiary hearmg differ from those involved in cases of pos-
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The continuing eligibility investigation is made by a
state agency acting through a "team" consisting of a;
,physician and a nonmedical person trained in disability
.evaluation. The agency periodically communicates with
the disabled worker, usually by mail-in which case he
is sent a detailed questionnaire-or by telephone, and
requests information concerning his present condition,
jncluding current medical restrictions and sources of
treatment, and any additional information that he considers velevant to his continued entitlement to benefits.
SSA Claims Manual (CM) § 6705.1; Disability Insurance
State Manual (DISM) § 353.3. 1 ~ .
Information regarding the recipient's current condition
is also obtained from his sources of medical treatment.
DISM § 353.4. If there is ·a canfiict between the
information. provided by the bet1eficiary and that obtained from medical sources such as his physician, or
between two sources of treatment, the agency may
arrange for an examination by an independent consulting
physician. 17 Ibid. Whenever the agency's tentative
assessment of the beneficiary's condition differs from his
sible medical recovery. They are similar, however, in the important
respect that the process relies principally on written communications
and there is no provision for an evidentiary hearing prior to the
cut-off of benefits. Due to the nature of the relevant inquiry in
certain types of cases, such as those invo1ving self-employment and
agricultural employment, the SSA office nearest the beneficiary
conducts an oral interview of the beneficiary as part of the pretermination process. SSA Clauns Manual (CM) § 6705.2 (c).
16 Information is also requested concerning the recipient's belief as
to whether he can return to work, the nature and extent of his employment during the past year, and any vocational services he is
receiving.
17 All medical source evidence used to mrtablish the absence of·
continuing disability must be in writing, with the source properly
identified. DISM § 353.4C.
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own assessment, the beneficiary is informed that benents
may be terminated, provided a summary of the evidence
upon which the proposed determination to terminate is
based, and afforded an opportunity to review the medical
reports and other evidence in his case file. 18 He alsd
may respond in writing and submit additional evidence.
!d., § 353.6.
The state agency then makes its final determination,
which is reviewed by an examiner in the SSA BureaU'
of Disability Insurance. 42 U. S. C. § 421 (c); CM
§§ 6701 (b), (c).19 If, as is usually the case, the SSA
accepts the agency determination it notifies the recipient
in writing, informing him of the reasons for the decision,
and of his right to seek de novo reconsideration by the
state agency. 20 CFR §§ 404.907, 404.909.:M Upon acceptance by the SSA, benefits are terminated effective
two months after the month in which medical recovery is
found to have occurred. 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III)
§ 423 (a) .
18 The disability recipient is not permitted personally to examiM
the medical reports contained in his file. This restriction is not
significant since he is entitled to have any representative of his
choice, including a lay fnend or fam\ly member, examine all medical
evidence. CM § 7314. See also 20 CFR § 401.3 (a) (2). The Secretary informs us that this curious limitation is currently under
review.
1o The SSA may not itself revise the state agency's determination
in a manner more favorable to the beneficiary. If, however, it believes
that the worker is still disabled, or that the disability lasted longer
than determined by the state agency, it may return the file to the
agency for further consideration in light of SSA's views. The
agency is free to reaffirm its original assessment.
20 The reconsideration n.ssessment is initially made by the stateagency, but usually not by the same persons who considered the
case originally. R. Dixon, Social Security Disability and Mass
Justice 32 (1973) Both the reCipient and the agency may adducellew evidence,
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Ir the recipient seeks reconsideration by the statEf
agency and the determination is adverse, the SSA reviews
the reconsideration determination and notifies the recipient of the decision. He then has a right to an evidentiary hearing before an SSA administrative law judge.
20 CFR §§ 404.917, 404.927. The hearing is nonadversary, and the SSA is not represented by counsel. As
at all prior and subsequent stages of the administrative process, however, the claimant may be represented
by counsel or other spokesmen. § 404.934. If this
hearing results in an adverse decision, the claimant is entitled to request discretionary review by the SSA Appeals
Council, § 404.945, and finally may obtain judicial review. 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g); 20 CFR § 404.951. 21
Should it be determined at any point after termination
of benefits, that the claimant's disability extended be~
yond the date of cessation initially established, the
worker is entitled to retroactive payments. 42 U. S. C.
§ 404, Cf. id., § 4,23 (b); 20 CFR §§ 404.501, 404.503,
404.504. If, on the other hand, a beneficiary receives
any payments to which he is later determined not to
be entitled, the statute authorizes the Secretary to·
attempt to recoup these funds in specified circumstances.
42

u. s. c. § 404.

22

c

Despite the elaborate character of the administrative procedures provided by the Secretary, the courts
Unlike all prior levels of review, which are de novo, the dis~
trict court is reqwred to treat findings of fact as conclusive if su~
ported by substantial evidence. 42 U. S.C. § 405 (g).
22 The Secretary may reduce other payments to which the bene:ficiary is entitled, or seek the payment of a refund, unless the
beneficiary is "without fault" and such adjustment or recovery would
defeat the purposes of the Act or be "against equity and good
c0nscience." 42 U S. C. § 404 (b) . See generally 20 CFR
:§'§ 404.501-404.515.
21
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below held them to be constitutionally inadequate, con:J
eluding that due process requires an evidentiary hearing
prior to termination. In light of the private and governmental interests at stake here and the nature of the
existing procedures, we think this was error.
Since a recipient whose benefits are terminated is
awarded full retroactive relief if he ultimately prevails,
his sole interest is in the uninterrupted receipt of this
source of income pending final administrative decision
on his claim. His potential injury is thus similar in
nature to that of the welfare recipient in Goldbergr
see 397 U. S., at 263-264, the nonprobationary federal
employee in Arnett, see 416 U. S., at 146, and the wage
earner in Sniadach. See 395 U. S., at 341-342. 23
Only in Goldberg has the Court held that due process
requires an evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary
deprivation. It was emphasized there that welfare
assistance is given to persons on the very margin of
subsistence :
"The crucial factor in this context-a factor not
present in the case of ... virtually anyone else whose
governmental entitlements are ended-is that ter-mination of aid pending resolution of a controversy
over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of
the very means by which to live while he waits."
397 U.S., at 264 (emphasis in original).
Eligibility for disability benefits, in contrast, is not based'
upon financial need. 24 Indeed, it is wholly unrelated to
This, of course, assumes that an employee whose wages are
·garnisheed erroneously IS subsequently able to recover his back
wages.
24 The level of benefits 1s dctermmed by the worker's average·
monthly earmngs dunng the penocl prior to disability, his age,
·and other factors not d1rectly related to financial need, specified i~
42. U. S C (Supp III) §415 See id·. , § 423 (a) (2)
28
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the worker's income or support from many other sources,
such as earnings of other family members, workmen's
compensation awards/ 5 tort claims awards, savings, private insurance, public or private pensions, veterans' benefits, food stamps, public assistance, or the umany other
important programs both public and private, which con~
tain provisions for disability payments affecting a substantial portion of the work force ... ." Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U. S., at 85-87 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See Staff of the House Comm. on Ways & Means,
Report on the Disability Insurance Program, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess., 9~10, 419-429 (1974) (hereinafter Staff Report).
As Goldberg illustrates, the degree of potential deprivation that may be created by a particular decision is
a factor to be considered in assessing the validity of
any administrative decisionmaking process. Cf. M orrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972). The potential
deprivation here is generally likely to be less than in
Goldberg, although the degree of difference can be overstated. As the District Court emphasized, to remain
eligible for benefits a recipient must be uunable to engage
in substantial gainful activity." 42 U.S. C. § 423; 361 F.
Supp., at 523. Thus, in contrast to the discharged federal employee in Arnett, there is little possibility that
the terminated recipient will be able to find even temporary employment to ameliorate the interim loss.
As we recognized last Term in Fusari v. Steinberg,
419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975), uthe possible length of wrongful deprivation of ... benefits [also] is an important factor
in assessing the impact of official action on private interests." The Secretary concedes that the delay between
25 Workmen's compensatiOn benefits are deducted in pa.rt in
accordance with a statutory formula. 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III)
§ 424a; 20 CFR § 404.408; see R ichardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S.
18 (1971) ,
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a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge and a decision on the claim is currently between
10 and 11 months. Since a terminated recipient must
first obtain a reconsideration decision as a prerequisite
to invoking his right to an evidentiary hearing, the
delay between the actual cut-off of benefits and final
decision after a hearing exceeds one year.
In view of the torpidity of this administrative review
process, cf. id., at 383-384, 386, and the typically modest
resources of the family unit of the physically disabled
worker/ 6 the hardship imposed upon the erroneously terminated disability recipient may be significant. Still,
the disabled worker's need is likely to be less than that
of a welfare recipient. In addition to the possibility of
access to private resources, other forms of government
assistance will become available where the termination of
disability benefits places a worker or his family below the
subsistence level_2 7 See Arnett v. Kennedy, supra,
Amici cite stat1shcs compiled by the Secretary which indicate that in 1965 the mean income of the family unit of a
disabled worker was $3,803, while the median income for the unit
was $2,836. The mean liquid assets-i. e., cash, stocks, bonds-of
these family units was $4,862; the median was $940. These statistics
do not take mto account the family umt's nonliquid assets-i. e.,
automobile, real estate, and the like. Brief for Amici AFLCIOj Green, at 25 n. 29, App. 4a.
27 Amici emphasize that because an 1dcntical definition of disability is employed in both the Title II Social Security Program and in
the companion welfare system for the disabled, Supplemental Security Income (S~I), compare 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d) (1) with id.,
(Supp. III) § 1382c (a) ('3), the terminated disability-benefits recipient
will be ineligible for the SSI Program. There exist, however, state ancl
local welfare programs which may supplement the worker's income.
In addition, the worker's household unit can qualify for food stamps
if it meets the financial need reqmrements. See 7 U. S. C. §§ 2013
(c), 2014 (b); 7 CFR § 271. Fmally, m 1974 480,000 of the approximately 2,000,000 disabled workers receiving Social Security
'b..enefits also recm.ved SSI benefits Sincfl financial need is a criterio~
26
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at 169 (POWELL, J., concurring), id., at 201-202 (WHITE,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In view
of these potential sources of temporary income, there is
less reason here than in Goldberg to depart from the ordinary principle, established by our decisions, that something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient priot
to adverse administrative action.

D
An additional factor to be considered here is the fairness and reliability of the existing pretermination procedures, and the probable value, if any, of additional
procedural safeguards. Central to the evaluation of any
administrative process is the nature of the relevant inquiry. See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600,
617 (1974); Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1281 (1975). In order to remain eligible for benefits the disabled worker must demonstrate
by means of "medically acceptable clinical and diagnostic'
techniques," 42 U.S. C.§ 423 (d)(3), that he is unable
"to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment .. .. " § 423 (a)(1)(A) (emphasis supplied). In
short, a medical assessment of the worker's physical or
mental condition is required. This is a more sharply
focused and easily documented decision than the typical
determination of welfare entitlement. In the latter case,
a wide variety of information may be deemed relevant,
and issues of witness credibility and veracity often are
critical to the decisionmaking process. Goldberg noted
for eligibility under the SSI program, those disabled workers who
are most in need will in the majority of cases be receiving SSI benefits when disability insurance aid is terminated. And, under the
ssr program, a pretcrminatwn evidentiary hearing is provided, if
requested. 42 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 1383 (c); 20 CFR § 416.13361
tel ;: 40 Fed. Reg. 1512;, sec Staff Report 346
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that in such circumstances 11 written submissions are ar
wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision." 397 U. S., atr
269.
By contrast, the decision whether to discontinue disability benefits will turn, in most cases, upon 11routine,
standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician
specialists," Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S., at 404,
concerning a subject whom they have p€rsonally examined.28 In Richardson the Court recognized the
11
reliability and probative worth of written medical reports," emphasizing that while there may be "professional disagreement with the medical conclusions" the
Nspecter of questionable credibility and veracity is not
present." I d., at 405, 407. To be sure, credibility and
veracity may be a factor in the ultimate disability assessment in some cases. But procedural due process rules
are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process as applied to the generality of cases, not
the rare exceptions. The potential value of an evidentiary hearing, or even oral presentation to the decision28 Tl1e decisiOn is not purely a question of the accuracy of a medi..
cal diagnosis since the ultimate issue which the state agency must
resolve is whether in light of the particular worker's "age, education,
and work experience" he cannot "engage in any . . . substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy ... ." 42 U.S. C.
§ 423 (d) (2) (A) . Yet information concerning each of these worker
characteristics is amenable to effective written presentation. The
value of an evidentiary hearmg, or even a limited oral presentation,
to an accurate presentat10n of those factors to the decisionmaker does
not appear substantial. Similarly, resolution of the inquiry as to
the types of employment opportumties that exist in the national
economy for a physiCally impaired worker with a particular set of
skills would not neccssanly be advanced by an evidentiary hearing. Cf. K. Davis, Admmistrative Law Treatise § 7.06, at 429
(1958) . The statistiCal mformation relevant to this judgment ia
inore amenable to wntten than to oral presentation.
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maker, is substantially less in this context than in
Goldberg.

The decision in Goldberg also was based on the Court's
conclusion that written submissions were an inadequate
substitute for oral presentation because they did not
provide an effective means for the recipient to communicate his case to the decisionmaker. Written submissions
were viewed as an unrealistic option, for most recipient&
lacked the "educational attainment necessary to write
effectively" and could not afford professional assistance ..
In addition, such submissions would not provide the
"flexibility of oral presentations" or "permit the recipient.
to mold his argument to the issues the decision maker
appears to regard as important." 397 U. S., at 269.. In
the context of the disability-benefits-entitlement asses-.
ment the administrative procedures under review here
fully answer these objections.
The detailed .questionnaire which the state agency
periodically sends the recipient identifies with particularity the information relevant to the entitlement deci-,
sion, and the recipient is invited to obtain assistance
from the local SSA office in completing the questionnaire. ·
More important, the information critical to the entitlement decision usually is derived from medical sources,
such as the treating physician. Such sources are likely
to be able to communicate more effectively through written documents than are welfare recipients or the lay witnesses supporting their cause. The conclusions of physicians often are supported by X-rays and the results of
clinical or laboratory tests, information typically more
amenable to written than to oral presentation. Cf.
W. Gellhorn & C. Byse, Administrative Law-Cases and
Comments 860-863 (6th ed. 1974) .
. A further safeguard against mistake is the policy ofi
allowing the disability recipient or his representative full
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access to all information relied upon by the state agency~
In addition, prior to the cut-off of benefits the agency
informs the recipient of its tentative assessment, the
reasons therefor, and provides a summary of the evidence that it considers most relevant. Opportunity is
then afforded the recipient to submit additional evidence or arguments, enabling him to challenge directly'
the accuracy of information in his file as well as the
correctness of the agency's tentative conclusions. These
procedures, again as contrasted with those before the
Court in Goldberg, enable the recipient to "mold" his
argument to respond to the precise issues which the
decisionmaker regards as crucial.
Despite these carefully structured procedures, amici
point to the significant reversal rate for appealed cases
as clear evidence that the current process is inadequate.
Depending upon the base selected and the line of analysis followed, the relevant reversal rates urged by the
contending parties vary from a high of 58.6% for appealed reconsideration decisions to an overall reversal
rate of only 3.3%.w Bare statistics rarely provide a
satisfactory measure of the fairness of a decisionmaking
process. Their adequacy is especially suspect here since
29 By focusing solely on the reversal rate for appealed reconsideration determinations amici overstate the relevant reversal rate.
As we indicated last Term in Fusan v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 38~
n. 6 ( 1975), in order fuly to assess the reliability and fairness of a
system of procedure, one must also consider the overall rate of error
for all denials of benefits. Here that overall rate is 12.2%. Moreover, about 75% of these reversals occur at the reconsideration stage
of the administrative process. Since the median period between It
request for reconsideration review and decision is only two months,
Brief for Amici AFL-CIO / Green, App. 4a, the deprivation is
significantly less than that concomitant m the lengthier delay
before an evidentiary ht>armg. Netting out theRe reconsideration
reversals, the overall reversal rate falls to 3.3%. Sec Supplemental
and·Rel)ly Brief for the Pcti!Ionrr 14,
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the administrative review system is operated on an openfile basis. A recipient may always submit new evidence,
and such submissions may result in additional medical
examinations. Such fresh examinations are held in approximately 30% to 40 % of the appealed cases, either at
the reconsideration or evidentiary hearing stage of the
administrative process. Staff Report 238. In this context, the value of reversal rate statistics as one means of
evaluating the adequacy of the pretermination process is
diminished. Thus, although we view such information
as relevant, it is certainly not controlling in this case.

E
In striking the appropriate due process balance the
final factor to be assessed is the public interest. This
includes the administrative burden and other societal
costs that would be associated with requiring, as a matter
of constitutional.,right, an evidentiary hearing upon demand in all cases prior to the termination of disability
benefits. The most visible burden would be the incremental cost resulting from the increased number of hear..
ings and the expense of providing benefits to ineligible
recipients pending decision. No one can predict the
extent of the increase, but the fact that full benefits
would continue until after such hearings would assure
the exhaustion in most cases of this attractive option.
Nor would the theoretical right of the Secretary to re·Cover undeserved benefits result, as a practical matter,
in any substantial offset to the added outlay of public
funds. The parties submit widely varying estimates of
the probable additional financial cost. We only need say
that experience with the constitutionalizing of government procedures suggests that the ultimate additional
cost in terms of money and administrative burden would
not be insubstantial.
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Financial cost alone is not a controlling weight in de~
termining whether due process requires a particular pro
cedural safeguard prior to some administrative decision.
But the Government's interest, and hence that of the
public, in conserving scarce fiscal and administrative resources, is a factor that must be weighed. At some point
the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual
affected by the administrative action and to society in
terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may
be outweighed by the cost. Significantly, the cost of
protecting those whom the preliminary administrative
process has identified as likely to be found undeserving
may in the end come out of the pockets of the deserving
since resources available for any particular program of
social welfare are not unlimited. See Friendly, supra, at
1276, 1303.
But more is implicated in cases of this type than ad hoc
weighing of fiscal and administrative burdens against the
interests of a particular category of claimants. The ultimate balance involves a determination as to when, under
our constitutional system. judicial-type procedures must
be imposed upon administrative action to assure fairness.
We reiterate the wise admonishment of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter that differences in the origin and function of
administrative agencies "preclude wholesale transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial, and review which
have evolved from the history and experience of the
courts." FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S.
134, 143 (1940). The judicial model of an evidentiary
hearing is neither a required, nor even the most effective,
method of decisionmaking in all circumstances. The essence of due process is the requirement that "a person in
jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case
against him and opportunity to meet it." Joint Anti-FatCist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S., at 1714
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172. (Frankfurter, J., concurring.) All that is necessary
is that the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision
to be made, to "the capacities and circumstances of those
who are to be heard," Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 268269 (footnote omitted), to insure that they are given a
meaningful opportunity to present their case. In assessing what process is due in this case, substantial weight
must be given to the good-faith judgments of the individuals charged by Congress with the administration of
the social welfare system that the procedures they have
provided assure fair consideration of the entitlement
claims of individuals. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S.,
at 202 (WHITE, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
This is especially so where, as here, the prescribed procedures not only provide the claimant with an effective
process for asserting his claim prior to any administrative
action, but also assure a right to an evidentiary hearing,
as well as to subsequent judicial review, before the denial
of his claim becomes final. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 u.s. 371, 378 (1971) .
We conclude that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of disability benefits and
that the present administrative procedures fully comport
with due process.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
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